In 2022, the BCME in cooperation with the International Centre for Defence and Security (Estonia) and individual experts from Latvia and Lithuania carried out a research project titled “Media Literacy Sector Mapping in Estonia.” Similar mapping reports, which applied the same methodology but studied Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, and Ukraine, were produced in 2021.
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Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine.
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This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China.
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The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts.
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With the Ukrainian Armed Forces reporting the good news almost daily, and the frontline constantly moving in Ukraine’s favour, many experts are now wondering when and speculating about how the war will end. However, as the war continues and Russia targets civilian infrastructure across Ukraine, civil defence remains of outmost importance. Ukraine’s experience from the first months of this war offers some important lessons that must be considered by civil defence planners everywhere, but especially in the countries exposed to the threat of Russia’ military aggression.
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The Baltic states, although not immune to disinformation, have accumulated unique experience and developed effective methods to resist and combat this malice.
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Although for some years, the Sumy State University had developed a theoretical grasp of the subject, it was not until 24 February 2022 – when Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine – that I had my first real-life encounter with resilience.
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The policy paper analysis explores a set of emerging human-driven vulnerabilities of the media landscapes in Estonia and Latvia to develop an evidence-based policy approach to increase the practical resilience and preparedness of Russian-language newsrooms and local journalists working in those areas and regions of high informational vulnerability.
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As the fog of war is always thick with lies and half-truths, it is useful not just for high-ranking decision-makers but also for regular citizens to maintain their practical sense of resilience against harmful disinformation. We must remain pragmatically calm in our everyday behaviour and see problems not just in terms of their immediate impact but also in relation to longer time frames and the variability of predictable consequences.
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Since 2014, after the occupation of the Crimea and part of the territories of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, Ukraine has remained the object of complex operations of influence from Russia. Effective protection from such operations is possible only if the various components of national resilience are fully explored, from regional media development to the readiness and ability of citizens to resist operations of such influence.
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