Ukraine’s Adaptation: Stabilised from Outside, Stretched from Within

Ukraine’s internal position is in flux with mounting pressure across governance, energy, and internal security. This stands in contrast to a more favourable trajectory on the battlefield, where the Ukrainian army has stabilised the front line and regained a relative advantage in drone warfare, despite acute manpower constraints. The result is a growing divergence between military performance and internal state capacity.

The political system has undergone a reconfiguration following the departure of Andriy Yermak from the Office of the President. What has emerged is a more fragmented, yet still president-centred model of governance. Initial disruptions in parliament have been contained, and decision-making remains concentrated around President Volodymyr Zelensky as the core source of legitimacy under wartime conditions. Authority is now exercised through more negotiated and transactional mechanisms, while on-going anti-corruption investigation has serious disruption potential.

Expectations Meet Reality

Public opinion remains broadly supportive of the war effort, with the majority open to compromise. Yermak’s successor, Kyrylo Budanov, has signalled greater flexibility on the settlement than the official line, while remaining institutionally anchored within the presidential system.

Expectations of a near-term settlement—and elections that would follow—have receded, especially after the war in Iran.  Kyiv is now preparing for the war to continue through at least 2026. This shift away from a political endgame has stabilised the system in the short term, but at the cost of growing institutional strain. This is visible in parliamentary fragmentation, the expanding role of anti-corruption investigations as a political factor, and declining state capacity in areas such as law enforcement and energy governance. Internal security is emerging as the most immediate concern.

The outcome of Hungary’s recent elections has modestly eased EU’s decision-making, while contributing to a more sober assessment of Ukraine’s trajectory. The proposed €90 bn support package is critical for short-term stability and the sustainability of Ukraine’s war effort. Yet an asymmetry is becoming more pronounced: Ukraine is stabilising externally while pressure mounts internally. Conditionality is tightening accordingly. With rapid accession effectively ruled out by key member states, Ukraine’s most tangible integration pathway is likely to develop in the defence sector, what corresponds with Kyiv’s posture as a security provider and indispensable defence partner.

The severely degraded energy system has emerged as the central strategic vulnerability. Ahead of the next winter, Kyiv increasingly views the coming months as a window to secure at least a partial arrangement, in the form of an energy ceasefire. This introduces a dual dynamic in Ukraine’s posture: growing confidence derived from battlefield resilience, combined with urgency driven by infrastructure constraints.

The war’s trajectory is increasingly reminiscent of the 19^th-century Crimean War: a protracted, externally shaped conflict in which battlefield dynamics alone are insufficient to produce a decisive outcome. Any eventual settlement is therefore more likely to emerge from cumulative exhaustion than from clear military victory. In this context, the balance of resilience behind the front becomes as decisive as developments on the battlefield.

Transactional Politics, Presidential Oversight

Senior personnel changes have been limited in formal terms, but the internal balance of power has shifted. Decision-making remains concentrated around Volodymyr Zelensky following the dismissal of Andriy Yermak and the appointment of Kyrylo Budanov to lead the Office. The current configuration rests on a small group with differentiated roles: Budanov on the settlement track, Davit Arakhamia on parliamentary management, and Mykhailo Fedorov on the defence agenda and external financing—all operating under direct presidential oversight.

Trust in Zelensky has stabilised at relatively high levels (62% vs 32%), following a temporary dip linked to stalled negotiations, but both generals, Valerii Zaluzhnyi and Kyrylo Budanov, are ahead in terms of trust. Electoral preferences place Zelensky ahead, followed by Zaluzhnyi and Budanov. There is growing support for the involvement of military figures in governance, alongside a strong demand for political renewal: around 70% of respondents favour the emergence of new leaders, and 57% prefer ‘new faces’ over established politicians. Public opposition to holding elections during the war remains overwhelming, with 69% supporting elections only after a full peace agreement.

The Svyrydenko cabinet faces both perception and performance challenges. The prime minister is widely viewed as a Yermak-era appointee, lacking an independent political base. Zelensky’s regular, publicised meetings with PM Yulia Svyrydenko and Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk appear aimed at reinforcing the system’s coherence and legitimacy.

Yermak’s departure did not trigger a broader political realignment. The informal coalition that pushed for his ousting amid the so-called Mindich Gate has not evolved into a structured challenge to Zelensky, suggesting that its primary objective was to rebalance influence within the system. Zelensky’s political agency remains dominant: from the outset, he has operated as a politically savvy actor guided by his own instincts and survival logic. Now, it is increasingly shaped by the ambition to be remembered as the president who secured victory.

Budanov’s position is more constrained than his formal role suggests. He has been unable to build a fully loyal team within the Office, relying instead on staff inherited from his predecessor. Key elements of the security architecture are influenced by the Yermak-era networks. Budanov’s institutional leverage depends largely on coordination with Arakhamia, both on parliamentary votes and on the settlement track. His remaining political space lies in his semi-independent public voice, as seen in a series of interviews in March and April in which he diverged from official messaging on settlement prospects, drone warfare, and even church-related issues.

The Servant of the People faction no longer commands a reliable majority, and legislative outcomes depend on ad hoc coalitions.

Parliamentary dynamics reflect this broader shift. The Servant of the People faction no longer commands a reliable majority, and legislative outcomes depend on ad hoc coalitions. After initial disruption following Yermak’s departure, functionality was partially restored in early April, when EU- and IMF-linked legislation passed with cross-factional support. External financial conditionality—linked to Ukraine’s structural dependence on EU funding—remains a key disciplining mechanism.

Potential alternative centres of power are fragmented. Valerii Zaluzhnyi continues to register in polling, but with declining momentum and a weaker public profile. Yermak retains access to the president, but his influence has diminished. Zelensky has consolidated his position as the primary source of political legitimacy, reinforced through sustained dominance of both the domestic and, increasingly, the European information space.

The anti-corruption landscape remains in a holding pattern, but with significant disruptive potential. No major cases have been advanced against senior figures following the Mindich Gate episode. The EU has signalled caution against destabilising the system, even as its conditionality continues to empower anti-corruption institutions. Ongoing investigations are likely to produce results, and any serious case involving Andriy Yermak would carry implications extending to the presidential level.

Conditionality and Defence

The removal of formal obstruction by Viktor Orbán has eased EU decision-making on Ukraine funding but has also exposed a more sober European assessment of Ukraine’s trajectory. Europe’s offer is increasingly structured around continued financing of Ukraine’s military needs combined with deeper defence integration and stricter political conditionality, particularly on anti-corruption.

Ukrainian public opinion is evolving in ways that reinforce such a development. A March 2026 survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology indicates a growing openness to compromise, but one that is highly conditional. While support for holding a referendum has declined, willingness to accept a comprehensive settlement package—including EU membership, security guarantees, reconstruction, and unspecified territorial compromises—reaches 61%, rising to 86% among likely voters. Public support, therefore, remains contingent on credible guarantees and framing rather than fixed positions.

This shift is increasingly reflected in Ukraine’s strategic posture. EU membership is now framed as the primary institutional anchor, gradually replacing earlier emphasis on NATO. Limited confidence in accession timelines has led Kyiv to prioritise sectoral integration—particularly in defence—as a more immediate and attainable pathway. This approach combines the development of a strong domestic military and defence-industrial base with the continued pursuit of external guarantees.

Public preferences on security further underscore this logic. A capable national military is viewed as the most reliable guarantee, while external arrangements—alliances, security agreements, or NATO membership—command lower and more fragmented levels of trust. The EU remains the most positively perceived external actor, though support has moderated, while views on NATO are more polarised.

Within the EU, the post-Orbán environment is clarifying underlying divisions. The Commission’s proposal for rapid or ‘reverse’ integration has been rejected by key member states, with their considerations shifting toward intermediate models such as associate membership or partial institutional integration without full budgetary access. Kyiv has firmly rejected such second-tier options, insisting on full membership.

Ukraine’s chance lies in defence integration.

Ukraine’s chance lies in defence integration—a future European Defence Union—as Polish PM Tusk made clear at a Rzeszów conference. The EU has approved a €90 bn support loan for Ukraine, with 2026 allocations including €8.3 bn in direct budget support, €8.3 bn under the Ukraine Facility, and €28.3 bn for defence—underscoring a clear prioritisation of military needs. Orbán’s defeat allows the EU to reintroduce stronger conditionality on politically sensitive reforms, including a renewed emphasis on anti-corruption enforcement. The EU’s proposed fourth pillar of security package—focused on defence sector reform, countering hybrid threats, and veteran support—complements existing military, civilian, and defence-industrial frameworks. However, these fall short of Ukraine’s expectations for security guarantees.

The internal EU picture is also getting clearer. Former European Council President Charles Michel acknowledged that some EU leaders privately doubt Ukraine’s prospects for full accession, suggesting that earlier unity masked deeper scepticism. As Ivan Krastev noted, the future of the EU is a strange mixture of integration and disintegration. Thus, the post-Viktor Orbán environment is revealing deeper EU divisions, unlocking more defence funding but also tightening political conditionality. With no single visible spoiler, scepticism is surfacing more openly, pushing the debate away from rapid accession toward phased, conditional integration.

Internal Strain

While Yermak’s influence is gradually declining, it remains significant through informal networks and continued access to decision-making. Ongoing investigations linked to the Mindich Gate risk moving closer to the presidential level, raising the stakes considerably. Earlier episodes in 2026 have already shown that high-stakes investigations can disrupt parliamentary functioning and delay key legislation. Both domestic actors and external partners, particularly the EU, have a clear interest in containing escalation. As a result, law enforcers are advancing into sensitive territory, but without triggering a systemic confrontation—at least for now.

Economic pressures are reinforcing public dissatisfaction. Cumulative inflation since 2022 has been substantial, particularly in energy, food, and fuel; household spending is increasingly limited to basic needs. The energy sector has emerged as a focal point. Delays in central decision-making—particularly on decentralisation, procurement, and winter preparation—are drawing increasing concern from sector experts. While local actors and private companies are moving more quickly, central coordination is lagging, raising the risk that a critical preparation window for the next winter may be missed.

Internal security is deteriorating in parallel. A shooting incident in Kyiv in April 2026, which exposed serious gaps in police response capacity and triggered leadership resignations, highlighted deeper structural weaknesses rather than an isolated failure. Severe staffing shortages—estimated at over 60%—are forcing non-operational personnel into frontline roles, undermining effectiveness. Authorities are signalling both constraints and adaptation, including discussions on expanding civilian access to firearms and selective high-profile enforcement actions aimed at restoring credibility.

Other developments also reveal entrenched systemic pressures. Weapons proliferation remains extensive, with millions of illegal firearms in circulation, while violent incidents—including those targeting military recruitment personnel—have grown significantly. Additional stressors, including prolonged psychological strain, substance abuse linked to frontline conditions, and evolving criminal activity such as fraud networks targeting domestic populations, are further eroding internal stability. Organised crime structures continue to adapt, underscoring the limits of state capacity under wartime pressures and raising risks for the post-war trajectory.

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This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).