The first months of 2025 witnessed monumental changes for European security. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has created a huge degree of uncertainty, and it is increasingly likely that Europe will need to prepare for much less American commitment to its security and defence. There are serious questions about how large the impact on the EU and NATO will be, the future of NATO’s Article 5, and what the US reaction will be if a NATO Ally is attacked. In any scenario, one of the most important enablers of Europe’s defence is the ability to move troops and equipment swiftly across the continent and ensure that reinforcements can arrive quickly in case of conflict. This brief maps developments at the EU level to enhance military mobility and highlights what is still needed to overcome challenges and bottlenecks.
Download and read as a PDF: Military Mobility A Critical Enabler | EU Defence Series 2 No. 4
The threat environment in Europe remains very bleak. Despite its war in Ukraine, Russia has, according to reports, been able to increase its military production and grow its capacity to modernise military equipment.[1] Some analysts project that if the war in Ukraine is frozen, Russia would be able to start a war with a bordering country within six months and launch a regional war in the Baltic Sea region within two years.[2] Furthermore, it could launch a large-scale attack on Europe within a timeframe of five years.
In this context, Europeans need to enhance their defence capabilities dramatically and become more self-reliant. Immediate priorities include increasing defence spending, filling capability gaps, and ensuring enablement, including through enhanced military mobility. Further improvements here are vital, for example, it still takes about sixty days to transport an equipment convoy from a French military site to the Cincu training centre in Romania, where France is the lead nation of the NATO multinational battlegroup.[3] Enhanced military mobility will require upgraded roads, railways, bridges, and port structures capable of handling heavyweight transports; the ability to protect this critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber-attacks; the streamlining and simplifying of bureaucratic procedures and systems across European countries; and exercising to make sure there is a high level of preparedness.
EU Military Mobility
Military mobility first gained attention at the EU level in 2017-18 through the launch of the EU Action Plan and the various commitments undertaken by the member states (MS) at the Foreign Affairs Council of June 2018, which included developing national plans for military mobility and ensuring permissions for cross-border movement within five working days.[4] A Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project to enhance cooperation on military mobility was also launched in 2018.
The increasing importance of enhancing military mobility was reflected in the EU’s Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022.[5] In light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Compass outlined the urgency of substantially developing military mobility across the European continent through strengthening dual-use transport infrastructure across the trans-European transport network, accelerating and harmonising cross-border procedures, and increasing cyber resilience of transport infrastructure. It also laid the path towards the development of a revised Action Plan on military mobility at EU level. The Action plan 2.0 was delivered in 2022 and provided concrete actions regarding each of the pillars identified in the Strategic Compass.
Military mobility gradually became a strategic priority at EU political level, designated as a focus area in developing EU defence capabilities and enhancing readiness
Military mobility gradually became a strategic priority at EU political level with the 2023 Granada declaration, which designates it as a priority focus area in developing EU defence capabilities and enhancing defence readiness.[6]
The topic further occupied a central stage during the Belgian Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2024. A military mobility pledge was agreed by the EU Council in June 2024, which set out key commitments to be implemented by the MS before 2026:
- Prioritise dual-use transport infrastructure investments and urgently complete the EU priority transport corridors for large-scale and short-notice military movements;
- Advance efforts to consolidate coordination and cooperation mechanisms at the national level;
- Encourage MS to share information and best practices on cooperation within strategic corridors; and
- Strengthen the overall resilience in all domains related to the transport sector, including cybersecurity.[7]
The special EU Council of 6 March 2025 underlined the need to continue to substantially increase expenditure on Europe’s security and defence and identified a first list of priority capability areas for action at EU level, including military mobility.[8]
In terms of EU-NATO cooperation, military mobility has been included in the common set of proposals to implement the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of 2016 and is currently a flagship area of cooperation between the two organisations, with an ongoing structured dialogue to ensure coordination and cooperation. Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has added significant value in the area of military mobility—both from a geopolitical perspective and a policy angle. The two countries bring alternative routes for transport and more transit capacities, as well as decades of experience, lessons, and best practice in comprehensive and total defence concepts to share with other Allies.
Persistent Challenges
Despite progress in setting strategies, directions and objectives, there are still many obstacles that hinder further progress in enhancing military mobility as an essential component for deterrence and defence on the European continent.
Above all, EU-level funding for dual-use transport infrastructure needs to be urgently increased. In a recent interview, the EU’s Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius highlighted that the EU would need an initial investment of €70 billion to adapt its infrastructure for the swift mobility of armed forces.[9] However, EU budget funding for 2021-27, channelled through the Connecting Europe Facility, totalled only €1.69 billion, which was used to co-finance 95 selected projects. The Draghi report on EU competitiveness urges the EU to mobilise public and private financing and increase EU and MS resources to prioritise military mobility.[10]
The Niinistö report on strengthening EU civil and military preparedness and readiness commends military mobility as an illustration of an EU dual-use policy that contributes to European preparedness in the face of crises and highlights the regulation that makes it mandatory for MS to consider military mobility needs when developing infrastructure on the Trans-European Transport Network. It also points to several problems with regulatory processes (such as the long time needed to obtain diplomatic permissions and to clear customs procedures and get special permits to move military equipment and dangerous goods across MS borders), infrastructural weaknesses and bottlenecks that slow down progress (infrastructure not suited for large, heavy military equipment which often creates long detours to reach destinations) and the inadequate level of funding needed if the EU is to meet the demands of better preparedness and increased deterrence.[11]
EU-level funding for dual-use transport infrastructure needs to be urgently increased
The European Court of Auditors’ special report on EU military mobility from February 2025 also outlines several challenges.[12] It notes that while EU funding has represented added value and that dispersing the funds has been quick, the level of the funding has been very low and quickly exhausted. At the same time, an estimate of the overall funding required to make the objectives of the Action Plan 2.0 achievable has been lacking.
One other important aspect pointed out by the Court is that while EU MS agree on the importance and urgency of military mobility as a strategic enabler, their priorities differ slightly in what needs to be done first: develop further dual-use transport infrastructure or simplify procedures and eliminate customs bureaucracy.
Progress has been slow, and implementation lags as political will does not seem to be fully in line with the priorities outlined
The new Commission’s White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 was released in March 2025. It acknowledges the progress made in developing military mobility while highlighting that multiple challenges still persist: red tape, non-harmonised procedures between MS, lack of dual-use capable transport infrastructure, and the limited availability of multiple routes and transport modes. [13]
The Way Ahead
Military mobility receives important attention in the White Paper as a priority capability area, critical to building a strong European deterrence posture and achieving a high degree of defence readiness on the European continent.
In terms of concrete steps undertaken so far, the document stresses that the EU has identified four priority transport corridors (rail, road, sea, and air) for military mobility and within these 500 dual-use infrastructure projects (such as railway tunnels, reinforcing road and railway bridges, expanding port, and airport terminals) that need to be implemented urgently. The White Paper also underlines that the EU can add further value in enhancing military mobility by facilitating the joint procurement of specialised and dual-use transport assets in all transport modes that are crucial for increasing the capacity to transport military equipment.
The emphasis on the need to extend the EU’s military mobility corridors into Ukraine to ensure smoother deliveries of equipment is essential both for supporting Ukraine and for the long-term enhancement of military mobility on the European continent.
Moving forward, the Commission’s intention to adopt a Joint Communication on Military Mobility by the end of this year is a very welcome move. This document should be immediately developed and should lay out concretely the funding avenues available for the dual-use infrastructure projects identified, and estimate the overall funding required to make this target achievable. It should also focus on the progress achieved by the groups of MS working to develop military mobility corridors and on how the EU, in partnership with NATO, could further connect these corridors and help streamline procedures. Furthermore, it is crucial for the EU to better link debates on enhancing military mobility between all MS capitals and Brussels.
Cooperation between MS to develop military mobility corridors has been put into practice on the European continent and should be further expanded. Examples include the corridors set up by the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland in January 2024 and by Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania in July 2024. Similarly, in November 2024, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland signed a letter of intent to harmonise military mobility corridors and cooperate on specific objectives such as: aligning cross-border movement regulations; exploring possibilities to scale already established national solutions to other Allies and partners, aiming to synchronise the development of cross-border military mobility infrastructure; and exploring funding mechanisms.[14] The development of these corridors should also encourage other nations to subsequently participate or set up similar corridors that will be paramount in the event of a crisis.
Conclusion
The EU has made important progress in advancing military mobility on the European continent: identifying bottlenecks, designing strategies, setting new priorities, and placing military mobility at the forefront of the debate about enhancing European defence. Military mobility is at the top of the political agenda, and there is no shortage of recommendations to tackle existing challenges.
However, progress on the ground has been slow, and implementation lags as political will does not seem to be fully in line with the priorities outlined. Addressing these underlying challenges will be paramount if the EU’s military mobility agenda is to be implemented.
Endnotes
[1] United States Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Christopher G. Cavoli,” 3 April 2025.
[2] Ketrin Jochecová, “Russia could start a major war in Europe within 5 years, Danish intelligence warns,” Politico, 11 February 2025.
[3] Elie Tenenbaum and Amélie Zima, “Return to the East: the Russian Threat and the French Pivot to Europe’s Eastern Flank,” IFRI, June 2024, 59.
[4] European Union, Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy,” 25 June 2018.
[5] European Union, European External Action Service, “A Strategic Compass for security and defence,” 24 March 2022, 12.
[6] European Union, European Council, “The Granada declaration,” 6 October 2023.
[7] European Union, Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on EU Security and Defence,” 27 May 2024.
[8] European Union, European Council, “European Council conclusions on European defence,” 6 March 2025.
[9] Paula Soler, “Kubilius: EU needs at least €70 billion to strengthen military mobility,” Euronews, 25 March 2025.
[10] European Union, European Commission, “The Draghi report on EU competitiveness,” 9 September 2024, 219.
[11] European Union, European Commission, “Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness,” 30 October 2024, 124.
[12] European Court of Auditors, “Special report 04/2025: EU military mobility – Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route,” 5 February 2025, 9-11.
[13] European Union, European Commission, “Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030,” 19 March 2025, 8-9.
[14] Government Offices of Sweden, “Letter of Intent on military mobility between Nordic countries,” 21 November 2024.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.
Download and read:
- Mihai Chihaia: Military Mobility A Critical Enabler | EU Defence Series 2 No. 4 (PDF)
Read also:
- Marianne Paire: The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 | No. 3
- Marianne Paire: Strengthening the Industry | No. 2
- Maxime Cordet: PESCO Must Step Up | No. 1