The Black Sea region has gained renewed strategic importance for the European Union following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As an area of considerable economic and geopolitical significance, as well as a focal point for potential future EU enlargement, its stability is now an urgent concern for European policymakers. Russia’s sustained efforts to undermine security in the Black Sea necessitate a coherent EU vision, moving beyond the fragmented scope of earlier initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy and aspects of the Eastern Partnership.
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Acknowledging these challenges, the EU has begun to recalibrate its engagement, as evidenced by the European External Action Service’s ongoing work on a Black Sea Security Strategy and the region’s inclusion in the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.[1] However, as the EU seeks to enhance its engagement in the Black Sea region, it must confront two fundamental dilemmas: the extent to which it seeks to act as a geopolitical player and how to balance geopolitical urgency with the gradual, methodical process of EU integration.
Strategic Promises & Perils
The Black Sea holds significant economic potential for the EU, particularly in the fields of connectivity, energy security, and regional development. As a maritime connection between the EU and the Caucasus, it forms a crucial component of the Middle Corridor—a multimodal trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. With the EU seeking to bypass Russia and Iran in its trade with Asia, and instability threatening maritime routes through the Red Sea, the Black Sea’s role in Euro-Asian trade has gained renewed strategic importance.[2] The Black Sea region is also relevant to the EU’s energy security and green transition, exemplified by the Black Sea Submarine Cable—a planned high-voltage connection within the EU’s Global Gateway initiative that would link Azerbaijan’s renewable energy sector to the EU via Georgia and Romania.[3] Moreover, the Black Sea hosts Romanian offshore gas fields and significant offshore wind potential, both of which could enhance EU energy security, with the latter also supporting its green transition. Furthermore, the Black Sea remains a critical factor in the economies of EU members Romania and Bulgaria as well as candidate states Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.[4] Ukrainian ports, in particular, play a vital role in global food security through their grain exports. These diverse economic interests underscore the Black Sea’s growing importance in for EU.
Russia’s military activity in the area has transformed it into a highly militarised zone
The strategic value extends beyond economic interests to encompass crucial geopolitical dimensions. Alongside the Western Balkans, the Black Sea region represents a key theatre for EU enlargement, home to four candidate countries—Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Türkiye. Successful integration of these states could theoretically transform the Black Sea into a predominantly European space, with six of its seven littoral states within the Union. Yet, with Georgia and Türkiye’s pre-accession processes effectively stalled due to democratic backsliding, this prospect remains remote. More immediately, the region is a focal point for countering Russian (hybrid) warfare, which has manifestly targeted Black Sea littoral states through direct and indirect military aggression, political subversion, economic coercion, and persistent disinformation campaigns.[5] An EU strategy prioritising stability, democracy, and resilience in the region is, therefore, not merely a matter of enlargement policy but a core imperative for European security.
Successful integration could transform the Black Sea into a predominantly European space
However, these opportunities are accompanied by significant security challenges that complicate EU engagement. A recent EUI report underscores this reality, identifying events in four Black Sea littoral states—Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, and Moldova—as presenting high to moderate risks to EU security.[6] This assessment is reflected in the region’s volatile security landscape: Russia’s military activity in the area, including naval deployments, drone warfare, and mining operations, has transformed it into a highly militarised zone. This military presence extends beyond the current war in Ukraine to Georgia, where Russia plans to establish a naval base in occupied Abkhazia. These developments threaten the security of all littoral states—including EU members Bulgaria and Romania—while hampering regional economic development. Simultaneously, other powers seek to consolidate their influence in the region: China advances its interests primarily through infrastructure projects like Georgia’s Anaklia deep sea port, while Türkiye—controlling access to the Black Sea under the Montreux Convention—asserts a strong sense of ‘regional ownership’ in the Black Sea region, complicating NATO and EU alignment in the area.[7] While NATO has maintained a presence through US and allied troops in Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye, growing concerns over US disengagement from Europe raise questions about the sustainability of NATO’s role. [8] Finally, democratic backsliding in primarily Georgia and Türkiye, combined with persistent Russian interference in Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria, creates additional instability, exacerbating opportunities for external actors to exploit political and economic weaknesses and weakening the EU’s overall influence in the region.
The Two Dilemmas
Navigating the Black Sea’s opportunities and risks comes with two fundamental dilemmas the EU has to confront. First, the realisation of the region’s economic and strategic potential hinges fundamentally on a secure and stable Black Sea. An effective EU strategy, therefore, requires a more assertive, security-driven approach to the region, especially as the US withdraws from its traditional role in European security. This necessity presents the EU with a profound institutional and political dilemma: while current circumstances demand that the Union act as a proactive geopolitical player in the region, such engagement would entail involvement in a heavily militarised arena characterised by competing global interests and significant security risks. Assuming such an assertive role demands not only enhanced security capabilities but also a fundamental reassessment of the EU’s geopolitical mandate by its member states—a debate that has thus far progressed too slowly to address immediate regional challenges. Effective engagement demands internal consensus and swift policy coordination, both of which remain difficult given the EU’s rigorous bureaucracy and political instability in key member states, including France and Germany, as well as the continued success of Eurosceptic movements across the continent. Yet the urgency of the situation, particularly regarding Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova’s security needs, leaves little room for protracted deliberation. Without timely and decisive action, the EU risks not only failing to secure its interests in the Black Sea but also losing the region’s strategic and economic potential—posing a direct threat to European security.
An effective EU strategy requires a more assertive, security-driven approach
The EU faces a second critical dilemma in balancing geopolitical urgency with institutional diligence when it comes to EU enlargement. EU enlargement in the Black Sea presents a strategic opportunity to fundamentally alter regional dynamics, with the potential inclusion of at least five littoral states possibly transforming the Black Sea into a predominantly European space. This prospect has gained urgency as Russia continues to consolidate its regional influence, making it essential for the EU to maintain momentum in the enlargement process and demonstrate the credibility of membership for candidate states, particularly Ukraine and Moldova. However, this geopolitical imperative for swift action is at odds with the EU’s methodical and gradual integration process, a carefully designed framework that serves to protect both the Union and its prospective members. The established step-by-step accession procedure, centred on the full adoption of the EU acquis, ensures institutional stability and economic preparedness for both parties. Any acceleration of this careful process carries substantial risks: rushed integration could destabilise both the EU’s and candidate states’ economies, create conditions that enable democratic backsliding in newly admitted members, and fundamentally undermine the Union’s cohesion and decision-making capacity. These risks are further compounded by region-specific challenges, including the question of how to shape Ukraine’s membership should the war persist or occupation endure, as well as the broader issue of sustained Russian interference and hybrid warfare targeting both candidate and member states. EU enlargement policy in the Black Sea, therefore, has to strike a delicate balance between strategic urgency and institutional prudence to ensure both the EU’s geopolitical interests and sustainable regional integration.
Conclusion
The urgent need for a decisive EU strategy for the Black Sea region has intensified with Washington’s wavering support for Ukraine and Georgia’s ongoing authoritarian drift. However, without first addressing the fundamental dilemmas of security and enlargement, EU action risks either ceding advantage to Russia or undermining its own institutional stability. The Polish presidency of the Council presents a key opportunity to address these dilemmas and enhance regional security, particularly through its focus on the Three Seas Initiative. Aimed at fostering connectivity between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Sea, the initiative cannot overlook the importance of comprehensive, holistic Black Sea security for its success. In the end, only a coherent, security-driven approach can unlock the Black Sea’s economic potential, advance EU integration, and ultimately reinforce European stability in the face of growing geopolitical challenges.
Endnotes
[1] European External Action Service, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (Brussels, March 2022).
[2] Hunter Stoll, “The Middle Corridor: A Renaissance in Global Commerce?” The Diplomat, March 2024.
[3] Thijs Van de Graaf, “Corridors of Power: The Black Sea Cable Between Azerbaijan and Europe,” Brussels Institute for Geopolitics, 30 October 2024.
[4] The World Bank, Bulgaria: Toward Blue Economy Development (Washington, DC, 2020).
[5] Tatyana Novossiolova and Goran Georgiev, Countering Hybrid Warfare in the Black Sea Region (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2023).
[6] Veronica Anghel, Global Risks to the EU (European University Institute, 2025).
[7] Daria Isachenko and Erol Kaymak, “Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 6 September 2024; High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Council: State of Play of EU-Türkiye Political, Economic and Trade Relations (European Commission, 29 November 2023).
[8] Giuseppe Spatafora, “The Trump Card: What Could US Abandonment of Europe Look Like?” European Union Institute for Security Studies, 17 February 2025.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.