While Baltic security thinking has long been dominated by assessments of the risk of Russian military aggression in Europe, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was still a shock in its brutality and scale. It has led the three Baltic states to further increase defence spending and to accelerate the building of national defence capabilities.
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A common Western policy on Russia requires a herculean effort. Yet European unity will be short-lived unless—once the war ends—Ukraine receives the only security guarantee that has proven effective—that is, membership in NATO.
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French president Emmanuel Macron caused quite a stir with his recent statement¹ that France would not retaliate with nuclear weapons against Russia if the Kremlin launched a nuclear strike on Ukraine. A follow-on tweet² from his official Twitter account saying “we do not want a world war” only added to the backlash on social media. While this messaging was in line with that from other allies—and did not express any intention to abandon Ukraine for the sake of avoiding a nuclear war—it was widely interpreted as, at the very least, undermining deterrence³. Although some of the harsher reactions are quite misguided, the episode raises a legitimate question about whether the French nuclear deterrent carries much weight in protecting Europe as a whole from rogue nuclear regimes.
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Russia’s war in Ukraine has undoubtedly been game-changing for Europe’s security, challenging the long-held beliefs and assumptions of many Western nations and prompting dramatic shifts in policy, for example, in Germany, Finland, and Sweden. The war’s conduct has also produced significant surprises, not least the unexpectedly poor performance of Russia’s supposedly reformed military.
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The sixth brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war at sea.
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As a new government takes power under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, it is opportune to ask what the Baltic states want from Germany in terms of their security, and what might they realistically expect?
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President of France, Emmanuel Macron, whose country is currently holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union, does not want the EU to be relegated to the background behind NATO and the US. He wishes to demonstrate his ability to oppose Russia while also maintaining dialogue with Moscow.
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Learning from Russian incursions, and its assertive foreign policy that has seen limited resistance, might encourage China to achieve national rejuvenation before the 2049 deadline by giving up the idea of peaceful unification of Taiwan with China.
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Promotion of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific will serve to connect Europe and Asia. ‘Sincere powers’ should proactively interact with each other and seek to convince the major powers such as China to restrain their behaviour and adhere to the international norms and rules.
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This analysis examines aspects of the Russian-Chinese defence relationship: its political motivations, trade between the two counties, collaboration in research and procurement, and military-military cooperation including exercises.
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