Spinning the Globe: Russian Information Warfare and Its Reach into the Global South

While concentrated on Europe, and especially on Ukraine, Moscow’s drive to challenge the world order has a global dimension. A tool of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy with worldwide impact is information operations.

This report presents a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of Russia’s global foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) ecosystem, spanning official state communications, state-controlled media, and intelligence-controlled covert media operations. The scope of these activities is vast and potentially powerful, and it represents a strategic asset for Russia’s foreign policy.

What the analysis finds is that Russia’s diplomats, state-controlled media, and intelligence agencies are attempting to implant the Kremlin-managed FIMI ecosystem in foreign settings. Such operations take time and depend heavily on local networks of influence, as well as a measure of elite access. In all these cases, Moscow mobilises the substantial budgets of media outlets such as RT and Sputnik and the credibility afforded by diplomatic representations.

Still, the impact is hard to measure. This report proposes that we think of Russia’s FIMI ecosystem and its regional implantations as a structure that creates long-term opportunities for Russian foreign policy and provides a framework for Moscow to seize those opportunities as they emerge. The cases of Ghana, India, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are compared, as their examples provide insights into how Moscow adapts its messaging and builds local networks. Moreover, an in-depth analysis of the case of Sudan shows the impact of Russian FIMI in the context of a civil war, making peace efforts more fragile.

In all cases, however, the goal of Russian FIMI is to advance the Kremlin’s foreign policy. In that sense, the analysis finds repeated Russian false narratives spread against Ukraine, NATO, the Baltic states, and any actor pushing back against Russian aggression.

There is no silver bullet to respond to these threats. For Europe—the EU and the national governments—to respond, the current efforts must be enhanced further:

• Conceive a positive narrative to reframe Europe’s relations with the countries of Africa and Asia. Shared prosperity and a partnership of equals must be the keywords.
• Respond to Russian FIMI through asymmetric means that exploit Russia’s limitations globally, especially concerning financial means (funding, sanctions) and partnerships.
• Expand proactive responses and upgrade the capabilities of the relevant agencies to monitor global FIMI across a wider range of languages.
• Enhance cooperation by funding local partners in the long term and involving the European defender community. Joint efforts must be led by regional partners.
• Deepen empirical research on disinformation and its effects, especially outside of ‘global north’ countries; these data will enhance our responses.