The FCAS Collapse and Europe’s Enduring Coordination Problem

Aside from Napoleon's own military acumen, the French emperor came to dominate Europe largely because successive European coalitions failed to translate their superior combined power into effective action. Competing interests, divergent strategic priorities and poor coordination prevented Europeans from confronting the common enemy together. The collapse of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) offers a reminder that this challenge has not entirely disappeared from the continent.

Conceived as a flagship project of European defence integration, FCAS was supposed to symbolise the ability of European states to overcome national and industrial rivalries in pursuit of a common strategic objective. Its failure highlights the political and industrial fragmentation that still divides Europe and makes cooperation on defence more difficult than many policymakers would like to admit.

The Symbolic and Real Value

Sensing an increasing vulnerability due to threats from Russia and the apparent disengagement of the US in Europe, most EU member states have ramped up defence spending to rebuild their military power and enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy. However, actual fighting capabilities depend not solely on how much money is spent, but also on how and on what it is spent. This is why the fragmentation of the European Defence Industrial Base (EDTIB)—in the form of duplication of military platforms, failures in joint procurement, and national protectionism by defence companies—constitutes the biggest hurdle to unlocking Europe’s military potential.

The fragmentation of the European Defence Industrial Base constitutes the biggest hurdle to unlocking Europe’s military potential.

By combining the national champions of France’s Dassault Aviation, Spain’s Indra Group, and Germany’s Airbus, the European powers envisioned building a 6th-generation fighter jet currently not possessed by any country in the world. Launched by France and Germany in 2017, the project was intended to transcend national interests and industrial competition while resetting Franco-German relations in pursuit of a common strategic goal: bolstering and modernising Europe’s defence capabilities. This ambitious €100 bn project would have demonstrated how the fragmented EDTIB could come together, allowing Europe to appear to the world as more than the sum of its national parts.

The Breakdown

Despite high hopes for FCAS, the programme was effectively terminated on 8 June 2026, after it became clear that neither the French and German governments nor their industrial champions could reach agreement on work-sharing arrangements, intellectual property rights, and the aircraft’s core functions.

Among other things, the preeminent issue was that Dassault Aviation, which possesses the know-how to develop the jet on its own, opposed sharing information with its industrial competitor, Airbus. This raised concerns in Germany about becoming dependent on a foreign company for the repair and maintenance of the jointly developed aircraft.

Ultimately, the political ambitions behind FCAS were overwhelmed by entrenched industrial interests, national priorities and differing strategic cultures.

These industrial disputes were further compounded by differences in strategic culture. France’s longstanding emphasis on strategic autonomy and independent military action led it to favour a jet capable of operating from aircraft carriers and supporting its nuclear deterrent, whereas Germany’s more multilateral approach prioritised a platform suited to land-based NATO-integrated missions.

Ultimately, the political ambitions behind FCAS were overwhelmed by entrenched industrial interests, national priorities and differing strategic cultures, splintering the hopes that this project would demonstrate Europe overcoming some of the barriers that have long thwarted its defence-industrial fragmentation.

Signals to Frontline Nations

The relatively muted reaction from eastern European and Baltic leaders stands in contrast to comments from elsewhere in Europe. Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles described the collapse as “very worrying for Europe,” and Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever called it “pure stupidity.” Although it would be unwise to read too much into the absence of public statements, the contrast may reflect differing strategic priorities. For states on NATO’s eastern flank, the immediate challenge is securing low-cost, effective capabilities that can strengthen deterrence in the near term, rather than being preoccupied with a sixth-generation fighter expected to enter service only in the 2040s.

This focus on immediate security needs also helps explain why the region tends to view European defence initiatives differently. Most states on NATO’s eastern flank value those only as long as they complement, rather than replace, the transatlantic Alliance. In contrast to the French conception of strategic autonomy, these countries are likely to view programmes such as FCAS primarily as a capability-enhancing project, rather than as a defining test of Europe’s ability to provide for its own security.

States on NATO’s eastern flank view programmes such as FCAS primarily as a capability-enhancing project.

Nevertheless, the disappointment with FCAS might stem from a deeper question concerning Europe’s leadership: who sits in the driving seat? The collapse of the programme exposed not only industrial disagreements, but also the limitations of the Franco-German engine that has traditionally been expected to drive European integration. Earlier this year, similar tensions emerged over the use of the €90 bn loan to Ukraine, with Paris and Berlin again disagreeing on the balance between supporting European defence industries and procuring capabilities immediately available from abroad.

This matters particularly to frontline nations like the Baltics. As Europe is expected to assume greater responsibility within NATO, its potential to develop and field military capabilities will depend on multinational cooperation. High-tech military capabilities increasingly require the financial and technological collaboration of several countries, meaning that smaller and medium-sized states cannot realistically pursue such ambitions on their own. FCAS-like projects matter not because the Baltic states would one day acquire this expensive equipment, but because the project’s failure sheds light on Europe’s capacity to organise and carry through ambitious multinational defence ventures. At a time of NATO’s Europeanisation, leadership struggles in the west carry growing consequences for states on Europe’s eastern frontier, whose security depends on the credibility of European deterrence.

Making the Case for Integration

Rather than discouraging cooperation, the fate of FCAS may yet strengthen the case for more stable, clearly defined frameworks rather than ad hoc arrangements between individual states. One possibility would be to make greater use of EU mechanisms, such as the European Defence Agency, which could help maintain continuity and coordination when political disagreements arise. At the same time, it would be unrealistic to assume that the most sensitive defence projects could simply be transferred into EU structures, as major European powers are unlikely to readily share critical technologies associated with capabilities such as a 6th-generation fighter. Furthermore, successful examples of multinational cooperation already exist outside formal EU frameworks, with the Common Armoured Vehicle System (CAVS), a bottom-up initiative, being one of them.

Rather than discouraging cooperation, the fate of FCAS may yet strengthen the case for more stable, clearly defined frameworks rather than ad hoc arrangements between individual states.

Therefore, the lesson of FCAS is not that one institutional model is inherently superior, but that ambitious multinational projects require governance structures capable of managing political disagreements before they come to undermine cooperation altogether.

It would be too naive and premature to view the failure of FCAS as a bellwether of the collapse of EDTIB integration. Parts of the programme, such as the combat cloud or sensors, are likely to move forward. Europe will not be short of a new generation fighter jet either, with the Global Combat Air Programme (CGAP) involving the UK, Italy, and Japan progressing at a faster pace and with greater alignment of interests than was the case for FCAS. But the significance of FCAS never lay as much in the aircraft itself as in what it represented.

FCAS serves as a reminder that resources and defence spending alone do not automatically translate into military power.

Despite the fragmented nature of the first five coalitions in the Napoleonic Wars, the Sixth Coalition ultimately emerged victorious thanks to the unprecedented unity Europeans were able to muster in pursuit of a common objective. Europe today is obviously a very different entity facing a very different challenge. Yet FCAS serves as a reminder that resources and defence spending alone do not automatically translate into military power. The ability of EU member states to subordinate national interests to a common strategic objective, while maintaining trust in one another and providing clear political leadership, may prove to be Europe’s most important force multiplier. If Europe is serious about strengthening its defence capabilities, overcoming the divisions exposed by FCAS will matter far more than the fate of any single fighter jet.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).