Deterrence is once more at the centre of discussions on national security. Faced with larger revisionist neighbours driven by aggressive foreign policies, Taiwan and states in the Nordic-Baltic region are drawing lessons from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine to understand how to enhance deterrence in their respective theatres.
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Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) spent much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region?
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Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states.
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For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states.
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The Kremlin has made no secret of the importance it attaches to military power as an instrument of foreign policy, most obviously in Georgia from 2008, in Ukraine from 2014, and in Syria from 2015. Below the threshold of war, Russia has frequently used military instruments to harass other states, including in the Baltic region.
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When the Swedish government under Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson submitted the Swedish application for NATO membership to NATO HQ in Brussels on May 18th, 2022, it was widely and correctly considered a historic event. But why did it happen? And why did it happen so seemingly fast? To understand this, both the peculiar history of Swedish security policy—or the “grand strategy”—and the recent developments must be taken into account.
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When Russia launched its open and brutal attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Finland immediately realized that the security environment had fundamentally changed overnight.
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Discussions about hydrogen’s role in the transition to carbon-neutral economies and the EU’s Green Deal seldom include consideration of geopolitical aspects and/or national security imperatives. However, given the importance of energy as a factor in global and regional geopolitical trends and national security, hydrogen development will reshape not only energy relations between countries but will also alter the broader geopolitical picture.
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President of France, Emmanuel Macron, whose country is currently holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union, does not want the EU to be relegated to the background behind NATO and the US. He wishes to demonstrate his ability to oppose Russia while also maintaining dialogue with Moscow.
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Finland and Sweden do not have a fast track to join NATO. If they apply for membership, they must be able to show they can meet NATO’s political, military, legal, resource and security preconditions, or at least have a plan to address any obvious shortfalls.
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