Discussions on international development assistance tend to contemplate the role of colonial legacies and the power imbalances between donors and recipients. Russian humanitarian aid and development cooperation stands out in this debate, as Moscow uses aid as part of its aggressive foreign policy based on spheres of influence.
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After all, Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine—as well as its other wars—renders the Kremlin into a source of insecurity and destruction rather than development.[1] Moscow has never apologised for or acknowledged the country’s colonial history but instead continued to present its development aid as a paternalistic ‘gift of modernity’.[2] This brief examines the state of Russian aid today and its role in Moscow’s foreign policy.
Cold War legacies loom large over this topic. Based on an adherence to Soviet Marxism and raison d’état, Moscow’s assistance emphasised the transfer of capital goods and the Soviet model of industrialisation. This thinking was pursued through large-scale projects and infrastructure that reached every continent. Russian society has been ambivalent about the legacy of this cooperation: notably, many blamed the financial problems of the late Soviet Union partly on Moscow’s Cold War assistance policy.[3]
Russia delivers aid to sustain its image as a major power and to support its claims to ‘spheres of influence’
Between 1991 and 2006, Russia was a net receiver of international aid. Its rise to donor status in 2007 was lauded by President Vladimir Putin as evidence of Russia re-emerging as a ‘major power’.[4] In 2008, the Kremlin published a development aid concept (updated in 2014 and 2023). The latest edition reaffirmed the aid’s relevance in Moscow’s great power claims. The 2023 text states that Russia is invested in global development, which reflects its role as a country “historically responsible for the formation of the international system.”[5]
The Power to Co-Opt
Russia’s aid abroad is primarily meant to co-opt foreign leaders. By deploying aid together with other engagements, Moscow seeks to gain leverage with relatively small investments and with no conditions for accountability, especially in human rights. For example, at different stages of the Syrian civil war, Moscow provided wide-ranging material support to Damascus labelled as ‘aid’. In reality, these deliveries served as an input for the patronage machine of then-ruler Bashar al-Assad.[6] The data available on Russian humanitarian aid to Syria up to 2021 allowed Jonathan Robinson to conclude that it was “shallow,” “inconsistent” and “lack[ing in] commitment.”[7]
In addition, the Kremlin considers foreign aid as a component of its state communications, all of which—in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war—consist of laundering its aggressive foreign policy. Rossotrudnichestvo (nominally Russia’s main international cooperation agency) is sanctioned by the European Union and several governments because of its involvement in the invasion and occupation of parts of Ukraine.[8] The EU’s sanctions regulation describes it as “[Russia’s] main state agency projecting the Kremlin’s soft power and hybrid influence” and “disseminating the Kremlin’s narratives, including historical revisionism.”[9] Since 2022, Russian state officials have written about the importance of amplifying the communications of aid provisions to increase Moscow’s influence abroad.[10]
Since the 2010s, Russian aid has reportedly reached almost every developing country in the world at least once
Historical revisionism is indeed part of Russia’s narratives deployed to accompany aid deliveries abroad. For example, in Central Asia, Moscow’s aid replicates the myth of Russia’s imperial innocence. Namely, instead of framing its assistance cooperation with Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan in terms of post-colonial reconciliation, Russia continues to portray its aid to the region in paternalistic terms, echoing the narratives Moscow used during the Soviet era to justify its continued domination over the region.[11] In sum, Russia delivers aid abroad to sustain its image as a major power and to support its claims to ‘spheres of influence’. These goals are reflected by the patterns and features of aid provision, especially since 2022.
Trajectories
Measuring and mapping Russian aid present a challenge. Official sources generally do not follow the reporting standards set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Moreover, Russian practices tend to be opaque, incomplete, and inconsistent, further impeding a reliable quantitative analysis of the aid volumes.[12] Russia’s isolation has also resulted in fewer international organisations reporting and corroborating cooperation data, so all figures need to be taken with caution.
Institutional setting. Rossotrudnichestvo operates under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and has a wide mandate that includes diaspora support, public diplomacy, and cultural cooperation; though all these activities have an informational warfare element, especially since 2022.[13] Rossotrudnichestvo is mostly engaged in bilateral cooperation and some multilateral projects, especially with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and BRICS. All other multilateral aid is managed by the Ministry of Finance.[14]
Aid volume. Prior to 2022, Russian and international sources estimated the volume at approximately 1bn USD disbursed annually since the late 2010s and split 60/40% between multilateral and bilateral aid. The last available OECD data suggest Russian aid amounted to 1.2bn USD in 2019. This figure amounted to under 0.1% of Russia’s Gross National Income (GNI), well below the 0.7% benchmark of the OECD.[15]
No longer reporting to the OECD, the official Russian aid database is known to undercount aid deliveries.[16] According to it, there was a decrease in foreign aid as the country was involved in 72 documented projects in 2023, a drop from 152 in 2021.[17] Other sources also hint at a downward trend. Since 2022, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has continued to report Russian contributions: in 2019, these amounted to 16.28mln USD and 37 projects; in 2024, contributions dropped to 0.2mln USD and 34 projects.[18]
Language promotion is a recurrent theme in Russian aid and has geopolitical edge
Geographic scope. Since the 2010s, Russian aid has reportedly reached almost every developing country in the world at least once, either through bilateral or multilateral channels.[19] For example, in 2015, Moscow delivered 39 tonnes of aid to Guinea over the Ebola outbreak.[20] Yet, Russian documents state a set of geographic priorities when choosing development partners. According to the 2023 concept, Russia’s cooperation policy is directed at “forming positive, neighbourly relations with bordering countries” as well as creating “positive conditions” for Russia in the world. The EAEU is said to be the top priority, together with countries “traditionally friendly to Russia.”[21]
According to data independently compiled by Asmus, Fuchs, and Müller, most countries in the world received a share of under 0.5% of Russia’s total aid in 2011-15. Yet, a few countries—Armenia, Cuba, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, North Korea, Serbia, Syria, Tajikistan, and Zambia—received over 1% of Moscow’s total aid abroad.[22] Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two Russia-occupied territories of Georgia, also received relatively larger shares of Russia’s total disbursed aid. This pattern may have held in 2022 and 2023: of the 113 aid projects officially reported, 43 (38,1%) targeted the above-mentioned countries and territories.
Russian aid does not have the features necessary for promoting long-term, sustainable development
Cooperation topics. Russian financial assistance—consisting of debt relief, state budget support, and dept-for-development programmes—was a key feature of Moscow’s aid in the 2000s and 2010s. One estimate based on 2019 OECD figures suggests that 61% of Russian aid consisted of debt forgiveness.[23] Since 2022, this assistance mechanism has been used twice: in Somalia (in 2023, for 690mln USD) and in other African countries (in 2023, for an alleged total of 20bn USD).[24] Russia continues to be part of several multilateral development funds. For example, it owns 100% of the Kyrgyz Development Fund, 65% of the Eurasian Development Bank, 20% of the BRICS-associated New Development Bank, and 6.5% of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.[25] Of the 24 and 33 countries listed as cooperation partners in 2022-23, only two (one for each year) had projects covered by Russia’s “economic development” (экономическое развитие) cooperation, namely, Laos and Kyrgyzstan.[26]
Russian language promotion is a recurrent theme in Russian aid—i.e., teacher training, book donations, and summer schools—and has a geopolitical edge. In Central Asia, these measures seek to prevent the Russian language from falling into disuse in the region, thus cutting off one important vector of Moscow’s influence in the region. Along these lines, the 2023 update of the Russian development assistance concept introduced higher education as a key aid measure.[27] It consists of government-funded spots at Russian state universities reserved for foreign students. Since 2022, the Kremlin has reportedly raised the number of scholarships to 15 thousand; although, this figure—incl. allocation and final admissions— cannot be independently verified.[28] These programmes’ graduates may then be involved in public diplomacy and propaganda operations by the Russian embassies in their home countries, often via alumni associations.[29] Finally, healthcare assistance—in the shape of vaccine donations and other medical supplies—has been rising in scope, despite the tendency of the Russian pharmaceutical sector to miss deliveries.[30]
Outlook
Due to the unreliability of Russian official data on foreign aid, the post-2022 trajectory is difficult to conclusively assess. Yet, some changes can be observed, such as the trend towards bilateral aid and shifts in recurrent partners.[31] In general, as the volumes, cooperation topics, and institutional setting show, Russian aid does not have the features necessary for promoting long-term, sustainable development. Instead, its long-term goal remains to perform a self-serving exercise meant to articulate the Kremlin’s ‘major power’ claim and to sustain partnerships that respond to its geostrategic interests. For Russia’s geographical neighbours, like the Central Asian states and the occupied parts of Georgia, Moscow uses aid as an element of its spheres of influence thinking. For those farther away, like in the cases of Syria and African nations, Russian material support is a vehicle of influence to underpin asymmetrical partnerships, often part of a power projection strategy. The outcome is that Russian aid is not conceived to deliver on development goals or humanitarian causes but to serve Moscow’s imperial agenda.
Endnotes
[1] A 2024 World Bank estimate of the reconstruction costs for Ukraine puts the total at 486bn EUR. “Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment Released,” World Bank, 15 February 2024.
[2] Botakoz Kassymbekova, Erica Marat, “Time to Question Russia’s Imperial Innocence,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 771 (April 2022).
[3] Charles Quist-Adade, “The African Russians: Children of the cold war,” in Maxim Matusevich (ed), Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three centuries of encounters (2007), 167.
[4] Thomas Kunze, Leonardo Salvador, Michail Khrapak, “Blending development assistance and interest-driven foreign policy. Russia’s development policy: concepts and implementation,” Development Policy Monitor, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, January 2022.
[5] President of the Russian Federation, Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 13.03.2023 № 161 [Russian Presidential Decree No 161 od 12 March 2023]” (Moscow: Official Portal of Legal Acts, 2023).
[6] Jonas Heins, “Putin and Assad, Partners in Crime: Why Russian Forces Steal Wheat From Ukraine,” ICDS, 3 November 2022.
[7] Jonathan Robinson, “Five years of Russian aid in Syria proves Moscow is an unreliable partner,” Atlantic Council, 8 June 2021.
[8] The full name is Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation.
[9] Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1270 of 21 July 2022, European Union official website.
[10] Sergey Mikhnevich, “How Can Russia Make Its International Development Assistance More Effective?,” Valdai Discussion Club, 15 March 2023.
[11] Interview with Botakoz Kassymbekova, October 2024.
[12] Robinson, “Five years of Russian aid in Syria”.
[13] Nadiia Koval, Maryna Irysova, Serhiy Tytiuk, Denys Tereshchenko, “Rossotrudnichestvo. The Unbearable Harshness of Soft Power,” Ukrainian Institute, 2022.
[14] Andrey Makarychev and Licínia Simão, “Russia’s Development Assistance with a Focus on Africa,” NOREF, July 2014.
[15] Kunze, Salvador, Khrapak, “Blending development assistance and interest-driven foreign policy,” 6.
[16] Robinson, “Five years of Russian aid in Syria”.
[17] “Gumanitarnaia Karta [Humanitarian map],” accessed in February 2025.
[18] United Nations Development Programme, “Russian Federation,” accessed in February 2025.
[19] Gerda Asmus, Andreas Fuchs, Angelika Müller, “Russia’s foreign aid re-emerges,” AidData, 9 April 2018.
[20] “Lutte contre Ebola : La Fédération de Russie et RUSAL appuient les autorités guinéennes… [Fight against Ebola: the Russian Federation and RUSAL support the Guinean authorities],” Africaguinee.com, 4 February 2015.
[21] President, Russian Presidential Decree No 161 od 12 March 2023.
[22] Asmus, Fuchs, Müller, “Russia’s foreign aid re-emerges.”
[23] Kunze, Salvador, Khrapak, “Blending development assistance and interest-driven foreign policy,” 7.
[24] “Russia has written off $20 bln worth of African debts — MFA,” TASS, 13 November 2024.
[25] “Russia and the World Bank: International Development Assistance,” World Bank Group.
[26] “Gumanitarnaia Karta.”
[27] Patrick Jack, “Russian scholarships for African students ‘echo Cold War tactics’,” Times Higher Education, 9 August 2023.
[28] Ilya Andreev, “Russia’s brain gain,” Novaya Gazeta, 17 September 2023.
[29] Ivan U. Klyszcz, How Russia Brings its War Against Ukraine to the Global South (ICDS, June 2023), 11-13.
[30] Paul Stronski, “What Went Wrong with Russia’s Sputnik V Vaccine Rollout?,” Carnegie Endowment, 15 November 2021.
[31] Yury Zaitsev and Alexander Knobel, “Russia’s Development Aid Becomes Bilateral,” Monitoring of Russia’s Economic Outlook. Trends and Challenges of Socio-Economic Development, no. 8, (2023): 14-17.
The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.