Not Quite Agents of Change: Russian Anti-War Grassroots Initiatives in Europe

Russian anti-war grassroots initiatives in Europe largely originated from small groups of emigrants who, in 2021, organised rallies in support of Alexei Navalny. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 sparked a wave of activism by Russian immigrants.

Since then, experts have begun to question whether these communities could play a role in Russia’s future transformations.

To evaluate the true political potential of these grassroots anti-war initiatives, it is essential to understand how they function. To this end, this report draws on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives of diaspora-type anti-war communities across Europe and highlights persistent characteristics of Russian anti-war grassroots initiatives.

Based on this analysis, this report provides the following recommendations:

• Manage expectations and communication appropriately. European governments should not regard Russian anti-war grassroots initiatives as “agents of change in Russia” or frame expectations in these terms. Émigré activists lack the resources, organisational infrastructure, and motivation for such a role. Clearly articulating realistic expectations will help avoid mutual disappointment and unnecessary financial expenditures. In the same vein, it would be prudent to curb any wishful thinking about Russia’s brighter political prospects.
• Steer clear of misconceptions about “mini-laboratories” for a future Russia. The idea of framing émigré activists as future “agents of change” in Russia is unlikely to be viable. Their graduates would be too detached from the harsh realities inside Russia to effectively compete for political power or serve as credible sources of information capable of influencing audiences in Russia.
• Avoid imposing leaders on Russian anti-war grassroots initiatives. The community is characterised by polyphony and a preference for horizontal structures. Intrusive attempts to present any current opposition politician as their representative will only reinforce alienation. Over time, more coordinated diaspora communities may emerge around registered large NGOs, potentially developing their own leadership structures.
• Prioritise the ‘Europe First’ concept in discussions of the future security system. European security strategy should not rely on dependencies or fragile illusions, such as the notion that only a democratic Russia can guarantee the continent’s security. The claim that Europe can secure its own safety only after a political regime change in Russia is mistaken and creates a false impression that Europe can influence internal dynamics within the Kremlin. Instead, focus should be on what is realistically within Europe’s capacity to effectively deter aggressive actions from its eastern neighbour: developing its own defence capabilities, strengthening societal resilience across Europe, and continuing support for Ukraine. European security ultimately rests in Europe’s hands.