Germany is the Front Line of Russian Hybrid Attacks: What Comes Next?

The German government recently attributed to Russia an attempted attack at Leipzig Airport involving a drone carrying explosives.

In response, the government shut down a Russian consulate in Bonn and the Russian House cultural centre in Berlin and summoned the Russian ambassador to the foreign ministry. Berlin will also propose adding more Russians to EU sanctions lists, set up entry controls for Russians, and increase pressure on Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which consists of tankers suspected of shipping Russian oil. The recent moves by Berlin come after years of mounting Russian hybrid attacks on German soil, including arson, drone flyovers, assassination attempts, espionage, and cyberattacks.

The Leipzig incident revealed that Russian hybrid attacks pose a new level of danger, as Moscow is unafraid of potentially causing deadly consequences and has the capability to reach German critical infrastructure. Furthermore, a weapons cache found outside Berlin last summer suggests that the resources needed to carry out potentially violent operations on German soil may already be in place. Authorities believe the cache was used by agents carrying out kinetic attacks for Moscow. The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) has warned that hybrid warfare is a sustained and evolving threat, which makes it difficult to combat.

Increasingly Tense Mood Amid Elections

The German response has gradually become more systematic since 2022. But German politicians are divided over the adequacy of the response so far and what measures should be taken. The Green Party says the government’s response to the Leipzig incident was too little and too slow, and did not do enough to deter Moscow. The CDU’s security expert Roderich Kiesewetter said that the German government should stop appeasing Russia and should invoke Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which requires allies to engage in consultations in the event of an external threat. Some fear that Russia will continue to escalate its attacks and could be preparing for a war against all of Europe.

The rising fear of Russia also comes amid domestic political change and tensions. In September, the AfD achieved 44% of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt, a historic win for the party. It is expected to do well in the 20 September elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The AfD’s success has been a signal of falling support for Merz and the CDU. One of the major policy changes the party advocates concerns relations with Russia. It aims to restore ties with Moscow, stop aid to Ukraine, and return to cheap Russian energy. Merz has warned that this would have “unprecedented consequences for all of us, including Germany”.

In order to prevent further harmful hybrid attacks, Berlin needs a strong, unified response. But this is becoming increasingly difficult amid divided public and political opinion. The AfD’s rise will make this especially difficult, given its favourable position on Russia. Formulating a government response to Russian attacks will only become part of the already polarised domestic debate around Ukraine. However, a failure to respond will only make Germany appear weak on national security and allow for further breaches by Russia on EU soil.

Policy Discourse

Berlin has recently begun to strengthen its institutions more actively to combat and prevent hybrid threats. For example, the cabinet recently approved a draft law increasing the operational capabilities of the intelligence services. One measure would allow intelligence services to take active protective measures when other agencies cannot intervene effectively.

The major debate among politicians now is whether Germany should fight back offensively. With increased capabilities, intelligence agencies could have the potential to do so. However, counter-attacking Russia risks significant escalation. Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has already stated that the attribution of the Leipzig attack to Moscow was “the start of a real war”.

“The major debate among politicians now is whether Germany should fight back offensively. With increased capabilities, intelligence agencies could have the potential to do so.”

The debate has reached the EU and NATO level, as European politicians are considering whether to open a debate about triggering NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence clause in the event of a hybrid attack.

“We are too shy – definitely,” said Bundestag member Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, who chairs the European Parliament’s defence committee. “Vladimir Putin never stops, he’s always coming closer … we have to show we’re willing to fight back.”

NATO forces shot down a drone over Lithuanian airspace on 15 September, a strong move signalling Lithuania and NATO’s preparedness in the event of a threat. Germany should pursue a similarly hard stance.

What Is Necessary

Instead of immediately escalating, Berlin should establish clear escalation ladders to signal to Russia what the implications are for each type of attack. With predictable measures, deterrence becomes more credible. A predetermined framework would allow Germany to respond proportionally to each attack, limit improvisation by Berlin, and reduce the temptation in Moscow to escalate attacks.

The debate over whether to counter-attack offensively is an important and valid one. However, should Germany retaliate against Russian infrastructure or targets on Russian soil, it risks escalating hybrid warfare into conventional warfare.

Yet Berlin must understand that the issue of hybrid warfare will not disappear soon. Germany is Ukraine’s second-largest supporter, so destabilising Germany is important for Russia as it attempts to reduce public and political support for Ukraine. Russia will undoubtedly continue to escalate its hybrid attacks, treading the line between war and hybrid war.

“If Europe continues to be afraid of escalation, Russia has no incentive to de-escalate its attacks.”

For credible deterrence, Germany must be firm in attributing attacks to Russia. Some experts believe that Berlin has refrained from placing too much blame on Russia because doing so could cost the governing parties the backing of many eastern German voters, who are already uncomfortable with Germany’s support for Ukraine. German authorities should target whole networks rather than individual low-level agents, who are replaceable in Moscow’s eyes. Germany must focus on Russian organisations in Europe facilitating these attacks, logistics networks, financing, and cross-border cooperation. This approach would be similar to the fight against terrorism. If Europe continues to be afraid of escalation, Russia has no incentive to de-escalate its attacks. As the head of the BND, Martin Jäger, said, Russia must also “feel the pain” for real change to occur.

Berlin has spent considerable time and resources investigating and mitigating individual hybrid attacks. While this is important, now is the time to take a firmer stance on Russia. With Ukrainian weapons and budget shortages, and German public support for Ukraine slowly declining – 42% now say military support goes too far – Russia may have the opportunity to get ahead in the war. Now is not the time for Germany to fall behind in its response to hybrid attacks.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).