Wartime Innovation in Europe’s Defence Transformation

Europe is entering a decisive period in its security trajectory. The largest war on the continent since World War II is reshaping military practice, industrial policy, and strategic decision-making.

Ukraine stands at the centre of this transformation both as a victim of Russian aggression and as the driver of technological change. Under extreme pressure, its defence ecosystem has evolved into a highly adaptive, innovation-driven environment.

Ukraine created a new category of defence production centred on autonomous and remotely operated systems.

Europe now faces a strategic choice: to integrate this experience rapidly and systematically, or to accept a growing gap between its capabilities and the realities of modern warfare. The first enables readiness to repel potential Russian aggression and supports the development of credible conventional deterrence. The second increases the risk of aggression by signalling an inability to evolve into a military power.

From Legacy to Wartime Engine

Ukraine’s defence industry has undergone a structural transformation since 2022. What had long been a fragmented, post-Soviet legacy base has become a rapidly scaling wartime ecosystem. Before, the sector combined strong technical foundations with limited industrial momentum. Institutions such as Antonov, Luch, Ivchenko, and Pivdenmash preserved deep engineering competence. Academia, including Kharkiv Aviation Institute and Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, continued to produce skilled specialists. This foundation ensured continuity of knowledge but did not translate into large-scale innovation or production. Key barriers to growth stemmed from an archaic and often corrupt procurement system, limited budgets, and the absence of a coherent future force vision.

The full-scale invasion removed these constraints, and industrial activity aligned directly with battlefield demand. Between 2022 and 2025, Ukraine created a new category of defence production centred on autonomous and remotely operated systems. Unmanned aerial vehicles expanded across reconnaissance, strike, and long-range roles. Unmanned ground vehicles emerged for logistics, support, and combat tasks. Maritime unmanned surface vessels reshaped  in the Black Sea. Production cycles compressed dramatically: in weeks rather than years, based on the feedback from the front line. Ukraine’s military spending skyrocketed from $6.90 bn in 2021 to over $60 bn in 2025, consistently ranking among the top in the world relative to GDP.

Ukraine has become a live laboratory where industrial processes, operational requirements, and technological innovation are fully integrated.

These developments reflect profound changes in both technology and doctrine. In both scale and speed, the war is driving a revolution in military affairs. Affordable precision systems are now produced en masse, reaching millions of units annually across certain types. Ukraine has become a live laboratory where industrial processes, operational requirements, and technological innovation are fully integrated. This environment generates solutions that are continuously tested, refined, and validated under combat conditions.

Europe’s Strategic Disruption

Europe confronts a structural shock to its security architecture. The war against Ukraine has become a central determinant and is widely understood as an existential challenge. The threat from Russia is immediate and credible: analysts estimate that escalation beyond Ukraine could occur within years, with some pointing to even shorter horizons.

At the same time, the transatlantic framework is under strain. The current US administration is pursuing a fundamentally different approach to alliances than any of its predecessors. Public statements questioning the US’s commitment to NATO have raised serious concerns across Europe, with member states beginning to factor reduced US engagement into their strategic planning.

The battlefield is evolving faster than institutional response.

This environment forces a reassessment of Europe’s defence autonomy. European governments must consider their ability to deter Russia with limited external support, accelerate decision-making, and align industrial output with wartime demand. Yet, there are already signs of concern about the pace of adaptation. In the United Kingdom, public debate criticises the speed of defence transformation as insufficient. And similar reckonings are likely to follow across the continent.

The changing character of warfare reinforces this urgency. The ongoing technological shift is exposing the ineffectiveness of many legacy systems and concepts. Furthermore, operational approaches, when tested in exercises such as Hedgehog 2025, reveal clear gaps between doctrine and reality.

The battlefield is evolving faster than institutional response. Europe’s defence industry is adapting, but unevenly. Startups struggle to keep pace with change and position themselves around next-generation warfare concepts. Established companies, such as Rheinmetall, have expanded in value, yet continue to focus on traditional models. Some industry narratives still equate technological complexity with effectiveness, while battlefield evidence proves the two are not reliably correlated. Legacy peacetime procurement systems, organisational culture, and bureaucratic processes are holding back transformation.

Europe has the resources, talent, and industrial capacity required to adapt, but may lack the political will to do it fast enough. The challenge, therefore, lies in translating these assets into effective military capability within a compressed timeframe. To this end, Ukraine provides the only large-scale, real-time source of validated solutions. The question is how to integrate them.

Build with Ukraine

Kyiv proposes a structured integration under the “Build with Ukraine” model. This approach reflects two imperatives: protection of sensitive technologies and the necessity of collaboration.

Control over critical technologies is a legitimate national security concern. Ukrainian systems have been developed under combat conditions and offer operational advantages difficult to replicate. The challenge lies in unregulated transfer, which creates risks, particularly in environments where ownership structures and capital flows can remain opaque. Nor do the existing European safeguards fully eliminate the possibility of technology leakage to adversarial actors.

Europe must build mechanisms that will integrate the Ukrainian experience directly into its industrial base.

At the same time, Ukraine understands that isolation reduces effectiveness and weakens European security. Integration is essential. The “Build with Ukraine” model enables controlled collaboration, allowing for the assessment of partnerships individually, providing structured, conditional technology sharing, and focusing on joint development over one-directional transfer. Evidence shows that isolated development approaches are insufficient. Moreover, many western unmanned systems underperform in Ukraine’s operational environment. High-density electronic warfare, cost constraints, rapid iteration cycles, and mission-specific requirements demand constant adaptation. These conditions cannot be reproduced fully in remote test ranges.

Europe must build mechanisms that will integrate the Ukrainian experience directly into its industrial base. As such, joint ventures provide the most effective framework, where European capital and capacity combine with Ukrainian operational knowledge and engineering expertise. Co-production and component manufacturing in Europe are equally critical. This reduces dependence on external supply chains and increases resilience.

Finally, government leadership is essential, as market-driven cooperation alone will not achieve the required speed—national governments and EU institutions should treat “Build with Ukraine” as a strategic priority.

The Decisive Layer

Russia’s war in Ukraine is forging a new doctrinal framework in real time. Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage through unmanned systems is redefining concealment and manoeuvre. Precision strike at scale is reshaping logistics and survivability, while electronic warfare is altering communications and targeting. European militaries must systematically study these changes and translate lessons into operational concepts—procurement decisions must reflect them. A case in point is Estonia’s recent decision to reallocate €500 mn from combat vehicle purchases to air defence and unmanned systems. Without doctrinal adaptation, increased spending will reinforce outdated models.

Modern warfare increasingly resembles continuous competition between opposing systems. Success depends on adaptation speed and integration, as well as one’s ability to constrain the adversary. European planning must be calibrated to how Russia conducts operations in Ukraine. A dedicated joint programme for studying the evolving operational environment—led by European governments and supported at the EU and NATO levels—is overdue. Institutions such as the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis and Training and Education Centre can contribute significantly, but their exact roles in these transformational processes need to be further defined.

Integration Matters

Integration is equally critical for Ukraine, whose defence ecosystem remains resource-constrained despite its adaptability. Sustaining and scaling innovation hinges on capital, components, and advanced technologies.

Access to capital is a primary limitation, as Ukrainian companies operate under wartime conditions with limited financing. A sustained large-scale foreign institutional investment can scale production, stabilise supply chains, and support continuous innovation. The required investment is modest relative to the scale of the threat facing Europe.

Enabling technologies represent another dependency. Sensors, optics, communications systems, and guidance components are often sourced externally, although European industry has strong capabilities in these domains. By harnessing those assets, reliable, secure alternatives strengthen resilience on both sides.

Without doctrinal adaptation, increased spending will reinforce outdated models.

Joint research and development should, therefore, become a central pillar of such cooperation. Ukraine’s battlefield-driven innovation can complement the scientific and engineering capacity of European universities, startups, and research hubs, with partnerships that streamline prototyping and iteration aligned with operational needs. The cost-benefit ratio strongly favours early investment, accelerating readiness and strengthening deterrence.

European support should also extend to industrial capacity-building by establishing component manufacturing facilities, co-developing critical subsystems, and creating distributed production networks. This model fosters mutual reinforcement: Ukraine gains scalability and resources, Europe gains validated solutions and rapid learning, and both sharpen their ability to respond to a shared threat.

The Need for Structural Change

Europe’s primary constraint is speed. Resources, talent, and industrial capacity are available—execution remains the limiting factor. Bureaucratic and cultural barriers slow progress, since the perception of defence as politically sensitive persists. Many banks and financial institutions still restrict services to defence companies, a practice particularly detrimental to startups.

These legacies are incompatible with today’s security environment, where the timeline for potential escalation is short. If the readiness for next-generation warfare is to be achieved in 2–3 years, the current speed is quite unrealistic to meet the target.

The window for action is limited, but Ukraine is here to help.

We need a shift in mindset, coupled with concrete actions. Governments must prioritise speed in decision-making and implementation by introducing fast-track mechanisms for defence projects. Regulatory frameworks should support rapid scaling; incentives should attract private capital; and administrative barriers to cooperation with Ukraine must be removed. Europe must finally align its pace with the reality of the threat. Russia has demonstrated its ability to mobilise and adapt under pressure. To deter it, Europe requires visible and accelerated preparation. The window for action is limited, but Ukraine is here to help.

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This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).