On Priorities and the Need to Prioritise to Win the War

There is light at the end of the tunnel, but the question is how deep this tunnel is. Far from you — there is light, but do you have the strength to crawl to it? Dmytro Putiata discusses Ukraine's military progress and homefront challenges, and urges us to stop talking only about drones.

Dmytro Putiata is a drone warfare expert who served in several units in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, he was an entrepreneur and wrote several case studies on battles from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and co-wrote In the Ring of Fire: Defense of Luhansk Airport. He also contributed to the Oryx open-source intelligence website. He joined the Ukrainian Armed Forces in April 2022 and initially served in the Special Operations Forces 7th Regiment. He began as a Mavic drone pilot, serving in the Kharkiv and Donetsk regions during Russia’s spring and summer 2022 offensive. He took part in Ukraine’s successful Kharkiv offensive. Dmytro then served in the strike-drone company of Ukraine’s 36th Marine Brigade, where he defended the Avdiivka front during Russia’s winter offensive. He then served in an analytical detachment in the General Staff before returning to the 36th Marine Brigade during Russia’s 2024 Kharkiv offensive. His brigade fought in the Vovchansk direction before fighting in Russia’s Kursk region during the winter of 2024–25. He has served in the Unmanned Systems Forces’ 20th K2 Unmanned Systems Brigade in the Lyman direction of Donetsk Oblast. In K2, he organised the brigade’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drone flights and served as a battle captain in the command post. He also managed the employment of heavy bomber drones in one of K2’s battalions.

Marko Tamming (MT): How fast is the development cycle of drone technology?

Dmytro Putiata (DP): On the Ukrainian side, over the last year, there were not that many major improvements, which is a little bit surprising and disappointing. Unfortunately, the reality is that our top five companies rely heavily on government procurement and don’t care much about R&D. They aren’t hungry for new developments and feel pretty good financially.

The biggest development right now, as it used to be, comes from small teams, from companies you’ve never heard of before. For example, one company is trying to produce its own communication system. Another company uses that system for its missile-strike drones, so they do not rely on American Starlink.

Apart from that, of course, we had this new so-called middle strike campaign. We saw a bunch of new, let’s say, platforms — drones, munitions, flying munitions; they were quite efficient for the first five months. They remain efficient, but the Russians have adapted. They managed to do this after they suffered significant losses, and their new interceptor teams are shooting those Ukrainian drones rather than, for example, targeting other people on the ground.

On the Ukrainian side, over the last year, there were not that many major improvements, which is a little bit surprising and disappointing.

Russia has made huge progress in cheap cruise missiles and has scaled production — five new cheap cruise missiles with a range of 500 kilometres. The range matters: their jet pilots will be fully safe from even modern NATO missiles and jets, and still be able to hit a target.

Apart from that, they invested a lot of their time and resources in developing jet-powered Geran-4 drones that are operated remotely and are capable of locking the target: you can do whatever you want in non-kinetic involvement, but if they lock the target, they will reach it — even if it’s a moving train. These are the main developments, and unfortunately, so far, they’re coming from the Russian side.

Russia continues developing its own communication system, which requires time and resources. They rely on a mesh network for their drones and general communication, and they are launching the new satellite Rassvet into space; it might be efficient in the future, and it’s going to cause big problems. The question is whether this will be used for communication inside their forces — instead of radios or with radios — or whether it is going to be communication for drone strikes, as Ukraine does with Starlink. They had their own communication system before they got access to Starlink. They still have Wi-Fi bridges they buy from the US company that made a fortune and, unfortunately, is not under sanctions.

For years, the Ukrainian army has relied entirely on Starlink, which wasn’t a great idea. That’s understandable, but we need to think more strategically. For example, when we invaded the Kursk area, we found out Starlink wasn’t working there, so we didn’t have communication — only radios — which, in this drone warfare, is not enough.

MT: Can we expect Ukraine to develop effective solutions to counter Russia’s jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones in the near future, or will it take longer?

DP: It’s already happening. We have a couple of solutions, but they are not public. Only one company reported destroying Geran-4 and Geran-5. We are thinking about ways to use drones against drones, but we have a bigger problem with cheap cruise missiles and jet-powered drones. I would rather invest in a cheap drone missile that will intercept a target without the help of a human, instead of creating this large system of crews that cover all areas. We need this at a tactical level, to secure our forces on the ground. In terms of strategic assets, we need cheap missiles to destroy cheap Russian missiles and jet-powered drones.

We need cheap missiles to destroy cheap Russian missiles and jet-powered drones.

MT: Ukraine’s Third Army Corps used ground drones near Sloviansk for offensive action: large aerial drones transported the ground drones to locations up to 10 kilometres behind enemy lines. Is it primarily propaganda, or does it also have genuine military value?

DP: The first time I heard about this idea was in June 2025. Back then, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) weren’t that popular, but my former brigade commander said, “What if we use a small UGV with a mine, then use a copter-type drone to fly through the front line and drop it, and then it drives?” It’s doable, and it’s happening, but I wouldn’t phrase it like UGVs are storming positions and securing the area. A UGV — whether it’s logistics, striking, reconnaissance, engineering, or underwater — is just another platform, maybe one of the most non-technological developments in our army. UGVs are quite primitive.

MT: The media created the impression that Mykhailo Fedorov was a driving force behind Ukraine’s innovation and drone industry, and that Ukraine could carry out such effective long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries, among other targets, largely thanks to his efforts. How, if at all, has Ukraine’s strategy changed since Fedorov left the defence minister position this summer?

DP: His role has been quite overstated. He was the wrong person for this position, and people give him credit for the things he was not responsible for. The initial plan for this middle strike campaign was created in summer 2025 — about six months before Fedorov became Minister of Defence. He had great public relations, and people made him into an idol, but he was far from it.

The key is to build a strategy and prioritise your resources; there is no silver bullet.

Deep strikes are not going to win a war, just like killing Russian infantry isn’t. This has to be a combination of different measures and countermeasures. The key is to build a strategy and prioritise your resources; there is no silver bullet.

MT: President Zelensky has said that, even though Kyiv does not deliberately target civil aviation or any passenger aircraft, airlines flying to Moscow and other major Russian cities are under threat because of the many drones that Ukraine is using. Is this idea of shutting down Russia’s airspace, as Ukraine’s airspace has been closed, for the media, too? This strategy would require a lot of drones just to close the airspace for even one day, but Russians would definitely feel it. Is this doable?

DP: The first question is: what do we want to achieve? Do we want to make life uncomfortable for Russians? In my opinion, it won’t change anything. The second question is whether we have enough resources: human resources, economic resources, and the capacity to produce enough. It is also about managing and prioritising our targets and resources. We definitely won’t be able to be everywhere and do everything. Even the US, with its economy, cannot do it. Just as in the army, in a brigade command post, we have many targets daily, but we can only target maybe 4 out of 10. So, the question is: what is important? I don’t have an answer to those questions.

MT: What are the targets that should be attacked? Should the long-range strikes be prioritised at all?

DP: It’s always beneficial to show the media that you’re attacking an oil refinery. It is easy, to be honest. A huge factory is burning, and everything looks great. I would rather prioritise drone ports that Russia is using to launch Gerans: not try to intercept every drone on Ukraine’s territory, but destroy the enemy’s ability to launch them. They have built new ports used for jet-powered drones. We know it; we saw it. But unfortunately, they don’t seem to be a priority.

MT: It is no secret that Ukraine is facing a shortage of air-defence interceptors. How do you assess Ukraine’s situation as another winter approaches?

DP: We have been hearing that this winter will be the most difficult since the start of the full-scale war. Unfortunately, it’s been true, because every new winter has got worse. Last winter was tough; the Russians destroyed much of our energy sector, and they’ll do the same this time. We have been trying to do the same in Crimea, but no one cares about Crimea inside Russia. Even when the people in Crimea are suffering the same conditions that Ukrainians did in 2022 and 2023, it leads nowhere. Neither Ukraine nor Russia will capitulate and ask for peace because of that.

I doubt they have a clear strategy for what they want to achieve with these kinds of strikes, because we see them targeting critical infrastructure: gas stations, which is absolutely dumb and useless; and logistics warehouses, which is also questionable. They have some capabilities and want to show their higher command that “Ukraine is burning.” But it is not going to improve their position on the front lines as much as they are trying to tell their leadership.

MT: What is the overall situation on the front?

DP: At the beginning of this winter, Ukraine conducted a couple of successful offensive operations. They were not very public, which is great, but we achieved great results. Ukrainian airborne troops liberated almost the entire Dnipro area that was occupied; they secured the flanks. We also conducted an operation in the Lyman direction [northern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts], which was quite good, especially in terms of operational security (OPSEC). At the same time, Russia has been advancing near Dobropillia, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk [Donetsk Oblast].

We pay way too much attention to square kilometres

We pay way too much attention to square kilometres. I will be cynical, but Ukraine is big: an extra 20 square kilometres in either direction, frankly speaking, in the long term, is acceptable. The point is whether we have the ability to continue fighting. Yes, Russians are dying en masse, but Ukrainians are also being killed, and the question is how much we will be able to resist. For many in the armed forces, there has been no rest, no rotation, and almost zero reinforcements for years; people are holding on with morale alone.

From October until at least January, the weather conditions will be terrible: foggy, windy, and rainy. At the end of July 2026, the Russians conducted a massive — at least for 2026 — armoured operation; it was very well planned and not badly executed — maybe the best-planned operation I’ve ever seen from their side. If they wait a little bit more until foggy weather, when we cannot see like 20–30 metres in front of us — they will have better chances.

MT: Is there resilience to continue fighting on the Ukrainian side? Are there enough people enlisting?

DP: Definitely not enough. The last major reinforcements were in 2024. After that, the only reinforcements we had were people who went absent without leave (AWOL) from one unit and joined ours. The army is literally fighting with its own resources. We don’t have enough political will and responsibility on the Ukrainian side to mobilise more and more effectively.

We don’t have enough political will and responsibility on the Ukrainian side to mobilise more and more effectively.

MT: Greater pressure is needed on Russia so that it will stop. One thing the west can do is sanctions; the other is help with military means, such as drone technology. Where does the key to further success lie?

DP: Despite the fact that people like to call this war drone warfare, I’m not, to be honest, a supporter of this statement, because the core of the war has not changed. We have the same problems; they just take a different shape. People can say that this is something new and unique that we have never faced before — which is not true, or at least partly true.

The biggest problem Ukraine faces is command and control. Right now, we are seeing major improvements; we have a new general. We have been implementing reforms in our army corps. This is the only thing that keeps me positive about the future. Not drones, not some kind of technology, etc., but these reforms. Of course, they require time and resources, but they’re the only thing that can literally change the situation for the better.

There is light at the end of the tunnel, but the question is how deep this tunnel is. Far from you — there is light, but do you have the strength to crawl to it?

We wouldn’t be able to make it without the western support — intelligence, financial, and moral — all of this matters. The world is cynical: the longer the war continues, the better it is for European countries, because Russia becomes weaker as we destroy its potential. At the same time, Russia is rebuilding its army. We kill their professional soldiers — but those are the people who were professional soldiers in 2022; right now, they have a new wave of professionals, and they are way more dangerous than they used to be.

MT: Where is innovation heading, and what problems as well as opportunities could this create for Ukraine?

DP: Despite many positive developments, the reality is sad. Everything we use and produce is made in China. In many cases, companies literally do this Lego construction: they buy different cameras, chips, etc. from China, and then create a new product. I don’t know whether you can call it technology or innovation.

The biggest problem Ukraine faces is command and control.

We have some really decent companies, and I sincerely wish them luck, but these aren’t the companies you usually see in the news. For the large ones, it’s just business — no innovation, no interest in developing something new. They had different opportunities from some very well-developed countries to do something, but they were so arrogant and self-confident that they didn’t even want to cooperate, which, to me, is absolute madness. But well, we have what we have. Two years ago, I hoped this would be our new future economy, as it was with the IT sector and agriculture before — but right now, I don’t think so.

MT: What advice would you give Estonia and other NATO countries? What should we keep in mind when procuring drones?

DP: Definitely stop talking only about drones. Think more about different kinds of sensors and software programmes. Think about methodologies, how to integrate those platforms, that tremendous amount of data, how to reform the army and economy for these new threats and possibilities. It’s not only about building factories and producing drones — no, please don’t do this; it’s not beneficial.

Rather, think about how to decrease the time to procure, connect companies with your military, let them communicate, help them — and try to move them to Ukraine because that is the only opportunity for them to do some testing. And be fair with testing, with yourself first of all. Don’t be ashamed of this.

Right now, a lot of western companies, no matter what they produce — electronic warfare (EW) systems, drones, software, or AI — come to Ukraine for a month, or maybe less; they do something that they call “battle testing.” A tremendous number of western companies produce — I’m sorry — just crap that is not working. But they have procurement contracts with governments, armies, and MoDs and service critical national infrastructure. It’s not pleasant for any business to admit they are not as good as they expected. I would recommend that the state be more tolerant of those companies and help them improve.

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This article was written for ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).