Russia’s war in Ukraine has undoubtedly been game-changing for Europe’s security, challenging the long-held beliefs and assumptions of many Western nations and prompting dramatic shifts in policy, for example, in Germany, Finland, and Sweden. The war’s conduct has also produced significant surprises, not least the unexpectedly poor performance of Russia’s supposedly reformed military.
Our series of Briefs, “Russia’s War in Ukraine”, deals with some of the most relevant aspects of the war, mostly at the operational level. Research Fellows of the ICDS and external contributors analyse the Kremlin’s likely aims and assumptions before the 24th of February 2022, early indicators of Moscow’s readiness to wage a large-scale war, Russia’s conduct of war in the cyberspace, in the air, at sea and in the information space, as well as factors related to weapons of mass destruction, Western military assistance to Ukraine, Russia’s military logistics and the performance of Russia’s armed forces in Ukraine compared to NATO’s existing forces and capabilities.
These are early interpretations. Defence officials and analysts will continue to study the war and try to identify its lessons as more information becomes available. Look out for ICDS’s future contributions.
Download and read (PDF):
- Brief No.10. Western Military Assistance, Tony Lawrence
- Brief No.9. Russia’s Propaganda War, Igor Gretskiy
- Brief No.8. WMD Issues, Richard Weitz
- Brief No.7. When Russia Went to War, Konrad Muzyka
- Brief No.6. The War at Sea, Bill Combes
- Brief No.5. The Early Air War, Tony Lawrence
- Brief No.4. Large-Scale War and NATO, Martin Hurt
- Brief No.3. Russian Military Logistics, Ronald Ti
- Brief No.2. The War in Cyberspace, Dmytro Dubov
- Brief No.1. The Kremlin’s Aims and Assumptions, Kalev Stoicescu