Europe’s Energy Security Playbook

Nearly all Baltic Sea states have recognised and prepared to weather the Kremlin’s energy security storms over the past two decades—but with a global energy crisis underway, the region will need to continue its steadfast efforts to maintain calm among the maelstroms.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow’s energy weaponisation strategy has reached its logical apex. After all, what could be more damaging to the energy security of Ukraine than a relentless campaign of overt kinetic strikes by the Russian military against its civil energy infrastructure?

Moscow’s energy weaponisation strategy has reached its logical apex.

In the nearly two decades prior to this open energy warfare against Ukraine’s power grid and energy production capacity, the Kremlin incrementally ramped up its multifaceted weaponisation of energy resources and infrastructure against the European continent. For casual watchers of European geopolitics, perhaps the highest-profile incidents involved the repeated Kremlin threats to cut off natural gas to the continent, including along the Ukrainian gas transit route. Putin’s notorious gas valve shutoffs to Ukraine took place in 2009, 2014, and 2018, to name just a few.

Outrunning the Weapon

During these years, the Baltic Sea region largely recognised that it was not immune to these threats from the east, which went well beyond easily definable, politically motivated gas supply cutoffs. Indeed, for many years, the Kremlin has used every tool at its disposal to undermine European security, including by deepening EU member states’ dependence on Russian energy and issuing legal challenges to Brussels’ antimonopoly measures against Russian state-owned enterprises extracting political tolls. Perhaps most insidiously, the Putin regime has also pursued strategic corruption and elite capture, recruiting former senior European officials to become lavishly paid members of boards for Rosneft, Gazprom, and others.

For the most part, Baltic Sea states not only recognised these threats but also witnessed the Kremlin’s actions against Ukraine’s energy sector over the decade before 2022 and took proactive steps to outrun Russian efforts to wield its energy weapon in the region. To forestall Putin’s ability to operationalise its dominant status in the European energy market, in 2014, Lithuania led the Baltic Sea region by opening the first large-scale LNG import facility—the aptly named Independence terminal in Klaipėda—followed up closely by Poland’s own LNG terminal at Świnoujście in 2016. Not only did these import facilities provide optionality to plug into the global natural gas market—a commodity that has become more fungible with the expansion of global LNG trade and market entry by emerging powerhouses like the United States over this period—but they also proved economically successful. The full import capacity of Lithuania’s terminal was already booked as of 2023, a full decade in advance through 2033.

Critical interconnectors were also constructed across the region, ensuring increased liquidity in the natural gas and electricity markets—key drivers of Europe’s energy security strategies, which have always prioritised diversification of sources, delivery routes, and fuel types. These vital energy conduits included the Estlink 1 (2006) and 2 (2014) subsea high-voltage electricity interconnectors spanning the Gulf of Finland, the Balticconnector subsea gas pipeline (2020) between Finland and Estonia, the NordBalt electricity cable (2015) linking Sweden and Lithuania, and the Gas Interconnector Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) and Baltic Pipe (Norway-Denmark-Poland) pipelines that came into operation in 2022, just months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Pivot

Of course, for all these prudent security investments that were made to pivot away from dependency, the largest economy in the Baltic Sea region—Germany—worked in the opposite direction, deepening its reliance on Russian energy infrastructure and resources through its dogged development of the Nord Stream pipelines and support of legal measures that would attempt to cement the Kremlin’s market position. And of course, Germany was home to the most prominent example of Russia’s elite-capture strategy: former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder accepted positions on the board of Nord Stream AG and, eventually, Rosneft, after approving the Nord Stream 1 pipeline while in office.

Mercifully, the German government, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, pivoted in line with its fellow Baltic Sea neighbours, just as the Kremlin began to cut off deliveries to Europe in an attempt to break the continent’s solidarity with Ukraine. Energy leaders like former German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck took rapid action to support the buildout of LNG import facilities, while the country finally abandoned projects like the Nord Stream pipelines. (Even Schröder ultimately—and belatedly—was pressured to give up his sinecures.)

Kremlin’s post-February 2022 energy cuts packed less of a punch than they might have otherwise.

Taken together, the long-term infrastructure diversification, interconnection, and regulatory actions taken by the majority of Baltic Sea states and EU institutions, especially from 2014 through 2022—coupled with Germany’s rapid reorientation away from Russia and integration with the global LNG market—meant that the Kremlin’s post-February 2022 energy cuts packed less of a punch than they might have otherwise. The adoption of the REPowerEU policy framework, which supported short-term market action paired with long-term investment in renewables, further weakened the Kremlin’s grip.

The fact that the continent has narrowly avoided what could have been an extreme crisis post-2022 is a testament to the sound security-of-supply-oriented energy policies and the success of cross-border infrastructure cohesion. They trace their origin back to Europe’s original energy security construct: the European Coal and Steel Community championed by visionary Jean Monnet more than half a century ago.

As positive an outcome as this was, for Europe—and the Baltic Sea region in particular—any celebration would have to be put on ice.

For just as EU member states took action to mitigate Russian security-of-supply threats and market manipulation, the Kremlin sought to counter those gains with a pivot of its own: one that would see not only overt kinetic strikes against Ukraine’s power sector, but also a parallel, shadow war. Moscow launched it to undermine European democratic resilience and support for Kyiv via covert sabotage actions against energy, transportation, telecommunications, and other critical infrastructure.

Underwater Mayhem

To argue that the region was largely unprepared for such an eventuality would not give due credit to the serious military, intelligence, and law enforcement planners who advanced civil defence regimes, especially in the Nordic and Baltic states. After all, they were often treated as the Cassandras of national security by western European capitals despite their decades (if not centuries) of frontline understanding of the threats they faced as Moscow’s nearest neighbours.

Nevertheless, in European policy circles, in-depth discussions of physical security threats against civil energy infrastructure were few and far between, compared to debates over market security, regulatory action, and investments in infrastructure diversification. To the extent that infrastructure damage was a focus, it was to discuss cyber threats, which had replaced outmoded clandestine physical sabotage as the threat vector of the day.

The Svalbard cable cut was likely a shaping operation to undermine Ukraine’s defence ahead of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

That’s why, when the Russian fishing vessel Melkart 5 dragged its seabed trawling equipment many dozens of times over a segment of the southern seabed fibre-optic line connecting the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard with the European continent until the cable snapped, few might have guessed the incident marked one of the first suspected infrastructure sabotage attacks in this new phase of Russian shadow warfare. Indeed, the cutting of the Svalbard seabed cable—the first case study in the University of Pennsylvania’s Underwater Mayhem research project—indicated a strategic move by the Kremlin, severing one of the two lines connecting the largest commercial satellite ground station on Earth, SvalSAT, with Europe. Six weeks later, Ukraine would use the type of open-source commercial geospatial imagery and satellite internet uplink data that transits through the station in its defence. According to military experts interviewed in Underwater Mayhem, the Svalbard cable cut was likely a shaping operation to undermine Ukraine’s defence ahead of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

In the years that followed, sabotage attacks, large and small, would occur around the Baltic Sea region. Some of the largest offshore attacks, such as the September 2022 Nord Stream 1 and 2 bombings, remain officially unattributed (despite findings from Underwater Mayhem providing data to suggest potential Russian involvement; conversely, some media narratives have pointed to a ‘pro-Ukraine’ sailboat diving team as the culprit). Onshore sabotage of energy connections, rail lines, telecommunications links, storage facilities, and other civil infrastructure began to be attributed to an increasingly regular pattern of Kremlin-backed activity. Often, when attribution has been possible, European law enforcement has pointed to Russia’s military intelligence, the GRU, using Telegram and other social media platforms to hire non-Russian nationals, including Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Polish citizens, to conduct low-level infrastructure sabotage.

The offshore sabotage continued in October 2023 with high-profile incidents involving damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline and other telecommunications cables between Sweden and Estonia, and between Estonia and Finland. The Hong Kong-flagged container ship NewNew Polar Bear dragged its anchor across these cables and pipelines—all while being closely escorted by the Russian-flagged nuclear-powered icebreaker Sevmorput (according to open-source AIS data). While Baltic Sea authorities didn’t act fast enough to interdict the NewNew Polar Bear before it exited European waters, the response time after subsequent incidents began to shorten. In 2024, when the China-flagged bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 was found to have dragged its anchor through both the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion 1 and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS seabed telecommunications cables, authorities stopped the vessel in Danish waters before ultimately releasing the ship. Then, on Christmas Day, the Russian shadow fleet vessel Eagle S (hiding behind its Cook Islands flag of convenience) dragged its anchor through the Gulf of Finland, severing seabed telecommunications cables and the Estlink 2 electricity interconnector. The cut to Estlink 2 occurred just weeks before the Baltic states were to desynchronise their electricity grid from the legacy Soviet system that tied them to Russia and Belarus, and synchronise with the European Union grid. Thankfully, while the incident did increase the level of technical risk associated with the synchronisation effort, it didn’t block the switch, which successfully took place several weeks later.

Looking for Legal Remedy

Some European policymakers have begun to merge two distinct Kremlin threat vectors—subsea sabotage and shadow-fleet sanctions-evasion activity—into one dismissible phenomenon. According to some, the damage to seabed infrastructure is, in retrospect, likely the result of accidents caused by the poor condition and unprofessional crews characteristic of the shadow fleet vessels. In truth, the majority of the suspected subsea sabotage incidents have been committed by non-shadow-fleet commercial carriers in relatively good repair, rather than by dilapidated Russian oil tankers like the Eagle S.

The Eagle S was seized after Finnish law enforcement rappelled from helicopters onto the deck in a daring operation in the Gulf of Finland. It led to the indictment of the captain, though the Finnish court case was dismissed in late 2025 in part due to insufficient jurisdiction, as the incident occurred in the narrow lane of the Finnish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), rather than in its territorial waters. Given that outcome, experts wondered if other such incidents might follow. Sure enough, just weeks later—on New Year’s Eve—another Russia-linked vessel, the Fitburg, was seized by Finnish authorities after dragging its anchor across seabed cables along nearly the same EEZ lane as the Eagle S; an investigation for gross sabotage was launched.

Does this mean that no legal deterrent is possible? For another possible legal course, one needs to look to the far side of the world, at a landmark legal case in Taiwan. In February 2025, a China-flagged vessel, the Hong Tai 58, was seized by Taiwan’s Coast Guard after it had been caught severing one of the subsea telecommunications cables operated by Chunghwa Telecom, which links the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu islands in the centre of the Taiwan Strait.

According to the lead prosecutor, the Hong Tai 58 was in extremely poor physical condition at the time of the incident. When it was boarded and inspected, its bulk cargo holds were entirely empty, and its cargo doors were rusted shut so that it couldn’t have been used for cargo transit. It was reasonable to conclude that the vessel was a ‘pawn sacrifice’: using a very old and decrepit vessel wouldn’t result in high cost if it were seized. Moreover, the captain, a Chinese national, was arrested and tried, and is currently serving three years in jail; he had a satellite phone and was in regular contact with the ship’s owner in China. The final call was recorded less than an hour before the incident, suggesting it could have been an order to drag the anchor, according to the prosecutor (though the contents of the call are unknown).

The key outcome of this case lies not just in the forensic evidence, though it could suggest a growing tactical convergence between Russia and China. Indeed, Taiwan’s legal interpretation and related studies may be useful to Finnish and other prosecutors. First, the Penghu Islands cable cut occurred in Taiwan’s territorial waters, giving the case considerable jurisdictional leverage. However, the prosecutor described a related study examining what legal recourse Taiwan might have if a future subsea cable incident occurred further afield, within Taiwan’s EEZ or beyond.

This all comes down to the so-called ‘results principle’. According to Article 4 of Taiwan’s criminal code, “where either the conduct or the result of an offence takes place within the territory of the Republic of China, the offence shall be considered as committed within the territory of the Republic of China.” Therefore, the prosecutor explains that “if the submarine cable is damaged in our EEZ or further out […], our country has jurisdiction over the case.” However, he notes, “the law does not grant investigative agencies law enforcement powers outside of the EEZ.” The results principle, applied to subsea cables, could be compared to how a democratic state indicts international corrupt actors preying on its citizens from a third-party national jurisdiction. This is a legal study in Taiwan, rather than a legal precedent, since it has yet to be tested in a court case involving Taiwanese seabed cable damage beyond its territorial waters, but it could be instructive for the Baltic Sea region.

Transatlantic Troubles

Beyond legal deterrence strategy, a striking absence of action is felt. Even for onshore acts of sabotage against energy and critical infrastructure—conducted by Russian or Russia-recruited actors—with clear and public attribution, no member state has invoked the consultation mechanism under NATO’s Article 4. While stopping short of the collective defence clause, Article 4 has the benefit of increasing political recognition, and could expand the resources NATO has already allocated through initiatives like Operation Baltic Sentry. Article 4 has been invoked over the past year due to Russian incursions into NATO airspace: Russian drones in Poland and military aircraft in Estonia. So, it is vital to use the same political action when it comes to sabotage.

Moscow uses its shadow fleet vessels not just for evading western sanctions on Russia’s oil exports, but also as platforms for dual-use threats.

Such incidents have illustrated new and emerging threat vectors against EU energy and critical infrastructure, beyond sabotage. In September 2025, Russian fighter jets performed a low-altitude manoeuvre in Polish waters over the PetroBaltic offshore oil platform; the Russian shadow fleet vessel Boracay was interdicted by French authorities after it was suspected of launching drones near the Danish Kattegat, which forced the shutdown of the Copenhagen airport. The Boracay had been previously stopped by Estonian authorities in the Muuga Bay months earlier, when the vessel was called Kiwala. It shows the extent to which Moscow uses its shadow fleet vessels not just for evading western sanctions on Russia’s Urals crude oil exports, but also as platforms for dual-use threats. This includes recent reports of Russian security personnel posted onboard ‘merchant’ vessels, unaccountable to the captains or crews.

As these threats have evolved, European authorities have worked to catch up, especially by focusing on vessel seizures, which enhance the efficacy of energy sanctions. These seizures have become increasingly frequent just as Washington has begun to weaken sanctions unity. After a month-long waiver of Russian oil sanctions by the Trump administration—and despite claims by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent that this waiver would not be extended beyond mid-April 2026—on 17 April, the US Department of the Treasury did just that, with the extension set to expire in mid-May.

This move may well be solely about the White House mitigating the uptick in global oil prices—and thereby stabilising costs for US consumers—due to the Iran war, and specifically due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. But regardless of core motivation, the short-term impact is the same: this destructive move allows the Putin regime to make windfall profits for another four weeks, while providing the Kremlin a fresh injection of capital at a time when it would otherwise face macroeconomic impediments to fund its illegal aggression against Ukraine. And although any economic lifeline to the Putin regime is clearly unacceptable even for another four weeks, the bigger concern is the long-term impact of this waiver on the efficacy of the transatlantic sanctions infrastructure that has been built up since Russia’s full-scale invasion. Any loopholes in these increasingly restrictive sanctions regimes can undermine Alliance cohesion to hold Russia to account for the humanitarian misery it is inflicting on the Ukrainian people. And what the Trump administration has done is create a loophole through which Putin could sail a shadow-fleet tanker.

What the Trump administration has done is create a loophole through which Putin could sail a shadow-fleet tanker.

The global energy security crisis stemming from oil cargoes stuck in the Persian Gulf and continued threats that Iran’s Houthi allies in Yemen could also choke off the Bab al-Mandeb Strait should make it abundantly clear: even though Europe did not start the conflict, the energy security impacts of the war have reached Europe at a moment when its response to Russian energy and infrastructure weaponisation is taking shape. Although the Iran war may be considered ‘not Europe’s war’, to avoid a jet fuel crisis or broader oil and gas shortages as the heating season begins in the autumn, as well as to secure alternative supplies, Europe will again have to evolve its energy security strategy to include robust global diplomatic outreach. And yes, European states will likely have to go further to include some degree of military action against Iran to help open and maintain these vital conduits of the global energy economy.

History will tell if Europe can evolve on a sufficiently fast timescale to maintain its leadership and hold Russia to account for its crimes in Ukraine and against EU member states, while also helping to ensure global energy security in the Middle East and beyond. As we have seen over the past two decades, although it might take time for Europe to develop its energy security response, it can rise to the challenge.

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This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).