On 30 April 2024, German defence minister Boris Pistorius signed the Osnabrücker Erlass (decree of Osnabrück) to restructure the Bundeswehr. What might this mean for the Baltic region?
From “laissez-faire”…
The Bundeswehr, responsible for the defence of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1955, has been reformed several times in response to changing world situations. The first major reform took place under defence minister Helmut Schmidt in 1972. The most comprehensive reform was in 1990 when the Bundeswehr was merged with the Nationalen Volksarmee of the German Democratic Republic. This marked a turning point in German defence policy: troop numbers were significantly reduced and defence spending was cut and would remain below 2% of GDP for the coming decades.
A 1998 reform under Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker committed the Bundeswehr to national and Alliance defence and introduced a new logistics organisational unit. In 2002, the most recent major reform—the “transformation of the Bundeswehr”—shifted the focus of the Bundeswehr towards missions abroad. After that, the Bundeswehr mostly lost the attention of decision makers in Berlin, although the federal government ended compulsory military service in 2011 to save money and Ursula von der Leyen initiated some modernisation steps during her 2013-2019 period in office as defence minister.
… to active shaping
This changed with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and with the appointment of Boris Pistorius as defence minister in January 2023. Pistorius is clearly committed to refocusing the Bundeswehr on national and Alliance defence and to using the Sondervermögen (special fund) for comprehensive modernisation. Troop numbers are set to increase again with a new conscription model based on voluntary participation.
The Osnabrücker Erlass provides for a restructuring of the Bundeswehr. The three armed forces will be joined by a fourth, the cyber force. The number of cyberattacks has increased in Germany, also affecting political decision makers, since the start of Russia’s full-scale war. Another major reform is the consolidation of the supporting infrastructure. A new Bundeswehr Support Command will gather under one roof several areas that were previously more or less separate, for example the ambulance service, logistics, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence, and civil-military cooperation.
A new single operational command will also replace the Territoriales Führungskommando (responsible for domestic operations) and the Einsatzführungskommando (responsible for foreign operations). Command and control will then be exercised centrally from one location and by one commander, avoiding overlaps.
Pistorius, whose commitment to the further development of the Bundeswehr already sets him apart from his recent predecessors, has presented these reforms as being required to implement the Zeitenwende. They are of considerable importance not only for defending against an attack, but also for cooperation within NATO and the EU.
The Baltic Sea
The Baltic Sea is of great importance to both Russia and NATO. For Russia, it provides vital trade routes and the only means of high-volume transit between continental Russia and its Kaliningrad exclave. For NATO it offers both opportunities, for example, Finland and Sweden’s accession allows the opening of new sea lines of communication, and risks, including a wide range of hostile hybrid or grey-zone actions. Comprehensive surveillance of the Baltic Sea is thus essential for NATO but is presently limited by a lack of joint situation monitoring and reporting.
Germany wishes to become more actively involved in the Baltic Sea. One development in the maritime domain is the establishment of a German underwater situation centre, whose aim is to “correlate the existing recognised maritime picture with civilian, military and intelligence information to get rid of the white spaces, both surface and subsurface”.
Separately, a new regional maritime headquarters for the Baltic Sea, Commander Task Force Baltic Headquarters, will be established in Rostock as part of the Alliance’s force structure with the aim of aligning international defence plans for the Baltic Sea. The creation of this headquarters demonstrates Germany’s willingness to take more responsibility in regional security.
A Step Forward?
Pistorius wants to prepare the Bundeswehr for future challenges, including those implied by the frequently used word kriegstüchtig (war-ready). But it is not clear that his plans are sufficiently far-reaching. Although the command and control structure is being reduced, for example, the number of generals is not. Too little emphasis is also placed on research of potentially great significance for the future, for example, there is little evidence of a readiness to incorporate lessons from Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, such as the use of drones or artificial intelligence, or the implications for military medicine.
CDU/CSU Member of the Bundestag and Speaker of Foreign and Defence affairs for his fraction, Johann Wadephul is a leading critic, arguing that the reforms are insufficient to deal with the “pressure to act” and need to be more comprehensive. Unlike many CDU/CSU politicians, however, Wadephul also sees his own party, which headed the Ministry of Defence from 2005 to 2021, to have been at fault. Many of today’s challenges can be traced back to decisions made during this period, such as austerity measures in defence and the end of the compulsory military service.
Pistorius’ reforms are certainly a step forward, dismantling duplicate structures and enhancing the profile of cyber operations. But further steps are needed to overcome today’s challenges. Wadephul draws the right conclusion: “it’s a missed opportunity”.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).