Japan and Strategic Connectivity: Policies, Partners, and Possibilities

Infrastructure, institutions, and norms are becoming weaponised in a dynamic geopolitical competition, linking development, security, and great-power rivalry.

China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013, served as the initial catalyst, prompting other major players—including Japan, the US, the EU, and India—to roll out their own competing strategies.

This report analyses the increasingly important role of infrastructure development and connectivityas a central arena of global geopolitical competition, particularly focusing on Japan’s connectivity policy under the banner of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The core aim of this report is to explore how Japan seeks to utilise strategic connectivity, specifically through its multi-layered approach, as a pivotal geopolitical instrument to project influence and promote a rules-based order, amidst rising competition with China. 

Japan’s policy aligns Official Development Assistance, economic cooperation, security considerations, and national interests. Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines, is a prime focal region, showcasing the integration of physical, institutional, and people-to-people connectivity with increased defence connectivity through tools such as Official Security Assistance. Furthermore, Japan has sought to collaborate with external actors in third regions. However, while Japan’s cooperation with India and the EU signals diplomatic alignment, the practical impact has been limited due to implementation difficulties, bureaucratic fragmentation, and weak private-sector incentives.

As an illustrative case study of a potential collaborative effort, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) can offer an alternative to China’s connectivity dominance. Japan is uniquely positioned to stabilise the IMEC and provide essential governance, regulatory harmonisation, and soft infrastructure. However, the current volatile politics of ‘disconnectivity’ by the US, Japan’s key ally, poses a major obstacle. The US policy, marked by tariffs, the withdrawal from international organisations, and a shift towards transactional ‘America First’ deals, creates a strategic void and raises questions about whether allies can compensate for this retreat.

Overall, a shift in focus in the connectivity debate can be witnessed in policy circles. There is a growing emphasis on collaborative efforts toward more narrowly defined areas, specifically economic security, competitiveness, and military security and defence cooperation.

This report offers the following ten actionable policy recommendations, in particular, for the European Union.

Recommendations for the EU’s Global Connectivity Agenda

• Cooperate pragmatically with the US: The EU should engage in collaboration with the US where interests converge on vital objectives, while remaining pragmatic.
• Cooperate with other major actors: Recognising the limits of US collaboration, Europe should deepen existing frameworks and create new partnerships with like-minded actors.
• Re-assess the EU approach: The EU should view the disruptions of the Trump administration as an opportunity to critically reassess its own policies, such as the Global Gateway, to better address the needs of recipient countries and sustainable development.

Recommendations for cooperation with Like-minded actors

• Utilise comparative advantage: Connectivity efforts should focus on comparative advantage, in the form of high-quality, sustainable, and inclusive flagship projects that promote a rule-based order rather than being framed as strategic competition with China.
• Leverage divisions of labour: Joint initiatives are more effective when they use an asymmetrical design where one actor provides strategic leadership and others offer targeted contributions based on their specific expertise.
• Learn from Japan’s multi-layered approach: Partners should adopt a comprehensive strategy that includes both hard and soft connectivity, and structural and non-structural dimensions such as technical standards and regulatory harmonisation.
• Mobilise the private sector: Private investment is indispensable but often constrained by political and regulatory risks. Existing multilateral forums should be actively leveraged for investment promotion and business matchmaking.

Recommendations for further research

• Bridge policymaking and academic study: Sustained and focused deliberations between academics and policymakers are essential to move beyond ad-hoc analysis and understand the evolving implications of connectivity.
• Emphasise the recipient perspective: Future research and strategy must prioritise the agency and specific needs of recipient states rather than focusing solely on the strategies of donor nations.