The Commission presented its White Paper on defence on 19 March at a press conference with the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. [1] This document is part of a dynamic that has been at work since the outburst of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, namely the greater priority given to defence within the EU.
Download and read as a PDF: The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 | EU Defence Series 2 No. 3
Published quickly—just 100 days after the confirmation of the Commissioner for Defence and Space—the document is short (23 pages) but has the merit of proposing concrete solutions to advance the readiness of EU Member States (MS) in the short term, i.e. between now and 2030 in the areas of defence industry (in particular to fill capability gaps, by producing more, faster and collectively), financing the defence effort, developing partnerships with other states around the world, and, of course, continuing to provide substantial support to Ukraine, which is “currently the frontline of European defence.”[2] The document stresses the EU’s role as facilitator and coordinator but points out that it is primarily the responsibility of the MS to speed up the development of their defence capabilities.
Why now?
A White Paper provides “answers and planning of resources for specific policies such as foreign policy or defence policy.”[3] In this case, the White Paper sets out guidelines in line with those agreed upon in the Versailles Agenda and the 2022 Strategic Compass, namely that the MS must do more for their own security. Unlike these documents, it is not simply an analysis of the threat but, above all, incorporates a detailed roadmap for the actions to be taken to achieve genuine EU readiness in the field of defence by 2030.
Europeans need to anticipate collective defence by themselves in the years to come
Right from the introduction, the document refers to the deteriorating context in which it is being written. Europe is in danger on its own territory because of the Russian threat to the East (described as fundamental and long-term), the many other types of threat it faces (hybrid, terrorism, dependence on raw materials, geographical threats in its Middle Eastern and African neighbourhoods, and also China), and also because of a future disinvestment by the US from the security of the European continent. Europeans, therefore, need to anticipate collective defence by themselves in the years to come.
The White Paper specifying the ReArm Europe plan announced by the President of the Commission on 4 March is part of a short-term approach that will be supplemented by a Preparedness Union Strategy and EU Internal Security Strategy. It is, therefore, in line with the defence of the European project: a project for peace, aimed at protecting EU citizens and defending their interests and values.
The content
The White Paper identifies four priorities. The first is filling capability gaps, with four areas of focus: shared understanding among MS on the most urgent capability investment priorities in light of the recent guidance from the European Council; stable long-term commitment to tackle them; clear agreement on the governance framework for each type of capability; EU funding and incentives to help MS mobilise budget and spend more effectively. Based on the shortfalls identified by the MS, the White Paper defines seven priority capability areas: air and missile defence, artillery systems, ammunitions and missiles, drones and anti-drone systems, military mobility, AI-quantum-cyber-electronic warfare, and strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection.
The second is support for Ukraine and the use of “the porcupine strategy.” The logic is as follows: Ukraine represents the advanced post of European defence and security, and it is this theatre that will define the new international order. What is more, Ukraine’s needs will not diminish in the event of a ceasefire or peace agreement; on the contrary, they are likely to increase, which is why Europeans need to help Kyiv deter any further attacks and ensure a lasting peace. The White Paper cites the integration of the Ukrainian defence industry with the European one as an objective, which would benefit both parties since feedback from the front line would enrich technological advances.
The third is to strengthen the defence industry so that it can produce more, faster and in a collaborative way to ensure predictability for manufacturers over the long term. The White Paper details the aspects related to dependencies, whether on production itself with access to raw materials but also on the use of technologies (components, restrictions on use and export) and the need to work on innovations are detailed, including the preservation of a pool of competent people. The White Paper stresses the need to simplify existing rules and administrative procedures (‘defence omnibus simplification’ proposal to come) and proposes building a true EU-wide market for defence equipment and creating strategic reserves.
The fourth concerns defence spending, which needs to be increased rapidly. The Commission sets out the solutions already mentioned by its President on 4 March. Firstly, a dedicated instrument, SAFE, to the tune of 150 billion euros, which should enable the MS to invest in defence capabilities at potentially more favourable borrowing rates, in a collaborative manner, in line with the ongoing discussions on the European preference for European Defence Industry Programme, EDIP (“in light of the higher requirements for strategic autonomy”). The White Paper also proposes that the MS should be able to activate the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact; that cohesion funds should be reallocated to new defence-related priorities; that the European Investment Bank should continue to reform the eligibility criteria for financing defence-related activities, mobilise more private funds, and increase financial predictability, notably with a larger budget in the next Multi-Financial Framework.
The document also sets out areas of work on military mobility, a crucial issue when it comes to rapidly transporting equipment and troops from one end of Europe to the other in the event of a crisis. The EU has identified four multi-modal corridors (rail, road, sea, and air) and 500 hot-spot projects to be upgraded urgently. In terms of infrastructure, the EU also recognises the need to strengthen the borders with Russia and Belarus with the implementation of the “Eastern Border Shield.”
The EU sets out guidelines for developing security through partnerships around the world
The EU sets out guidelines for developing security through partnerships with organisations and countries around the world. First and foremost, NATO must be strengthened, as it remains the cornerstone of defence, using the EU’s normative and financial power to achieve capability targets (developed in the NATO Defence Planning Process, NDPP). It is also necessary to preserve the transatlantic relationship, which is considered ‘crucial’, and partnerships with the United States and Canada are mentioned in this context. While the language used in relation to the United States refers to the need to preserve ties, that used in relation to Canada shows a desire to enhance them, even indicating a future security and defence partnership. For the record, to date, only six such partnerships have been established with Japan, South Korea, Moldova, North Macedonia, Norway, and Albania. The paragraph on the United Kingdom also mentions the possibility of sealing such an agreement, which could move forward between now and the summit of 19th May between the EU and the UK announced by Kaja Kallas at the press conference.
It may be necessary to ensure that the MS are not left on the sidelines, since it will be their armies that use the new weapons
A strong place is also given to the countries applying for EU membership, including Turkey, but also to Indo-Pacific partners such as Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which have been very supportive of the Ukrainian war effort. India has its own paragraph in which it is stated that the possibility of a partnership will be explored. The visit of the President of the European Commission to New Delhi at the end of February was a step in the right direction in terms of developing cooperation.
Challenges
At the press conference, Kaja Kallas reiterated the EU’s coordinating role, which is to build on existing bodies such as the European Defence Agency (EDA). The latter would also be in charge of aggregating the demand in defence equipment of MS. It would be made possible by a catalogue of European defence products (European Military Sales Mechanism) and implemented with EDIP.
Brussels will have a facilitating role, particularly in the area of standards, trying to simplify procedures for the acquisition and production of defence products (for example, on certifications). In this respect, the strategic dialogue between the European institutions and industry is useful, but it may be necessary to ensure that the MS are not left on the sidelines, since it will ultimately be their armies that use the new weapons.
The coordination with NATO regarding the capability planning will be key, particularly in view of the forthcoming Summit in The Hague in June 2025. The degrees of industrial development or R&D are not the same for all the seven priority capability areas the White Paper lists, and with a potential US disengagement from the continent in the medium term, a particularly strong coordination between NATO and the EU is to be expected to reinforce the European pillar of the Alliance.
The next deadlines are expected in the next few months: firstly, with regards to financing, the MS have until the end of April to trigger the escape clause. Discussions on the use of cohesion funds, the mobilisation of private players and possibly the introduction of Eurobonds (although this was not mentioned in the White Paper, which only states that the Commission “will continue to explore additional funding sources”). Disagreement persists on this last point between so-called ‘frugal’ states such as Germany and the Netherlands and countries such as France and Italy, which would prefer to borrow at the European level rather than add to their national debt (hence, the question mark over whether they would trigger the escape clause).[4]
A strong coordination between NATO and the EU is to be expected to reinforce the European pillar of the Alliance
Whether it is the implementation of SAFE or the EDIP negotiations, which should be concluded by the beginning of the summer at the June Council, European preference will be at the core of the debates between countries that favour boosting the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) (such as France) and those that favour the urgency and availability of equipment for procurement. The purchase of American weapons will, therefore, be an issue in the future, even if it is unlikely to be mitigated in the short term.
Furthermore, one of the next steps will be to reach an agreement between MS on continued support for Ukraine.[5] The integration of Ukraine into the EDTIB is also distilled as a priority in the White Paper and can be seen as a signal to Russia that Ukraine belongs to Europe/the EU and to the US that while Washington may not see the country as strategic for them, it is strategic for Europe.[6]
In the current configuration of international relations, Europe appears to be one of the only places where respect for the international order that aims at guaranteeing stability, including in economic terms, can be applied. Thus, the establishment of partnerships in the field of defence and security with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific is strategic. As far as the direct closest neighbourhood is concerned, it is in the EU’s primary interest to quickly finalise agreements with its natural partners: the UK, Switzerland, Iceland, Moldova, Türkiye, and the Western Balkans. The White Paper only mentions Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, stable NATO Allies and most involved in the EU adhesion process.
Finally, the most important part of the paper remains the implementation of the actions. As Commissioner Kubilius pointed out in his presentation at the press conference, “Putin will not be dissuaded by a White Paper, but by action.” To be credible, all the MS need to be heavily involved, and quickly.
Endnotes
[1] European Commission, “College read-out / press conference (with international sign language) by High Representative / Vice-President Kaja KALLAS and Commissioner Andrius KUBILIUS on the White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030,” 19 March 2025.
[2] European Commission, Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 (European Commission, 19 March 2025), 2.
[3] Patrice Buffotot, “Les Livres blancs sur la défense sous la Ve République, Paix et sécurité européenne et internationale ,” 2015, 2.
[4] Gregorio Sorgi and Giovanna Faggionato, “Southern Europe rebuffs von der Leyen’s debt-based defense plan,” Politico, 26 March 2025.
[5] Nicholas Vinocur and Jacopo Barigazzi, “EU plan to send more military aid to Ukraine in shambles”, Politico, 20 March 2025.
[6] Alexandre Jubelin, Elie Tenenbaum, Rym Momtaz, “ Europe : le début du réveil stratégique ? [Le Casque et la Plume #11] ,” podcast Le Collimateur, 25 March 2025.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.
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