Germany has a new coalition of the conservative CDU/CSU and the social democrats (SPD). Six months after the inglorious end of the last government under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Germany can finally get back to business. What are the government’s defence policy goals for the next legislature?
Quick negotiations, quick results, quick action?
The CDU/CSU and SPD were able to reach an agreement faster than expected – just two months after the election. The geopolitical situation has changed enormously in this period, including through the threat of punitive US tariffs on German products that would place a heavy burden on the already weakened economy. Both sides faced some pressure to reach a quick agreement.
While the speed of the agreement is positive, it is possible that some decisions were made too quickly or could not be properly debated. The next step is for the CDU/CSU and SPD to hold a final vote on the agreement. The SPD must consult its members, while a small party conference decides for the CDU, and the executive committee for the CSU. All this needs time. It is likely that Friedrich Merz will not be elected as chancellor and his ministers nominated until 7 May.
Learning from the past?
A CDU/CSU and SPD coalition has been the most common format in Germany’s history. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel also formed a coalition with the SPD in three of her four terms in office (2005-09 and 2013-2021). This period was marked by enormous crises – the economic and financial crisis, the refugee crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic – with defence playing a less important role and defence spending kept at a low level, even after 2014. The result was a lack of personnel, quality equipment and military infrastructure from which the Bundeswehr is still suffering. When it comes to defence, in the next four years all three future coalition parties, but especially CDU/CSU, must demonstrate that they have learned from these mistakes of the past.
Strengthened defence policy
The new coalition agreement defines the current geopolitical situation as the biggest challenge since the end of the Cold War. It states that intensive cooperation with the US must continue, and Ukraine must receive comprehensive support to be in the best position for possible negotiations. This should include, in coordination with other European states, the use of frozen Russian assets. The EU, meanwhile, should become a defence union in order to strengthen the European pillar of NATO.
The new government is also calling for a fair NATO burden-sharing arrangement between the Allies with Germany’s defence spending kept in line with NATO requirements, while a law to significantly accelerate the procurement of military equipment projects will be introduced. The brigade in Lithuania, which is to be implemented by the end of 2027, remains a key project with high priority. More broadly, due to its location, Germany has to be a reliable central logistic turntable for all NATO Allies. Compulsory military service as practised before 2011 will not be re-instated, but a model based on the Swedish one, meaning based on voluntary service, will be introduced. Finally, the competitiveness of the German and European defence industry is to be strengthened, and supply chains made more resilient. Together, these measures should lead to Germany being able to defend itself, so that Germany does not have to defend itself.
Nevertheless, the new government remains very vague on some points. First, while the intent to ensure that defence spending is in line with NATO guidelines is important, the coalition agreement contains no proposal to increase the NATO target. The future federal government apparently has no position here, even as the NATO Summit in The Hague is rapidly approaching.
Second, there is no national target for defence spending outside of NATO guidelines. The Baltic states have already announced that they want to invest more than 5% in defence – significantly more than any possible target that may be adopted in The Hague. This is a missed chance to emphasise Germany`s aspiration to take responsibility in NATO and encourage other Allies to also increase their defence budgets.
Third, in the context of the new military service model, young men will only be asked to fill in a form at the moment. It is not yet clear how the model will be implemented afterwards, but one of the original aims was to compensate for the lack of regular soldiers. On the downside, the target of 203,000 soldiers by 2031 (currently 180,000, still decreasing) is no longer included in the new agreement.
Fourth, the new government recognises the importance of maritime security in the North and Baltic Seas. This is underlined, for example, by the opening of the NATO Commander Task Force Baltic in Rostock in October 2024. However, there are no proposals for how to handle current challenges, such as the sabotage of underwater cables or airspace violations, especially in and over the Baltic Sea.
Boris Pistorius
Apart from the future Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz, no other government positions have been announced. The agreement states that the CDU will provide the Minister for Foreign Affairs, while the SPD will provide the Vice-Chancellor and the Ministers of Finance and Defence. This makes it very likely that Boris Pistorius will remain as defence minister, allowing him to finish the implementation of the German brigade in Lithuania, his largest and most important project. He is also the loudest voice advocating an increased NATO defence spending target.
In recent decades, the term ‘Grand Coalition’ (Grosse Koalition, GroKo) has been used to describe a coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD, as they have had more than two-thirds of MPs. These times are definitely over: the new coalition has only a slim majority of 13 seats in the Bundestag. The new government must be quick to implement new policy once it is sworn in, but above all, its work must be based on trust. Any future crisis in the government will be detrimental to its work.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).
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