Small States Series. Reforming to Preserve: Finland and the Rules-Based International Order 

Like other small western democracies, Finland has benefited immensely from the rules-based international order established after World War II: both the universal framework that revolved around the United Nations system securing sovereign equality, non-aggression, and territorial integrity, and the ‘thicker’ US-led liberal order with its institutions built on principles of open trade, international criminal accountability, human rights, and alliance solidarity.

Finland’s integration into the institutional edifice of the liberal order was a decades-long process, culminating in NATO membership in 2023. There is considerable irony in the fact that the external challenge to the order—Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—prompted Finland to cling even more tightly to a status quo that is now eroding from within. As the US has joined the ranks of revisionist powers ranged against the order it created, a rift has opened in the ‘global west’ that has traditionally underpinned the liberal system.

Helsinki, like other strategically exposed US allies, thus faces a dilemma: how to deal with an actor that is simultaneously an indispensable ally and a driver of the order’s erosion. Should allies tread carefully—sticking to established ways of doing things to protect immediate security interests, and refraining from calling out US revisionism—even though the order under threat is precisely what supplies the rules and predictability on which their prosperity depends? Or should they push back and hedge, at the risk of alienating the very patron on which their security still rests?

This brief explores how Finland is managing that dilemma. It argues that, with respect to the rules-based order, Finland is a reformist defender of the existing order. It wants to maintain and even broaden its relationship with the US, but it also advocates initiatives designed to bolster the liberal order’s wider global legitimacy and to strengthen ownership of the system among its greatest beneficiaries in the global west. It also seeks to reinforce the fabric of the order by deepening cooperation with like-minded powers that share a similar vision of the order and of the threats it faces. These efforts, not exclusively related to the ongoing systemic turbulence, unfold at three interconnected levels: the global, the regional (the Euro-Atlantic space), and the subregional (northern Europe).

The Global Level: Widening the Order’s Legitimacy

In his public remarks, President Alexander Stubb has emphatically underscored the global south’s vital role in defining the trajectory of ongoing systemic change. In his view, the global west—now divided—can no longer sustain the order on its own in the face of pressure from China, Russia, and other powers of the global east. To endure, it needs the global south on board, which in turn requires reforming that system so it better reflects these states’ rising weight and affords them genuine ownership. Rather than preaching, the west should lead by example and adopt values-based realism—Stubb’s brainchild, which calls for upholding universal values while accepting the world’s diversity of cultures and histories, and which is now codified in Finland’s official foreign policy approach.[1]

This attitude notwithstanding, Finland has not produced a comprehensive blueprint for reforming global governance structures. Faithful to the idea of value-based realism, the reforms it has proposed mainly concern strengthening the universal framework rather than forcefully promoting liberal values. Its central demand has been the UN Security Council reform. President Stubb has repeatedly called for enlarging the Council’s permanent membership (two new seats each for Asia and Africa, one for Latin America), abolishing the veto, and suspending the voting rights of any member that violates the UN Charter.[2] The official state position is more guarded: endorsing the enlargement of the body and a stronger General Assembly while cautioning that expansion “should not expand the right to veto.”[3]

The Regional Level: Adjusting Euro-Atlantic Cooperation

At the regional level, in the Euro-Atlantic space, Finland’s reformist efforts are more tangible than its global advocacy. It seeks to thicken the region’s European and inter-allied cooperative fabric without decoupling Europe from Washington. Three processes stand out.

First, Finland supports a more European NATO and the build-up of the US-proposed NATO 3.0, which, according to Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen, suits Finland’s defence thinking.[4] The government’s updated foreign policy report of April 2026 calls for a coordinated process, stating that “European states will be taking a stronger role in the conventional defence of the continent” and that “Finland is actively building a more European NATO and is contributing to the strength of NATO’s deterrence and defence.”[5] However, how Finland conceives of the contours of a more European NATO, and its own role within it, remains unclear.

Second, Finland is intensifying and consolidating cooperation with middle powers, especially Germany, France, the UK, Canada, and also Poland, all of which are named in the Government’s recent white paper.[6] Helsinki is seeking to buttress these relationships with a range of agreements. It already has a strategic partnership with the UK, concluded in 2024, and with a recent memorandum of understanding on maritime industry and the Arctic, Canada is becoming a close ally and partner for Finland.[7] Agreements with Germany and France are reportedly in preparation.[8] President Stubb, in particular, has promoted cooperation between like-minded middle powers—strongly advocated by leaders such as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, but criticised by the US.[9]

Thirdly, and interestingly, the EU’s traditionally strong role in Finnish security thinking has been in relative decline. That said, in recent years one of Finland’s key efforts at the EU level—drawing on its own national model—has been to strengthen the Union and its agency by promoting comprehensive security. This effort centres on three strategies: the Commission’s White Paper for European Defence, the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, and the European Internal Security Strategy, all building on the report on strengthening the EU’s civil and military preparedness by former President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö.[10] Finnish fingerprints are particularly evident on the Preparedness Union Strategy.

The Subregional Level: Concentric Circles in Northern Europe

At the subregional level, in Finland’s most immediate operating environment, its efforts revolve around three concentric circles: the Nordic countries, the Nordic-Baltic group, and wider northern Europe. From Helsinki’s vantage point, these are its most like-minded partners in defending the existing order from external and internal threats. That said, Finland’s subregional gaze is not fixed exclusively on northern Europe. Helsinki has also deepened cooperation with the so-called eastern-flank states within the EU and with the more NATO-focused Bucharest Nine—which it reportedly considers joining.[11]

The very hard core, and the innermost subregional circle, is defined by multi-domain, pervasive but increasingly hard-security-driven Nordic cooperation. The Nordic countries are building a ‘deterrence cluster’—a group of multinational alliance members engaged in deeper cooperation—aimed at deterring Russia in northern Europe while also exerting influence within NATO. The ambition is to develop a seamless Nordic capacity for military operations and, more broadly, to make the region the most integrated defence space in Europe.[12] Beyond defence, the Nordic countries are Finland’s go-to partners for foreign-policy coordination—for example, the joint Finnish–Norwegian efforts to engage US President Donald Trump. ^[13]

Paradoxically, at a time when the Nordic countries are more united than at any point in their history, the greatest danger to their cohesion now comes from within the NATO Alliance. Until recently, Nordic cooperation, and military collaboration in particular, was seen as highly complementary to the link with the US. Constant US threats to take over Greenland, however, risk pitting Nordic cooperation against the indispensable tie with Washington—a nightmare scenario being a forced choice between the Nordic Allies and the US.

The middle circle is Nordic-Baltic cooperation, which has intensified significantly with Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO accessions but which, particularly in military matters, does not reach the depth of the Nordic level.[14] The Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) engages in frequent policy dialogue and coordination at both the working and political levels, producing coordinated stances in multilateral settings such as NATO, the UN, and the EU.[15] President Stubb has called the Nordic-Baltic countries Finland’s “closest family of nations.”[16]

The outermost circle is wider northern Europe, where cooperation takes place through several formats, including the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the Council of the Baltic Sea States, and the Northern Group. In recent years, the region’s states have converged significantly on issues such as support for Ukraine, Ukraine’s integration into European security structures, and the threat posed by Russia. JEF, with its annual summits, joint operations, and exercises, has become the most visible regional format addressing security threats in the Baltic Sea region and the European Arctic. It does not, however, include Germany or Poland. Experts have argued that consolidating subregional cooperation in northern Europe requires bringing the two in—either by admitting them to JEF or by reinvigorating the Northern Group, which encompasses all the key subregional powers: the NB8, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK.[17]

Not Giving Up

Finland has not given up on the rules-based order—neither on its universal framework nor on the thicker liberal order. As the Government’s 2026 foreign policy report puts it, “the rules-based system in itself is not deemed void even if some states violate their obligations.”[18] Nor has it given up on the US, with which it still engages actively. Rather, Finland is a reformist defender of the existing order, seeking to enhance its global legitimacy, to strengthen the ownership felt by its principal beneficiaries, and to reinforce the fabric and resilience of the order by deepening cooperation with like-minded powers. These efforts unfold at the global level and, in particular, at the regional and subregional levels. Several recommendations follow from this analysis.

First, a small country such as Finland should focus its primary efforts on the regional and subregional levels. This is not to say that global efforts are unimportant, but devoting too much attention to cajoling the Global South risks diverting bandwidth from more pressing issues.

Second, Finland—and other European Allies—should move quickly to articulate a vision of a Europeanised NATO to match American initiatives on NATO 3.0. The risk is that the Alliance drifts in a suboptimal direction if the process is not guided by a blueprint that every Ally shares.

Third, subregional cooperation in northern Europe should be consolidated. This requires political leadership and the involvement of all the key powers. The paradox of cooperation among like-minded countries is that contentious issues absorb the attention that unproblematic ones also require—even the areas of easy agreement need sustained high-level commitment.

[1] Alexander Stubb, “The West’s Last Chance: How to Build a New Global Order Before It’s Too Late,” Foreign Affairs, 2 December 2025. See: Finnish Government, Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, Publications of the Finnish Government 2024:22 (Finnish Government, 20 June 2024).

[2] Alexander Stubb, “Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Alexander Stubb at the General Debate of the 80th Session of the UN General Assembly,” Office of the President of the Republic of Finland, 24 September 2025; Stubb, “The West’s Last Chance.”

[3] Finnish Government, Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, 50.

[4] Aliisa Uusitalo, “Häkkänen: USA:n esittämä Nato 3.0 sopii Suomen ajatteluun puolustuksesta [‘Häkkänen: the NATO 3.0 proposed by the US fits Finland’s thinking on defence’],” STT, 18 June 2026.

[5] Finnish Government, Government Report on Changes in the Foreign and Security Policy Environment, Publications of the Finnish Government 2026:27 (Finnish Government, 16 April 2026), 13.

[6] Finnish Government, Government Report on Changes in the Foreign and Security Policy Environment, 14.

[7] Government of the United Kingdom and Government of the Republic of Finland, “Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Finland,” Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 20 May 2024; Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, “Finland and Canada to Deepen Their Cooperation in Arctic Maritime Industry and Technology,” Finnish Government, 15 April 2026.

[8] Erkka Mikkonen and Roni Kuronen, “Venäjän uhka yhdistää Suomea ja Saksaa – maat kertoivat turvallisuusyhteistyön syventämisestä [‘The Russian threat unites Finland and Germany – the countries announced a deepening of security cooperation’],” Yle, 15 July 2026.

[9] Mark Carney and Alexander Stubb, “Prepare for a World of Ad Hoc Coalitions,” The Economist, 8 July 2026; Trevor Filseth, “What Elbridge Colby Gets Wrong About the ‘Middle Powers’,” The National Interest, 18 July 2026.

[10] Finnish Government, “Comprehensive Security in Europe,” Finnish Government (Prime Minister’s Office); Sauli Niinistö, Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, Report by Sauli Niinistö in His Capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission (European Commission, 30 October 2024).

[11] Prime Minister’s Office, “EU Leaders to Meet in Helsinki for Eastern Flank Summit – Discussions to Focus on Security,” Finnish Government, 24 November 2025; Alec Neihum, “MTV:n tiedot: Suomi aikoo liittyä Naton itäiseen ryhmään” [‘MTV’s information: Finland intends to join NATO’s eastern group’],” MTV Uutiset, 17 July 2026.

[12] Benjamin Vorland Andersrød, “Trump med ny Grønland-melding: – Nå er tiden inne” [‘Trump with a new Greenland message: “Now the time has come”‘],” NRK, 19 January 2026.

[13] Matti Pesu, “NATO’s Spearhead in the European Arctic: The Rise of a Nordic Deterrence Cluster,” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 9, no. 1 (2026): 415–432.

[14] Hiski Haukkala and Kristi Raik, “The Circles of Security: The Role of the NB8 in (Northern) European Security,” NB8 Series, Brief 2 (International Centre for Defence and Security, 17 April 2026).

[15] See: Hanna Tuominen, “A Louder Voice for Human Rights: The Nordic–Baltic Group at the UN Human Rights Council,” Cooperation and Conflict 60, no. 4 (2025): 846–868; “Joint Statement by the Nordic-Baltic Ministers (NB8) of Foreign Affairs,” Government Offices of Sweden, 30 April 2026.

[16] Alexander Stubb, “Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Alexander Stubb at the State Banquet at the Presidential Palace in Vilnius, Lithuania, on 14 May 2026,” Office of the President of the Republic of Finland, 14 May 2026.

[17] Matti Pesu, “Northern Europe as a Political Force: Consolidating the Region’s Role in European Security,” FIIA Comment 3/2026 (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 31 March 2026).

[18] Finnish Government, Government Report on Changes in the Foreign and Security Policy Environment, 18.

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