Small States Series. Estonia’s Balancing Act: Hard Security and High Principles

Estonia’s foreign policy has been shaped by its geopolitical vulnerability as a small state bordering its former 'imperial master' with revisionist ambitions. Informed by its own experience of occupation, Estonia values international law, particularly the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, it recognises that international law alone cannot guarantee security. Transatlantic cooperation and European integration have therefore been key pillars of Estonia’s foreign policy since the 1990s.

Russian threat has remained a central factor shaping Estonia’s foreign policy. Estonia considers that even a partial Russian victory in Ukraine would further deteriorate the European security environment. Tallinn consistently condemns Russia’s violations of international law and urges the EU to maintain sanctions and international isolation even after a potential ceasefire to prevent Russia from rebuilding the economic and military capabilities required for future aggression.

Its position towards the United States is less straightforward today. Trump’s second administration has ushered in a new era in the transatlantic relationship, characterised by greater transactionalism and a nakedly power-based approach. Estonia supports some US policies, such as calls for European NATO members to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP, but Washington’s voting in alignment with Russia and Belarus at the UN and its open questioning of the Alliance’s value have placed Tallinn in a difficult position.

Estonia is not abandoning the transatlantic cooperation but seeks to reinforce its shelter-seeking strategy. Preserving NATO’s credibility remains among Estonia’s highest priorities. At the same time, Estonia has focused on what it and its European Allies can do: invest in national defence and deepen ties with like-minded partners to reinforce European deterrence.

A Realist Approach Towards Washington

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US shifted its geopolitical focus away from Europe—first towards the War on Terror and the Middle East, and later towards China and the Indo-Pacific. Under these circumstances, the US was expected to transfer greater responsibility for European security to Europeans, even as Russia’s war against Ukraine drew the US back to the continent through an unprecedented degree of intelligence-sharing in 2021, followed by weapons deliveries to Ukraine in 2022–23.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between a gradual recalibration of US engagement and the seismic rupture that the international community faces today. Publicly addressing this disruption has been challenging for Estonian policymakers, as Estonia has regarded the US as its principal ally since the 1990s, with security at the core of that partnership. Tallinn has sought to manage the relationship by taking ad hoc and sometimes contradictory positions on various controversial US policies, balancing between staying silent, emphasising its principled stance (e.g., on territorial integrity) while refraining from direct criticism, and fully supporting the US when it serves Estonia’s broader interests. For instance, while several western Allies were quick to rule out sending naval assets to secure the Strait of Hormuz, Estonia stressed that it remained open to discussions with the administration. While doing so, Estonia highlighted the importance of global supply chains rather than signalling political support for the US military action against Iran.

Since the early 2000s, Estonia has aspired to be not only a security consumer but also its provider, contributing over 1 300 troops to over a dozen international peacekeeping and crisis-management operations, including US-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, Trump’s efforts to acquire Greenland served as a sobering reminder that the current US administration may neither value nor remember the support it received from Allies. Nevertheless, Estonia continues to highlight its contributions to demonstrate its reliability as a partner and to honour Estonian soldiers.

For Tallinn, a sustained US military presence in Estonia or, failing that, as close to its borders as possible is fundamental. While the future presence of US troops in the region remains uncertain and the Trump administration is limiting foreign assistance programmes, Baltic advocacy in Congress has successfully secured statutory protection through the Baltic Security Initiative (BSI).[1] The government has also sought new ways to demonstrate its value to Washington by investing in capabilities and expertise that serve long-term US interests, as exemplified by the opening of Europe’s largest rare-earth magnet factory in Narva in 2025.

Putting Eggs in Different Baskets

Concerns over US conduct have made strengthening Europe particularly important for Estonia. While consistently stressing that NATO remains the framework for European defence, Tallinn has moved from its earlier scepticism of EU defence cooperation towards a more positive view, including support for joint procurement and a willingness to back common borrowing to finance European defence initiatives. Yet Estonia, like other countries on NATO’s eastern flank, faces a dilemma. While greater investment in Europe’s defence industry would strengthen European capabilities in the long term, the urgency created by Russia’s aggression and the desire to maintain US engagement has led Estonia and its eastern partners to place considerable emphasis on procuring weapons from the US. This dependence can itself create vulnerabilities, as illustrated when deliveries of HIMARS rockets and Javelin missiles from the US were paused amid ammunition shortages linked to the war with Iran.[2]

Tallinn has traditionally been wary of a multi-speed Europe, fearing that its geographical peripherality and small economy could leave it in a second tier of member states. However, as cooperation increasingly shifts to smaller coalitions because of veto constraints and diverging national priorities, Estonia has placed greater emphasis on working with like-minded partners, especially around the Baltic Sea. The clearest example is the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8), but Estonia also values cooperation with the UK, particularly through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), as well as Germany and Poland.

While keen on regional cooperation, Estonia’s broader objective is to make the EU more capable and competitive. This requires reforms in European competitiveness, particularly in AI, defence, and the automotive industry. Estonia should consequently continue to support the reform agenda outlined by Mario Draghi, who warned in September 2024 that the EU risked “slow agony” without radical change. With only around 30% of his recommendations having been implemented, staying on the current trajectory is insufficient.[3]

The EU’s internal reform is intertwined with EU enlargement that Estonia has consistently supported, particularly for Ukraine and Moldova. It seeks to advance Ukraine’s economic and defence integration with European countries—even before formal accession—by promoting Ukraine’s participation in EU programmes and deepening cooperation with its defence industry.

The UN Does Not Send Troops, America Might

Since 2022, Estonia has advocated various legal mechanisms to hold Russia’s leadership accountable for its aggression. At the UN, it has called for forming a special tribunal, and in February 2026, the Estonian Parliament became the first legislative body to approve the Council of Europe agreement establishing a management committee for the tribunal. The Parliament has also been at the forefront of approving other legal measures, having recognised Russia’s war crimes as acts of genocide in 2022 and supporting the use of frozen Russian assets to compensate for war-related damages in 2024. This does not reflect a naïve belief that legal mechanisms alone can constrain the actions of Russia’s armed forces, but rather the government’s commitment to using available legal tools to condemn aggression, pursue justice, and uphold international law.

Estonia has also used legal and diplomatic instruments to defend its security interests. In September 2025, it called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to highlight Russia’s 12-minute violation of Estonian airspace. Reportedly, Estonia’s decision to escalate the incident through diplomatic channels, together with the establishment of NATO’s Eastern Sentry operation, has helped prevent similar brazen airspace incursions.[4] In addition, when Estonia and several of its neighbours bordering Russia withdrew from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty in 2025, they showed that legal instruments can also be amended to respond to a deteriorating security environment.

At the same time, Estonia recognises that international law must be complemented by other pillars of strength. These include Estonia’s own investments in defence capabilities, as well as pragmatic relations with Allies and the continued presence of Allied forces in the region. This creates a dilemma when an Ally’s actions—such as threatening the annexation of Greenland, removing a head of government through a military raid, or launching a war on questionable grounds—conflict with the value Estonia attributes to international norms.

Thus far, Estonia has sought to manage this predicament by choosing its battles. In the case of Greenland, Tallinn signalled its criticism between the lines. Estonia was the only Baltic state to publicly affirm that Greenland is an integral part of the Kingdom of Denmark and to declare its willingness to participate in a potential Danish-led military exercise. By contrast, in response to US actions against Russia’s partners, such as in Venezuela or Iran, Estonia has openly expressed support and readiness to assist, both to maintain alignment with Washington and to endorse actions expected to weaken Moscow’s partners.

As Estonia continues this balancing act, its foreign policymakers and politicians should avoid wishful thinking and critically assess the country’s bilateral relationship with Washington and the credibility of American security guarantees. So far, the prevailing response has been to focus on what Europeans themselves can do, including accelerating defence procurement and closing capability gaps in areas where Europe remains dependent on the US. The ‘what if the US were no longer involved?’ debate is gradually emerging in discussions of regional military cooperation, capability development, and setting up a more Europeanised NATO. However, a more candid debate is needed if Estonia is to communicate its positions and dilemmas honestly to its own population and European partners. These considerations point to several concrete steps:

• Estonia should continue engaging with the US, while addressing emerging issues—particularly choices related to international law—on a case-by-case basis.
• To reinforce Europe’s defence capabilities, Estonia should consider subsidising its defence industry, following the example of other European countries, such as Germany and Poland.
• Internationally, Estonia should seek to strengthen the security dimension of NB8, which to date has primarily served as a platform for political consultation.
• Even though being a strong supporter of EU enlargement, Estonia has been relatively invisible in broader European discourse over enlargement and the internal EU reforms that may accompany it—as a constructive voice, Tallinn should play a more active role in shaping these debates.

[1] Henry-Laur Allik, “Big F*cking Deal”: How the U.S. Congress Secured Defense Aid for the Baltic States,” The Baltic Sentinel, 27 February 2026.

[2] Mirjam Koch, “Estonian experts: US arms halt forces turn to other manufacturers,” ERR, 21 April 2026.

[3] Institut Montaigne, Implementing the Draghi Report: The Moment of Truth (Institut Montaigne, June 2026).

[4] Epp Ehand, “Estonia’s spy chief: Russia not planning to attack a Baltic country at this time,” ERR, 29 December 2025. 

Small States Brief Series:

Introduction: When Old Certainties No Longer Hold: Nordic-Baltic Foreign Policy Adaptation by Kristi Raik

Brief I: Small States Series. Reforming to Preserve: Finland and the Rules-Based International Order by Matti Pesu

Brief II: Small States Series. Denmark: From Super-Atlanticist to European Hawk by Anders Wivel

Brief III: Small States Series. Estonia’s Balancing Act: Hard Security and High Principles by Merili Arjakas and Helena Eglit

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).