Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of effective air and missile defence for the protection of both units on the battlefield and infrastructure behind the front lines. The war has also served as a reminder that while Europe’s air and missile defence has long been recognised as a critical capability shortfall, NATO Allies and EU Member States have not acted with sufficient resolve to rectify this situation.
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International partners have provided significant military assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. The temporary suspension of critical US military assistance in early 2025 raised concerns about Ukraine’s strategy to fend off Russia. While it is difficult to predict how the battlefield will unfold in 2025, strong ties with Western partners will be crucial to continue a war of attrition against an overwhelming enemy.
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The Commission presented its White Paper on defence on 19 March at a press conference with the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. [1] This document is part of a dynamic that has been at work since the outburst of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, namely the greater priority given to defence within the EU.
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14 December 2022 — what could have been just another busy day for the EU cybersecurity community — became a landmark moment as the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union agreed to strengthen Europe’s cyber resilience with the new NIS2 Directive.
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With the March 2022 Strategic Compass, the EU “set out a common strategic vision and concrete objectives for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030.” [1] The Compass noted the deterioration in the strategic environment as a result of the return of war to Europe, increased competition between powers, the complexity of threats to the continent’s security, and the undermining of the principles of the international order. In defence, the member states (MS) recognised the need to invest “more and better in innovative capabilities and technologies, fill strategic gaps, and reduce technological and industrial dependencies.” [2] This brief considers the EU’s progress in the defence industrial domain.
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Between February and July 2024, twenty-two countries entered into bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. This paper provides a comparative analysis of these agreements, aiming to identify and explain key similarities and differences in them, thereby offering a clearer understanding of their content and potential implications.
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Since the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has needed huge volumes of weapons and ammunition for a war that is inherently asymmetrical, largely relying on the capabilities that it had—Soviet and domestically produced weapons—and on donations from partner countries. However, it has become clear that the approach is inadequate, especially if there are interruptions in supplies from outside, and that the restoration of Ukraine’s own military-industrial complex is vital to ensuring its security and defence capability, independence, and victory.
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Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has given a new impetus to the EU’s enlargement. Although Ukraine and other candidate countries have a long way to go to full membership, it is useful to start analysing the potential impact of Ukraine’s accession.
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2022 was a wake-up call for the West. The response by the Global South to the war in Ukraine highlighted Russia’s enduring strengths in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.
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Due to their limited human and natural resources, both Estonia and Singapore have become particularly open to technological development and innovation, the latter constantly ranked among the top innovators in the world (sixth in both the Global Innovation Index 2016 and the Bloomberg Innovation Index 2017).
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