Trump’s Diplomatic Blitz on Ukraine May Really Be About the Midterms

Last week, after a long hiatus, Trump's special envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff held back-to-back meetings with the presidents of Russia and Ukraine. Ten days earlier, CIA Director John Ratcliffe had made an unannounced visit to Moscow. Much suggests that the US administration's renewed diplomatic push on the Russia-Ukraine war may be directly tied to the American electoral calendar.

This trip stands out sharply against the backdrop of Kushner and Witkoff’s previous shuttle diplomacy on behalf of a US-brokered “peace deal” between Russia and Ukraine. They visited Moscow for the first time since the start of the US military operation in Iran, then travelled on to Kyiv for the first time since Donald Trump returned to the White House. More strikingly, this may be the first round of their talks not accompanied by leaks — before or after — and one in which the phrase “peace plan” was barely invoked at all. As the FT put it, “[t]he envoys brought few new ideas.”

So Why Go Now?

The answer may lie in the electoral math Republicans now face. With two months to go before election day, the party finds itself in a tough spot. Approval of its leader, President Donald Trump, keeps sliding, and Republicans are close to losing their majority in at least the House of Representatives.

The main drivers of Trump’s declining ratings are the unpopular war in Iran and dissatisfaction with his handling of the economy. These two factors are, in fact, intertwined. After the US and Israel launched their military operation against Iran and Tehran escalated threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, fuel prices at American pumps began climbing sharply. A gallon of regular gasoline now costs roughly 30% more than it did before the fighting began, while diesel has surged nearly 60%. Trump typically pins blame for the country’s troubles on the previous administration, but that line of defence is wearing thin this time around.

By late spring, Washington had apparently concluded that the conflict with Iran could drag on indefinitely and that there was no realistic prospect of a negotiated settlement before the midterms. Airstrikes on military targets failed to produce the desired effect — neither toppling the ayatollahs’ regime nor shifting its foreign policy. Tehran, for its part, recognises that a full-scale US ground invasion is unlikely, and is playing for time, evidently betting on wearing Trump down politically.

With the Iran track stalled, the Trump administration pivoted to the Russia-Ukraine war, hoping to bank some political capital there before November. In June, Trump declared that he was putting Iran “in the rearview mirror” to focus on what was happening in Ukraine. Around the same time as this latest round of shuttle diplomacy, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Energy Secretary Chris Wright began citing Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries as one of the root causes of higher fuel prices, obscuring the administration’s own role in the run-up at the pump.

What to Expect?

As reported, Witkoff and Kushner were focused on making progress on the diplomatic track “before winter.” That progress could plausibly take the form of relaunching talks in a more permanent format, replacing the current shuttle diplomacy. At a joint press conference with Trump’s envoys, Volodymyr Zelensky floated two possible options: a “trilateral format” involving Ukraine, Russia, and the US, or a “trilateral-plus format” that would bring in Europe. Setting up a standing negotiating group along these lines by November would likely suit Washington just fine, since it could be presented to American voters as proof that the administration is making headway on the fuel-price problem.

The Kremlin, for its part, could well go along with this. Putin likely calculates that time is on his side: Trump grows more electorally vulnerable, Europe is being swept by a wave of right-wing populists open to business as usual with Moscow, and Ukraine faces a brutal winter ahead. What’s more, no negotiating format would impose any real constraints on the Russian military. If anything, Russia keeps doing what it has been doing all along — terrorising Ukrainian cities, destroying power plants, logistics hubs, shopping centres, and other civilian infrastructure, in hopes of breaking the population’s will to resist.

Ukraine, too, may play along and agree to resume talks in a trilateral or broader format. Kyiv likely sees it as an opening for expanded US support, which has all but dried up since Donald Trump took office. President Volodymyr Zelensky has acknowledged that a difficult winter lies ahead, pointing to a “winter package” of assistance that could include US LNG shipments, arrangements for air-defence munitions, and financial aid. Five years into a war of sheer survival, the value of any assistance is hard to overstate.

All told, this US diplomatic push on Ukraine looks less like a carefully considered attempt to end the war than an image-management campaign for Trump and his administration ahead of the midterms. Achieving a durable peace, however, will take more than the facade of a “peace process.” It requires a sharp escalation of sanctions pressure on the Russian economy, a ramp-up in support for Ukraine, and a western willingness to respond decisively whenever Putin tries to raise the stakes.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).