Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) spent much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region?
Download and read as a PDF: Brief. The Joint Expeditionary Force: Baltic Interests
Despite its name, the JEF is not a force. It is a flexible framework led by the UK, under which the UK itself and at least one other member (a ‘1 + 1’ format) can pool military capabilities for the purpose of conducting specific operations. The UK also provides the backbone of a permanent operational headquarters for the JEF—the Standing Joint Force Headquarters—although other command and control options are available depending on the scale and nature of a particular operation.
Framework Nations
The JEF is one of three ‘Framework Nations Concept’ arrangements welcomed by Allied leaders at NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit. The Framework Nations Concept, originally a German proposal, foresaw “groups of Allies coming together to work multinationally for the joint development of forces and capabilities required by the Alliance, facilitated by a framework nation.”[3] Underlying the concept is the idea that defence cooperation, widely seen as essential if Europe is to build the defence capability it needs in a degraded security environment, is easier and more effective when carried out by smaller groups of states rather than entire international organisations such as NATO and the EU. Furthermore, these effects should be amplified inside regional groupings whose members share common security perceptions and interests.
Defence cooperation is easier and more effective when carried out by smaller groups of states that share common security perceptions and interests
At the Wales Summit, Allies also welcomed Germany’s agreement to lead a ten-member (now twenty) grouping, the German Framework Nations Concept, focused on developing capabilities collaboratively through a series of capability clusters, and on building multilateral military formations. Under this arrangement, for example, the Netherlands has, since 2015, leased Leopard 2 main battle tanks from Germany and operated a tank company within a German battalion, thus preserving an armoured capability it would otherwise have abandoned. The Netherlands now plans to build on this capability and to re-establish its own tank battalion in the coming years.[4]
A third Italian-led grouping of six southern flank Allies and non-aligned Austria was also announced in Wales. This appears to have less tangible goals and to be the least ambitious of the three arrangements. While NATO envisaged that other framework arrangements would emerge, this has not been the case. However, a similar framework, the European Intervention Initiative, was launched between nine states under French leadership in 2018.[5] This arrangement, in which Estonia also participates, seeks to foster a common European strategic culture, but is not tied to NATO.
JEF 1.0
The JEF was initially conceived by the UK as a vehicle for crisis response operations in support of the UN, NATO and the EU. Unlike previous UK rapid reaction concepts however, the JEF was to be based around a flexible pool of forces, rather than standing units. Furthermore, multinationality was to be built in from the beginning. According to a 2015 press release on the occasion of the signing of the JEF Memorandum of Understanding, the concept originally envisaged generating UK-led international forces up to 10 000 strong for crisis response “similar to that deployed to tackle the Ebola outbreak in West Africa” (in 2014, UK armed forces medical, engineering and force protection personnel had deployed to Sierra Leone and incorporated personnel from international partners such as Canada and Norway into their operations).[6]
The JEF ties a leading NATO nation and nuclear power into Nordic-Baltic regional security arrangements
Reference to this operation reflects a UK view that the JEF would be especially useful for humanitarian and disaster-relief tasks beyond Europe, contingencies in which its Baltic members would presumably have had limited interest and limited capabilities with which to participate. But the changing strategic context, notably Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and waging of war against Ukraine in Donbas, had already by this point led the UK to begin to rethink the JEF and to focus it much more on operations within Europe, in particular in the Nordic-Baltic and Arctic regions, as well as the North Atlantic.
Just a few months after the signing of the JEF MoU, the UK voted to leave the EU. For the UK, the JEF grew in importance as a means to retain influence and involvement in Europe’s security and defence arrangements; more so as the particularly brutal form of Brexit pushed by the British government excluded defence and foreign policy cooperation from the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.
Roles and Benefits
Membership of the JEF brings several key benefits to the countries of the Nordic-Baltic region. Perhaps most significantly, on the political-strategic front, it ties a leading NATO nation and nuclear power into Nordic-Baltic regional security arrangements, allowing its members access to UK decision makers. Its role as a political forum for like-minded nations to share and discuss ideas has also grown in recent years. In practice, the JEF adds an extra, but complementary element to the regional security architecture, described by one UK naval officer as a “force of friends, filling a hole in the security architecture of northern Europe between a national force and a NATO force.”[7] Key questions, not fully answered in the JEF’s public communications, are what “hole” it fills, and how?
Operationally, the JEF has two ‘operating models’.[8] JEF Integration Options are essentially activities intended to enhance multinational capabilities and to build interoperability at all levels among its members. JEF Response Options are operations in response to particular events, with a focus on sub-threshold or hybrid threats. The first JEF Joint Response Option was activated in November 2023 following the severing of the Balticconnector gas pipeline and several undersea cables. While the patrolling of JEF warships in the Baltic Sea undoubtedly contributed to both deterrence and reassurance, the impact was somewhat limited by the delay in the activation of the operation (the infrastructure was damaged on 8 October) and by the fact that NATO had already stepped up its own activities in the Baltic Sea with similar aims.[9]
The UK and others are keen to stress that all JEF activities are complementary to NATO’s aims and objectives. However, JEF nations also stress the JEF’s ability to act swiftly and decisively. A frequent claim is that the JEF may act where NATO either cannot or will not: “designed to be a first responder before NATO,” according to Estonia’s Government Office.[10] Perhaps the most obvious example is in countering hybrid threats, for which NATO (and the EU) places the primary responsibility on the affected member state. As Russian hybrid warfare increases in intensity across Europe, including in the Nordic-Baltic region, there is a growing urgency both to deter it, and to find collective solutions.[11] The JEF has the capacity and the ambition to play a part. Even so, as a primarily military framework, albeit one that is “inter-agency by design” it will be limited by capability and mandate in the domains in which it can respond.[12]
The JEF might also be used in a deterrence role in a crisis, for example if Russia was menacing one or more JEF members. Naturally, any threatened Ally would look first and foremost to NATO, seeking to invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. But the like-mindedness of JEF members, who largely understand the threat Russia poses to north-eastern Europe and the importance of a military component in any response to that threat, may allow the JEF to react more quickly than NATO as a whole. This possibility, and the more serious prospect that the JEF may also be ready to step into an Article 5 situation while the North Atlantic Council dithers in its decision making may offer some comfort to frontline states but is, of course, untested.
Opportunities and Risks
The JEF, then, remains something of a work in progress. With Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, it has an opportunity to plug itself more firmly into NATO, not only because memberships have become aligned, but also because technical obstacles such as permissions to share intelligence have been lowered. At the same time, the JEF might help to bridge the Nordic-Baltic fissure created by the allocation of the new Allies to NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk while the Baltic states (and Denmark and the Netherlands) remain under the remit of Joint Force Command Brunssum.
Alongside opportunities, there are also risks. One obvious one is that a security structure separate from NATO may result in competition for resources, fragmentation of security arrangements, and duplication. Somewhat ironically, these are precisely the accusations that the UK and several Nordic-Baltic states have levelled over decades at the EU as it has attempted to build a defence dimension. Another risk is that the JEF’s ‘flexilateralism’ may result in it being both everything and nothing. Also, the JEF is very UK-dominated. The opt-in arrangements for JEF Integration and Response Options indicate perhaps that the UK needs its partners more for political purposes than they do for military effect. While this may ensure strong leadership, it may also limit the influence that partners have on the JEF’s profile and development. Ambitious UK-generated ideas such as ‘JEF Digital’ or an Indo-Pacific role for the JEF may result in a departure from the core interests of the Baltic and Nordic members.[13]
JEF members understand the threat Russia poses to north-eastern Europe and the importance of a military component in any response to that threat
Overall, though, the JEF’s longevity, visibility, and activity are testaments to its success and to the value its members attach to it. Opportunities and risks are matters for governance, to be grasped and mitigated accordingly. The JEF leaders’ meeting in Tallinn provides a venue to do just that.
Endnotes
[1] “‘Joint Protector 2024’ military exercises taking place in Latvia,” LSM+, 30 October 2024.
[2] Government of Estonia, “Joint Expeditionary Force Leaders’ Summit in Tallinn,” 6 November 2024.
[3] NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” Press Release (2014) 120, 5 September 2014.
[4] Thomas Newdick, “Dutch Decide To Bring Back Main Battle Tanks,” The Warzone, 5 September 2024.
[5] “Letter of Intent between the Defence Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom concerning the Development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2),” 25 June 2018.
[6] Ministry of Defence (UK), “UK-led joint force launched to tackle common threats,” 30 November 2015.
[7] Dominic Nicholls, “Russian spy ship tracks British-led military exercises in the Baltic Sea,” The Telegraph, 30 June 2019.
[8] Joint Expeditionary Force, “JEF Operating Models,” 2024.
[9] NATO, “NATO steps up Baltic Sea patrols after subsea infrastructure damage,” 19 October 2023.
[10] Government of Estonia, “Joint Expeditionary Force Leaders’ Summit in Tallinn.”
[11] Patrik Oksanen, Minna Ålander, Karen-Anna Eggen, Jeanette Serritzlev, Marek Kohv, Bjarni Bragi Kjartansson, Ieva Bērziņa, and Adam Roževič, “Tracking the Russian Hybrid Warfare – Cases From Nordic-Baltic Countries,” Stockholm Free World Forum, 27 May 2024.
[12] Joint Expeditionary Force, “Structure,” 2024.
[13] Lord Peach, Robbie Boyd and Ed Arnold, “Stretching the Joint Expeditionary Force: An Idea for Our Times,” Royal United Services Institute, 8 September 2023.