Summitry: APEC and Beyond

Many important meetings will take place at this year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' summit on 18–19 November. While a potential US–China–Russia trilateral — and what that may mean for Europe — has taken the limelight, Washington and Beijing will also focus on Indo-Pacific dynamics, with Ukraine among many issues to be discussed.

The US has multiple goals heading in. Before President Donald Trump makes it to Shenzhen, he will stop off at the ASEAN summit in Manila. There, he will likely reaffirm ties with key Southeast Asian allies and partners, including the Philippines, amid ongoing tensions in the South China Sea. But also, to Chinese criticism, Washington plans to convene a Quad leaders’ meeting on the ASEAN sidelines, reassuring Tokyo of American commitments and mending relations with New Delhi following trade disputes. At APEC itself, Trump has mentioned “denuclearisation” and “ending the war in Iran” as two key priorities, meaning limited time could be allocated to discussing Ukraine.

China has its own aims as host of APEC 2026. For one, Beijing may be looking to deepen diplomatic relations with Seoul in the short or medium term. Current China–South Korea relations are a Strategic Cooperative Partnership (战略合作伙伴关系). Elevating relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership (全面战略合作伙伴关系) could come under discussion. If realised, this would, from Beijing’s perspective, contribute to stability in an otherwise challenging North-East Asian security environment, where the situation on the Korean peninsula is tense and China–Japan relations are strained. APEC will also give Beijing the opportunity to signal its continued dissatisfaction to Tokyo by maintaining minimal dialogue, as it has since November 2025 following Takaichi’s comments about Taiwan.

Shenzhen not Yalta

On a possible trilateral meeting between presidents Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin, parallels to Yalta have been drawn, implying the potential carving up of Ukraine or even the shaping of a new global security architecture. However, several factors suggest Shenzhen is not Yalta: the current geopolitical moment is fundamentally different; all three countries have limits to their power, while their shared will to act together is lacking.

First, the current global order is highly contested. While Yalta convened the winners of the Second World War, Shenzhen — even as a summit of major powers — is not comparable in gravitas. Second, although the US, China, and Russia are all countries with significant impact on global security, their actions are not necessarily decisive. Russia’s war against Ukraine has dragged into its fifth year, while the US’ war in Iran is approaching its ninth month. If decisive power is lacking, it would be difficult for the three to implement an agreement without involving other major actors, such as Ukraine and European states. Third, the three countries also have other priorities and goals which may impede their ability to coordinate on Ukraine. The US is preoccupied with denuclearisation and Iran; China does not view itself as a major party to the war; and Russia has not abandoned its initial objectives in Ukraine.

Although the US, China, and Russia are all countries with significant impact on global security, their actions are not necessarily decisive.

However, even if Shenzhen is not Yalta, each of the three participants hopes to achieve some political gains. Trump want reassert his importance on the global stage after suffering a defeat in the midterms. Xi could present himself as the responsible statesman pursuing stability by bringing the US and Russia together. And Putin would be able to showcase Russia as a G3 country seated alongside the world’s two major powers.

The Limits of Summitry

Shenzhen may be yet another summit in a wider pattern of high-level talks that have raised expectations but delivered few results. Previous examples include Trump’s 2025 bilateral meeting with Putin in Anchorage and the two Trump–Xi summits of 2026 in Beijing and Washington, which have yielded little other than perceived strategic stability.

Shenzhen may be yet another summit in a wider pattern of high-level talks that have raised expectations but delivered few results.

While the stakes for APEC 2026 are high — amid ongoing discussions about the post-war security infrastructure of Ukraine and Europe, according to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio — conflicting messaging and chaotic coordination decrease the likelihood of substantive results. In the run-up to the summit, some sources suggested China had no interest in a trilateral meeting, while Trump later came out saying he thought it would happen. Stakeholders have struggled to find common ground — with China pushing for a highly scripted summit and the US looking for a looser format. It is questionable whether the parties can reach substantive agreements when they fail to agree on small details.

Nevertheless, even if breakthroughs remain elusive, high-level engagement carries value in itself. APEC in Shenzhen and the G20 in Miami will mark the third and fourth Trump–Xi summits of 2026, respectively, demonstrating a sustained commitment to dialogue. In an otherwise tumultuous geopolitical environment, continued contacts could help maintain some global stability, even if concrete outcomes remain limited.