Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) spent much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region?
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Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, several European states re-introduced conscription while others took steps to increase the effectiveness of existing conscription arrangements. Compulsory military service, often regarded as an anachronism in the post-Cold War period, has thus re-emerged as a means to ensure that relatively large wartime force structures can be generated at low cost and, in some cases, to provide personnel to standing units.
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Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states.
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Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine.
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When the Swedish government under Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson submitted the Swedish application for NATO membership to NATO HQ in Brussels on May 18th, 2022, it was widely and correctly considered a historic event. But why did it happen? And why did it happen so seemingly fast? To understand this, both the peculiar history of Swedish security policy—or the “grand strategy”—and the recent developments must be taken into account.
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In the next few months Finland and Sweden will likely become the 31st and 32nd members of NATO. What kind of Allies will they be, and what will this mean for the security of the Nordic-Baltic region?
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The revolution in Germany’s security and defence policy following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has rightly received much attention. But other European states, like Sweden, are responding in unprecedented ways too.
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Finland and Sweden do not have a fast track to join NATO. If they apply for membership, they must be able to show they can meet NATO’s political, military, legal, resource and security preconditions, or at least have a plan to address any obvious shortfalls.
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Due to its proximity to the Baltic states, its relevance to China and its recent publication of a strategy document on that country, Sweden’s policy towards Beijing should be of great interest to the Baltic countries.
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Occasionally, suggestions are aired about the potential participation of partner nations in NATO activities that are directly related to the Alliance’s core task of collective defence.
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