When Old Certainties No Longer Hold: Nordic-Baltic Foreign Policy Adaptation 

The security of the Nordic and Baltic countries rests heavily on the transatlantic alliance and the rules-based international order. In recent years, however, these two pillars of foreign policy have weakened and become harder to reconcile, forcing the small states in the region into an uncomfortable, at times almost impossible, balancing act.

ICDS asked leading experts from the Nordics and the Baltics how the region’s states have adapted to the erosion of the rules-based international order and what changes this has prompted in their foreign policies. We are publishing their responses as a series of Briefs. By way of introduction, I will highlight some common dilemmas, as well as differences between the countries.

Both Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine and United States foreign policy during Donald Trump’s second term have dealt unprecedented, if not devastating, blows to the international order established after the Second World War. The United States, which for decades led the rules-based international order, has retreated from that role. Great powers have violated international law before, but we have now reached a point where both Russia and the United States can be regarded as revisionist powers. According to Harvard professor Kathryn Sikkink, the United States no longer even pretends to want to preserve the rules-based international order. Like Russia, it has begun actively dismantling it, without offering a credible new vision in its place. 

For Estonia and its close neighbours, this situation raises the question of whether and how our countries need to adjust their foreign and security policies in order to survive in this new world. Russia remains an existential threat to us, while the United States remains our strongest ally. Yet repeating old certainties and urging people not to get worked up over every statement by Trump cannot be a sustainable strategy when the world around us is undergoing profound change. 

Faced with a Choices Between Values 

The Nordic and Baltic countries have generally taken a pragmatic and conservative stance towards the ongoing changes, seeking to preserve the old order as far as possible while updating their foreign policy priorities. They continue to attach importance both to the alliance with the United States and to international law, which means that they face the same dilemmas.  

Anders Wivel frames the main dilemma as a choice between dependence and abandonment. Denmark’s security is deeply dependent on the United States, but the US security guarantee can no longer be taken for granted. Moreover, Denmark’s most important ally has become a threat to its territorial integrity, while efforts to reduce this dependence could weaken the US security guarantee even further. Matti Pesu asks what stance Finland and other strategically vulnerable countries should take towards the United States, which is both an indispensable ally and a driver of the erosion of the international order on which our security and prosperity have relied for decades. 

More specifically, these dilemmas arise in situations where small states are forced to choose between supporting international law and supporting US policy. As a rule, they try to avoid making such choices, preferring either to remain silent or to hide behind vague statements. Estonia, for example, has expressed its readiness to support the United States in securing the Strait of Hormuz but has avoided taking a position on the legality of US military action. When tensions around Greenland were most acute, Estonia publicly affirmed that Greenland belongs to Denmark and expressed its willingness to take part in a Danish-led military exercise, but stopped short of directly criticising the United States. In the Nordic countries, there has been concern that if US pressure over Greenland were to increase again, it could begin to undermine Nordic unity. 

The war in Ukraine has made both the importance and the limitations of international law especially clear. Norms agreed within the UN framework—including the prohibition on the use of military force and respect for state borders—provide an international legal basis for supporting Ukraine and putting pressure on Russia. Unfortunately, these norms have failed to protect Ukraine against Russian military aggression, nor would they protect Russia’s other neighbours. Their practical weight depends on whether enforcing the rules matters to the great powers. For the United States, this is no longer the case; Russia, for its part, has only ever respected them selectively. 

The war in Ukraine has made both the importance and the limitations of international law especially clear.

Strengthening European and Regional Defence 

The new priorities in the foreign policies of the Nordic and Baltic countries, which seek to mitigate the dilemmas described above, are partly shared and partly distinct.  

First, all countries in the Baltic Sea region are taking seriously the need to strengthen both national and European defence capabilities, which in turn reinforces NATO. In Denmark’s case, the greatest change has been its new engagement in EU defence cooperation—not as a substitute for NATO but as a complementary means of strengthening European deterrence. At the same time, it should be noted that in Finnish security policy, which previously emphasised the EU’s defence dimension, the EU has become less important since Finland joined NATO. There is broad agreement that Europe must assume greater responsibility within NATO, but our region’s more concrete vision of the Europeanisation of the Alliance remains vague. Related questions, including the expected reduction of US presence and the development of Europe’s defence industry, touch directly on the dilemmas of transatlantic relations on which countries in our region have tended to avoid taking a clear position. 

Second, all countries in the Nordic-Baltic region attach importance to strengthening regional security cooperation, but here too concrete substance is lacking. Cooperation among the Nordic countries is, and will remain, a category of its own, with the integration of defence capabilities as a new and important dimension. The NB8 remains secondary. A major open question is how to involve the larger Northern European countries—the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland—more closely in regional defence cooperation. 

Third, the issue of reforming the rules-based international order has remained somewhat in the background, as it does not help to address the Nordic-Baltic region’s immediate security concerns. Small states must always carefully consider where to direct their limited resources. Within the region, Finland has recently been the most active on UN reform and on developing relations with the countries of the so-called Global South, particularly in the person of President Alexander Stubb. It is too early to assess whether this activity will produce concrete results. 

Amid the upheaval in world politics, small states need to ask which changes they can shape and which they must adapt to and accept. Idealism and realism are colliding and searching for a new balance. In his recent book on Zbigniew Brzezinski, Edward Luce describes how, even in the early years of the Cold War, Brzezinski was convinced that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, by holding on to their national identity and desire for freedom, would sooner or later bring down the Soviet empire. His strategic vision stood in contrast to the great-power-centred realism embodied, among others, by Henry Kissinger. Realism helped Finland preserve its independence during the Cold War; idealism made the restoration of the Baltic states’ independence possible. 

Today, the Nordic and Baltic countries depend on the United States, but they have little influence over the course taken by their most important ally. We must prepare for the possible scenario of the continued weakening of US global influence and a decline in its willingness and ability to defend Europe. What Estonian foreign policy can influence is the future of NATO and the EU, Ukraine’s integration to Europe and deepening cooperation of the countries in our region. Being active on these issues can help us survive next to Russia. 

Small States Brief Series

• Introduction: When Old Certainties No Longer Hold: Nordic-Baltic Foreign Policy Adaptation by Kristi Raik
• Brief I: Small States Series. Reforming to Preserve: Finland and the Rules-Based International Order by Matti Pesu
• Brief II: Small States Series. Denmark: From Super-Atlanticist to European Hawk by Anders Wivel
• Brief III: Small States Series. Estonia’s Balancing Act: Hard Security and High Principles by Merili Arjakas and Helena Eglit
• Brief IV: Small States Series. Reorganising Dependence: Lithuania’s Response to the Erosion of the Rules-Based International Order by Margarita Šešelgytė

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).