For years, Moscow has tried to pressure the west to recognise its status as a great power and accept its vision of rearrangement of world order. To force the international community to respect its great power position, Russia has applied a wide range of coercive and deterrent measures, which fall under the Russian concept of ‘strategic deterrence.’
Russian nuclear signalling has served the purpose so far. In an unprecedented situation of large-scale conventional aggression shielded with nuclear threats, the west has tried to avoid an escalation by self-imposing red lines and being hesitant when calibrating its support to Ukraine. The high cost of such cautiousness is being paid by Ukraine.
This analysis examines Russia’s application of its instruments of suasion, including nuclear signalling, from the toolbox designed for its concept of strategic deterrence during the war. It studies their effectiveness and adjustments to the changes in the situation on the battlefield and international environment that serve to deter the west from intervening and restraining its support to Ukraine.
This analysis provides an overview of the western reactions to Russian signalling when making strategic decisions on escalation management. Although there has been no major change in nuclear posture, restraint by the US and the Allies had no effect on Moscow and even encouraged further threats of escalation.
Russia’s continuous nuclear signalling, absent any tangible nuclear activities on the ground, has been losing its credibility. At the same time, Russia is beginning to lose arms control as leverage while the US is in the process of adapting its approach to arms control. Nonetheless, Moscow will likely continue engaging in nuclear suasion as it still reserves signalling options that do not cross the nuclear threshold.
Russia’s commitment to the war has strengthened over the last years. It has rearranged its economy to service wartime needs. It seeks to impress upon various audiences with its readiness for the long haul, enduring high costs and taking high risks whenever necessary, and project a belief in its ultimate success. Thus, the west should demonstrate resolve to change Moscow’s calculus and challenge the notion that Russia can outlast Ukraine’s will to fight and western determination to support it. Such resolve requires that the west overcomes its own mentality of de-escalation and excessive risk avoidance so successfully stimulated by Moscow and its rhetorical red lines drawn as part of nuclear suasion.
Download and read: For as Long as It Works: Russia’s Nuclear Signalling During Its War in Ukraine (PDF)