November 11, 2024

The Lights Go Off: The Inglorious End of Germany’s Ampelkoalition

EPA/Scanpix
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reacts after delivering a government declaration, as he sits next to former German Finance Minister Christian Lindner, in the German parliament 'Bundestag', in Berlin, Germany, 26 June 2024.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reacts after delivering a government declaration, as he sits next to former German Finance Minister Christian Lindner, in the German parliament 'Bundestag', in Berlin, Germany, 26 June 2024.

Germans will long remember 6 November 2024. In the early morning, Donald Trump was elected to become the 47th president of the United States. And in the late evening, Germany lost its first Ampelkoalition (traffic-light-coalition).

Expectations were high when Olaf Scholz became chancellor in December 2021. Most German citizens looked forward to a new vigour in Berlin. Germany’s political and economic stagnation after Angela Merkel’s 16 years as chancellor was to be ended. Three parties with extremely different goals—the SPD (social democrats), the Green Party and the liberal FDP—agreed to form a coalition. The FDP in particular differed from the others in its economic and financial objectives, yet the parties succeeded in forming a stable government.

Breaches of Confidence

Differences of opinion can arise in any government. Germany’s coalition committee, composed of members of each party in government, is intended to be the forum for finding common solutions. However, as the number of disputes in the Scholz coalition grew, they were increasingly aired in public, from contradictions in press conferences to separately organised summits with industry representatives, for example, after the approval of the Renewable Energy Heating Act.

Most recently, major differences about the 2025 budget led to the Ampelkoalition polling as the worst government in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was increasingly obvious that the differences between the three parties was insurmountable.

Scholz decided to dismiss Finance Minister Christian Lindner and to publicly criticise him in unusually clear terms: “Too often, necessary compromises have been drowned out by publicly staged disputes and loud ideological demands. Too often, Federal Minister Lindner has blocked the laws of other ministers outside his responsibilities. Too often, he has engaged in petty tactics. Too often, he has broken my trust.” As a result, the FDP announced that most of its ministers would leave the federal government, leaving Germany rudderless.

And Now?

Scholz’s goal is to lead a minority government consisting of the SPD and the Greens for the next weeks as there are still some laws, regulations and the 2025 budget to be passed by the end of the year. He has approached the leader of the opposition, Friedrich Merz (CDU), to try to secure the necessary majorities for this. He then wants to call a motion of confidence to determine whether he still has the trust of a majority of Bundestag members: this will most likely not be the case. He had scheduled this vote for 15 January 2025, but is now under some pressure to submit the motion already this year.

Federal law requires the president to dissolve the Bundestag at the request of the chancellor or on the resignation of the government. New elections must then be held within 60 days. Federal elections originally scheduled for 28 September 2025 may now, as a result of conservative CDU/CSU pressure for an early motion of confidence, take place as soon as 19 January. Early elections would favour the CDU/CSU, as they are currently forecast to get 33% of the vote, making Friedrich Merz the most likely next chancellor. The far-right AfD would also receive more votes, while the parties of the Ampelkoalition would lose out. Polling at just 3%, the FDP may no longer be part of the new Bundestag at all. In any event, Germany will be very preoccupied with itself for the next few months.

Consequences for Defence

Germany’s defence minister, Boris Pistorius, is the most popular politician of the nation. He has been forward looking on both the national and international levels. During his term of office, Germany’s defence spending reached 2% for the first time in 30 years, and he has implemented his most important project: the German brigade in Lithuania. He has started reforms in the Bundeswehr command structure, even if these are not sufficient to solve ongoing challenges.

It is to be seen whether he will remain in office under a CDU/CSU chancellor after the next election. While this may be possible if the SPD are also part of the next federal government, under Angela Merkel, all defence ministers between 2005 and 2021 were members of the CDU/CSU. As such, they were responsible for abolishing military service in 2011 and for making considerable financial cuts to the Bundeswehr, leaving it drastically short of equipment.

A key question is whether a CDU/CSU defence minister would revert to such policies, rather than focus on the long-term task of maintaining, or better still increasing, defence spending to ensure that the Bundeswehr is provided with modern equipment and in particular with personnel, all which would be essential to continuing Germany’s new-found active role in defence.

It is already clear that the CDU/CSU will likely not pursue Pistorius’ current model of compulsory military service, as they “want a real military service” based on the Scandinavian model. To future-proof defence reform more broadly, Scholz’s Vice Chancellor, Robert Habeck, has proposed that a new Sondervermögen (special fund) for the Bundeswehr should be approved before the election. There is a risk that after the election, the far-right AfD and the far-left BSW (party of Sahra Wagenknecht) would block such a move.

Merz, meanwhile, has announced that he wants to lead a Germany active in defence matters. This also includes support for Ukraine. In recent years, as leader of the opposition, Merz has criticised Scholz’s hesitation in supplying tanks, air defence systems and other military equipment. A new CDU/CSU-led government should thus continue to support Ukraine extensively – but only once a stable government is in office.

Three years after its launch, the Ampelkoalition has failed. While at the beginning, it could be seen as a functional, proactive government, it must be recognised retrospectively that this experiment will not be sustainable in future governments. Germany now needs to regain a stable government as soon as possible to ensure that it can act on the national level and especially, in the light of the results of the US presidential elections, on the international level too.

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