Escalation in the Taiwan Strait: scenarios and implications for Estonian security

This report analyses the Taiwan Strait as a structurally escalating security flashpoint.

Since 2022, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has intensified military pressure around Taiwan through large-scale exercises, grey-zone coercion, air and maritime incursions, and efforts to normalise a heightened military presence in the Strait. These developments are embedded in a broader systemic rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which increasingly defines global geopolitics.

Taiwan represents both a symbolic and strategic objective for Beijing. For the Chinese leadership, unification is linked to regime legitimacy, national rejuvenation, and long-term geopolitical positioning. The report emphasises that Beijing has not renounced the use of force and continues to modernise the PLA with Taiwan-related contingencies in mind. At the same time, US–China competition is deepening structurally across military, technological, economic, and ideological domains. Even if short-term diplomatic stabilisation occurs, the underlying rivalry is unlikely to diminish. Taiwan, therefore, functions as a potential trigger point within broader great-power competition. Beijing’s decision to launch an invasion is dependent on several factors, but the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and US domestic politics are key determinants.

The report identifies four interconnected scenarios that form a potential escalation continuum rather than discrete alternatives:

1) Status quo (hybrid warfare): persistent grey-zone activities, cyber operations, disinformation, economic coercion, and military exercises. This scenario already characterises the current environment and may continue for an extended period.

2) Quarantine: limited restrictions on maritime and air access to Taiwan under legal or administrative pretexts. This approach seeks to test international reactions while avoiding the formal designation of a blockade.

3) Blockade: a large-scale effort to cut off Taiwan’s external trade and energy flows. Given Taiwan’s economic structure, even a temporary blockade would have immediate global economic repercussions, particularly in high-technology supply chains.

4) Invasion: an amphibious assault combined with missile strikes and operations to gain air, naval and information superiority. While militarily risky and politically costly, this scenario cannot be excluded given the PRC’s stated objectives and ongoing force modernisation.

The report stresses that these scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Escalation could proceed incrementally, and non-kinetic pressure (hybrid warfare or quarantine) could rapidly evolve into armed conflict.

For Estonia, the Taiwan Strait crisis would pose indirect but serious security risks. Most importantly, a crisis could alter Moscow’s strategic calculations. If western attention and resources were heavily concentrated in East Asia, Russia might perceive a greater opportunity to exert pressure in Europe, including along NATO’s eastern flank. In the context of greater Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, Russia has begun commenting more openly on Taiwan-related developments, showing Moscow’s keen attention to the strait. Additionally, if a crisis flared up while Russia’s war in Ukraine was ongoing, Beijing’s will and ability to support Russia’s war effort may be affected, thereby affecting the battlefield in Ukraine. Thus, developments in the Indo-Pacific have tangible implications for Baltic security. Furthermore, economic disruption would affect global markets, supply chains, and financial stability, with knock-on effects for Estonia’s open economy. In a globally unstable security environment, to which an unstable strait contributes, European strategic autonomy gains further importance.

Although predicting the timing of a crisis is impossible, several milestones are important to note in Beijing’s calculus. The report does not deem 2027 as the most likely year for invasion, but rather the period between 2028 and 2032, which will see elections in Taiwan and the US, the PRC’s 80^th anniversary and the end of Xi’s (probable) fourth term. After this, the current perceived window of opportunity (for Xi) will start to close. 2049 remains a long-term important milestone, as this is the year in which Beijing aims to complete national rejuvenation, which would include establishing control over Taiwan. The report concludes that the Taiwan Strait represents a high-risk, structurally unstable security environment. Even without immediate war, sustained hybrid pressure carries escalation risks. For Estonia, the issue is not geographically distant but strategically interconnected with European security, global economic stability, and Moscow’s strategic calculations. Proactive monitoring, strategic foresight, and policy coordination with allies are therefore essential.