The Bear’s Sharp Claw or a Soft Underbelly? Russian Armed Forces in the Far East

Japan lies some 7 500 km away from the battlefield, and the war in Ukraine does not, in and of itself, pose an immediate threat to Japan’s security. This does not mean, however, that Russia’s war against Ukraine is irrelevant to Japan’s security.

Reliable estimates of Russia’s power and posture in the Eastern Military District (VVO) are of great significance to Japan’s defence planning, given its limited resources. This analysis focuses on (1) how much military power has moved from the eastern to the western theatre because of the war in Ukraine; (2) the activity level of the forces remaining in the Far East; and (3) how the war has changed the patterns of Russia’s military relations with Asian states.

To illuminate the how and the extent of the changes despite those technical limitations, this paper employs two research methods. First, it conducts open‑source intelligence (OSINT) analysis, drawing on published materials and social media. Second, it performs satellite imagery analysis, using commercial optical imagery, in cooperation with the private intelligence organisation, DEEP DIVE, to assess how the war has reconfigured Russia’s military power in the Far East.

Going forward, it will be essential to monitor what Moscow offers its East Asian partners in return, particularly in the military realm. More broadly, this underscores that efforts to uphold international order can no longer be bound within a single geographic theatre. Japan and its partners will need to increase the available deterrence resources (weapons, ammunition, intelligence, etc.) in each region and build mechanisms to swing and surge them flexibly and rapidly across Eurasia.