The Office of the High Representative (OHR) exemplifies a controversial system of international intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The challenges posed by the institution's far-reaching powers have once again come under scrutiny following the resignation of the High Representative (HR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schmidt.
His departure has revealed the weaknesses of international oversight without unified western backing, while also exposing the United States’ transactional approach under the Trump administration and the European Union’s shortcomings in maintaining conditionality and normative power during enlargement negotiations. Ultimately, this raises a broader question: what will these developments mean for the future of the OHR?
Status Quo of the OHR
The election of the HR for BiH represents more than just the selection of a new leader for one of the country’s most controversial institutions. It exposes the political tensions between the European Union and the United States, the business-oriented ambitions of the Trump administration, and BiH’s weakened governmental structures, which for the past three decades have relied on external actors while continuing to harbour unresolved, deep-seated ethnic tensions among the country’s three constituent peoples.
At the forefront of these discussions are the Office of the High Representative and its UN-appointed head, the High Representative. After the signing of the US-negotiated Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) in 1995, the OHR was established to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. The HR is meant to ensure the continuity of the DPA and, for this purpose, wields the Bonn powers, which authorise the HR to enforce legally binding decisions, impose or annul legislation, and remove public officials from office.
After Schmidt’s departure, the members of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board (SB) have been unable to agree on a successor, as customary practice requires – not unanimity or consensus but agreement among the major powers on a single candidate.
In this interim period, the American diplomat Louis J. Crishock assumed office as Acting High Representative on 1 July 2026. He took office with the same mandate and responsibilities as a fully-fledged successor, including the authority to wield the Bonn powers. Crishock’s appointment as Acting HR followed procedure. He had previously served as the First Deputy High Representative – one step lower in the hierarchy – and was familiar with Bosnian domestic politics through his role as Supervisor for the Brčko District.
United States’ (Lack of) Interference
When Schmidt’s resignation as HR was announced on 11 May 2026, it did not come as a surprise, as it had already been the subject of speculation for several months. Although his tenure was controversial among both the domestic population and the western political elite, and his departure was officially presented as a personal choice, reports suggest that Schmidt was pressured to leave by the Trump administration. This was linked to Schmidt’s unwillingness to support a Trump-linked business venture, the Southern Interconnection, a gas pipeline project connecting BiH to Croatia. This, in turn, would have reduced Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reliance on Russian energy sources. Furthermore, Schmidt’s strongly interventionist role in BiH differed considerably from the US’s newly unveiled strategic approach towards the Western Balkans, which advocates weakening international oversight and advancing economic cooperation while promoting intervention only when it serves US interests.
This US approach affirms a well-known position of the Trump administration – that Europe needs to deal with its own affairs.
Consequently, this US approach affirms a well-known position of the Trump administration – that Europe needs to deal with its own affairs. However, this becomes problematic when the United States continues to engage diplomatically with Russia, including through intermediary actors in BiH, such as Milorad Dodik. The strongman behind Republika Srpska, BiH’s majority Serb-populated autonomous entity, Dodik espouses secessionist views and deeply nationalistic policies and is a favoured politician of the Kremlin. As such, when the Trump administration decided to lift sanctions on Dodik, which Schmidt had imposed, and organised meetings with influential figures from Dodik’s circle, as illustrated by the meeting between Donald Trump Jr. and Igor Dodik, Milorad Dodik’s son, it signalled a highly counterproductive approach. Engaging with a leader who encourages separatist sentiment and taking a transactional approach to peacebuilding raises questions about the US’s true aims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while also creating uncertainty about its plans for the future High Representative.
Still, the US withdrawal of support for Schmidt brings to light an even greater problem concerning the prospects for the OHR’s authority and continued presence in BiH. As Schmidt never received endorsement through a UN Security Council mandate because of vetoes by Russia and China, the authority of his position depended on the support of the United States and other members of the PIC. The next HR will likely face a similar situation, as Russia remains adamant about dismantling the OHR. Without US backing, therefore, the HR’s authority and the OHR’s mission to implement the 5+2 Agenda risk being compromised, along with the peacebuilding efforts of the past thirty years.
Accession to the EU?
As the US moves away from maintaining the post-DPA order that it helped build, the question arises: who will take on the mantle of upholding this peacebuilding framework? The most likely contender is the European Union. Twenty years after the Thessaloniki Summit, the EU introduced its Growth Plan for the Western Balkans in 2023. This strategy, rooted primarily in economic integration with the ultimate goal of preparing the region for EU accession, reaffirms the European Union’s commitment to the Western Balkan countries.
However, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union presents a multifaceted challenge. Although the country has been working towards EU membership for over twenty years, BiH was granted candidate status in 2022 because of a changing outlook towards enlargement rather than because it had fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine revived the importance of security and geopolitical considerations in enlargement policy, while tentatively easing enlargement fatigue.
As the US withdraws, the authority that has strongly underpinned the OHR is being compromised.
Although BiH has taken steps towards accession and adopted some of the necessary reforms, it has become increasingly evident that its gradual integration into the EU has stagnated. One reason is domestic political fragmentation along ethnic lines, which has even prevented BiH from agreeing on a chief negotiator with the EU. Because of these divisions, the political elite has been unable to agree on a Reform Agenda, with the result that BiH has not even received pre-financing under the Growth Plan. If BiH’s political leadership cannot agree on a strategy by December 2026, the EU will inevitably have to allocate funding to Western Balkan countries that have made greater progress in their gradual integration.
Still, as the US withdraws, the authority that has strongly underpinned the OHR is being compromised. The EU therefore needs to determine what kind of future it favours for Bosnia, while the Bosnian political leadership must do the same. As public opinion in BiH strongly favours accession and this support is also reflected in the Balkan Barometer, while the EU is the country’s biggest financial supporter, a stronger EU role in supporting BiH’s accession process might not face significant public resistance if ethnic divisions can be overcome. Nevertheless, the argument remains that, for EU accession to be achieved, the OHR cannot continue intervening in domestic political processes, as one reason for its controversial nature is the way in which it weakens domestic accountability within BiH’s own governmental structures. However, the OHR was never intended to be a permanent institution, and at some point its role must come to an end. An alternative pathway to fulfilling the 5+2 Agenda – and thereby dismantling the OHR – could also be achieved through EU accession, as previous High Representatives Carl Bildt and Wolfgang Petritsch have argued.
The Power of the People
Dependence on external actors is evident in BiH – whether or not its necessity is disputed – but the authority of domestic governmental structures and the power of the Bosnian people cannot be overlooked.
As the post-DPA order potentially weakens and a stronger pro-EU trajectory continues, a situation could emerge in which the only viable outcome is greater domestic accountability within governmental structures. If international oversight loosens its grip on BiH while the US intensifies its business-oriented approach, an outcome similar to the Flamingo Revolution in Albania could occur. This civic movement, driven mainly by young people, centres on far-reaching governmental reforms aimed at increasing domestic accountability, reducing corruption, and protecting the environment. Already in the summer of 2026, similar sentiments emerged among Bosniak youth, who began carrying flags adorned with white lilies as a sign of protest against the international community’s presence. Despite the presidency and government institutions being divided among the three constituent peoples, and despite deep-seated ethnic tensions that have built up over decades, this could – in a hopeful scenario – provide a framework for greater unity. However, there is a caveat. The HR, whatever its shortcomings, is still perceived as a figure who, among other things, is meant to ensure that no one ethnic group dominates another. Even so, greater solidarity among Bosnia’s communities remains possible.
Acting High Representative – Permanent Successor?
Currently, the US and several European governments are divided over their preferred permanent candidate. The United States supports the Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi, while the European majority and the United Kingdom back the French diplomat René Troccaz. The disagreement, however, centres on the mandate. The US is advocating less international oversight while pursuing its economic objectives in BiH, whereas the EU wants to maintain its normative authority while ensuring the continuation of the peacebuilding efforts of the past thirty years.
The US is advocating less international oversight while pursuing its economic objectives in BiH, whereas the EU wants to maintain its normative authority while ensuring the continuation of the peacebuilding efforts.
However, another possible scenario is that the members of the PIC SB fail to reach an agreement on who should become HR, which could ultimately result in Crishock remaining in his position. Although Crishock would remain bound by the PIC SB and the DPA, this would significantly increase US influence in BiH and could turn out to be the best-case scenario for the US, with both the HR and Deputy HR potentially being American and wielding fully fledged authority within the OHR. According to precedent and tradition, the HR has always been appointed from a European state, while the First Deputy High Representative has been American.
Nevertheless, the manner of Schmidt’s departure could have established a precedent, meaning that Crishock’s own position towards the US and the future of the OHR could prove inconsequential if political pressure from Washington becomes too strong to ignore.
This interregnum in Bosnia and Herzegovina will eventually pass. Even so, the question remains: what kind of order will emerge?
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).