The Trump–Xi Second Summit: What Europe Stands to Lose

President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping will meet for their second summit of 2026 in Washington, DC on September 24. Many of the same issues from their May summit remain on the agenda — trade and investment, the emerging strategic-stability framework, AI competition, Iran, and Taiwan.

For Europe, three areas carry implications: any discussion of Ukraine, although a priority for neither side; economic talks and their impact on EU-China trade tensions; and the discussions around Iran and Taiwan, alongside their implications for the US global security posture.

The summit will mark the first Chinese state visit to the US since 2015, when President Xi was received by President Barack Obama. Both sides come in with different priorities. While Trump may look for quick economic wins and for Beijing’s restraint in supporting Tehran, Xi’s focus may lie on the wider US–China relationship. In May, Beijing secured Washington’s agreement to its proposed concept of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” (建设性战略稳定关系). Turning this into a real, working framework will be a major goal for the Chinese side, as will extracting further concessions on Taiwan, rhetorical or otherwise.

For Europe, the summit is unlikely to bring any positive news. As Ukraine is a priority for neither side, Washington is unlikely to increase aid to Kyiv, nor is Beijing likely to cut its lifeline to Russia. Therefore, it is up to Brussels to continue its steadfast support. On trade, the US may seek a thaw with China as the midterms approach. At the same time, EU–China trade tensions continue to mount, meaning that, if need be, Brussels will have to act against Beijing on its own.

Heading into the Summit

In the pre-summit weeks, Xi went on a diplomatic tour of the global south, signalling Beijing’s wide range of global partnerships and list of non-US priorities. Between late August and mid-September, the Chinese president made state visits to Kyrgyzstan and Egypt and attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS summits in Bishkek and New Delhi respectively. This international engagement, even amid rivalry with India, casts China in a cooperative light and stands in contrast to the US, which continues its trade war with Canada, a close partner.

This international engagement, even amid rivalry with India, casts China in a cooperative light and stands in contrast to the US, which continues its trade war with Canada.

Meanwhile, Trump is politically in a tough spot going into the summit, with his popularity in decline ahead of the midterms. As his recent diplomatic blitz on Ukraine may in fact be about the midterms, the Trump–Xi summit will also carry weight for US domestic politics. Going into November, a quick economic win or a breakthrough on Iran would boost Trump’s political capital. A strong desire to achieve some sort of deal could push the American president to make concessions in other areas.

The Chinese side does not face the same immediate political pressure. Although 2026 has seen numerous high-level purges within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including General Zhang Youxia’s removal from the Central Military Commission in January, Xi has so far weathered the storm. The next major event on the Chinese political calendar, the 21^st Party Congress, will not take place for another 12 months. Going into the summit, Xi therefore faces less pressure than Trump to secure concrete, short-term deliverables.

The Agenda

Major topics expected to be covered are trade, investment, AI, Iran, and Taiwan. Shorter-term issues include trade and investment, as well as the war in Iran. Discussions of AI competition, defining the wider US-China relationship, and the future of Taiwan remain longer-term sticking points between Washington and Beijing.

On Iran, Trump will likely ask Beijing to curb its support for Tehran. To date, the American President seems content with China’s limited role, saying that the Chinese President had “behaved reasonably well.” This perceived restraint may not stem from Trump’s requests, but rather from Beijing’s calculus in maintaining ties with Gulf partners, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

As for Taiwan, Xi will reiterate China’s position. If Trump makes any further rhetorical concessions, they will fall on receptive ears in Beijing. After the first summit, Trump said that Taiwan was 9 500 miles away, implying that US intervention was undesirable because of the distance. Additionally, he called the arms trade a “very good negotiating chip,” going against the longstanding norm of not discussing the matter with Beijing, as laid out in the Six Assurances to Taiwan. Whether rhetorical concessions become material concessions remains to be seen, with the most recent $14 bn arms package still under review.

Impact on Europe

Neither side looks likely to bring anything new to the table on Ukraine, as both Washington and Beijing have higher-priority issues to deal with. Even if Ukraine were to be discussed, little would change. Trump continues to look for a quick end to the war, while Beijing continues to support the status quo — propping up the Russian economy as Moscow’s number one trading partner and supplying dual-use goods. Neither position is conducive to a sustainable peace. This means Brussels must continue supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes.

A thaw in US-China trade relations could leave Brussels to face Beijing on its own. During the State of the European Union address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that the EU’s €1 billion-a-day trade deficit with China had reached a “tipping point.” She called the relationship unsustainable, also citing dangerous dependencies, and added that the EU “will use all tools” at its disposal to rebalance relations. It has become increasingly clear that the EU has no other option but to act. Brussels had originally hoped to present a united front with Washington, but if the second Trump–Xi summit improves US–China trade relations, then the EU will have to go it alone.

Finally, the summit’s discussions on Iran and Taiwan are important for Europe to follow. The former has direct implications for European security, as the war continues to tie up the US military and severely deplete its weapons stockpiles. The latter matters because of the interconnectedness of the European and Indo-Pacific security theatres, and as a broader signal of continued US security commitments to allies and partners.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).