The new Trump administration’s seemingly unending mission to fundamentally overhaul global power structures has exposed systemic cracks in Moscow’s relationship with Tehran.
Since 2015, Moscow has continually strengthened its ties with Tehran to solidify its anti-western axis with North Korea and China. Russian-Iranian bilateral cooperation expanded further after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when Iran started exporting drones and other munitions to Russia. Today, however, Trumpian power shifts have revealed how tenuous the Russian-Iranian relationship truly is, possibly hinting at a soon-to-come bilateral estrangement.
Mutual Russian-Iranian cooperation increased in 2015, when both countries worked together to help defend the Assad regime. In a document signed on 26 August 2015, the Kremlin took control of the air base in Khmeimim and supplied military resources to Syria; that September, Russia sent soldiers into Syria, in cooperation with Iran, and became a crucial player in ensuring Assad’s victory. Although both countries frequently disagreed on a number of topics in the governance of Assad’s Syria, their shared desire to maintain regional influence forced them into cooperation.
A Drone-based Partnership
Tehran’s engagement with Moscow increased significantly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Although the exact date is unclear, Iran began to supply Russia with Mohajer-6 drones as early as February 2022. Iranian drone sales to Russia increased as the conflict persisted. By the end of the first year of war, multiple sources estimated that Iran supplied Russia with almost 2 000 drones.
Drone warfare has been an essential aspect of the war in Ukraine. Specifically, Iranian Shahed-136 drones have been among Russia’s most commonly used weapons in Ukraine, especially against civilian infrastructure. Despite being relatively cheap, Shahed drones have a range of 1 000 to 2 500km, a powerful explosive payload, and even reconnaissance capabilities.
A large-scale hack of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) shell company’s email server in 2024 revealed that Russia had agreed to a $1.75 billion deal with Tehran to create a Shahed-136 drone manufacturing plant in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia. The plant has overseen substantial drone production growth over the past few years. Although the deal originally promised 6 000 Shahed-136 drones by September 2025, some reports claim that Alabuga manufactured almost 6 000 in the first nine months of 2024 alone.
As the war continues, both sides have been rapidly ramping up production, and there is every indication that this trend will continue. The Alabuga venture has been wildly successful, and there are some reports of a new plant manufacturing long-range kamikaze drones. Due to this success, Moscow will almost definitely continue to invest in drone manufacturing capabilities.
Cheaper at Home
Further development of domestic infrastructure is a factor in the degradation of mutual Russian-Iranian reliance. Because Moscow is growing its indigenous production, its previous dependence on Shahed drones imported from Iran has dramatically decreased. Moreover, Ilya Vorokov, the co-founder of the drone manufacturing company tasked with creating the Alabuga plant, claimed in interviews that 70% of drone parts at his facility are made domestically, and the rest are made in China. From June 2023 to September 2024, Ukrainian defence intelligence reported that Chinese companies sent at least $96 million in funds to Alabuga for drone parts, among other things.
A huge incentive for the further expansion of the Alabuga manufacturing plant is the cost of each unit. Some sources, such as the New York Times, have reported domestic Shahed-136 production as low as $20,000 per unit. However, the general consensus is that each unit is around $35 000. Despite the relatively low per-unit price, purchasing drones from Iran is much more expensive. According to a document leak of Iran’s Defence Ministry, which revealed the $1.75 billion deal that launched the development of the Alabuga plant, Moscow purchased Shahed-136 drones at $193 000 per unit. Simply put, there is virtually no possibility that it would be more economically pragmatic for Russia to purchase another large order of Iranian-manufactured Shahed drones.
How Comprehensive and Strategic Is This Partnership?
As Moscow transitioned to domestic drone production and utilisation, Iran increased missile exportation. In 2024, the US Department of Defense reported that Iran supplied Russia with hundreds of Fath-360 close-range missiles, demonstrating the mutual interest both Moscow and Tehran had in continuing their partnership. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Mahmoud Pezeshkian signed an agreement in January, seemingly solidifying their alliance.
However, the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” treaty is notably ambiguous and does not tie either country to any genuine military or economic obligations. Nikita Smagin at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrote that the treaty “turned out to be little more than a bureaucratic summary of the current state of affairs.” The document has no legitimate security or economic guarantees, unlike the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” deal signed in 2024 between Russia and North Korea, which was a legitimate defence pact.
The strengthening alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang is notably more robust than its Russian-Iranian counterpart. The US Admiral for the Indo-Pacific, Samuel Paparo, recently warned that North Korea is sending “hundreds of thousands of artillery shells and thousands of KN-24 short-range missiles to Russia.” Moreover, at least 11 000 North Korean soldiers are currently fighting against Ukrainians in Kursk Oblast, Russia, but the actual number is probably much higher.
The Third Wheel
Another crack in the Russian-Iranian alliance was frequent disagreement and competition in Assad-controlled Syria, which indirectly resulted in Assad’s downfall. After Russia began significant involvement in Syria in 2015, there was frequent tension between the Russians, Iranians, and Syrians on the country’s governance. In 2017-18, there was a significant diplomatic divergence between the Russians and Iranians on the arming of southern Syrian rebel groups. The Russians grew dissatisfied with the Assad regime, and similarly dissatisfied with its relationship with Iran in Syria. By 2022, the Russians were having discussions about forcing the Iranians out of Syria and controlling the country alone.
Russian-Iranian international cooperation continued to sour, even as Iran started exporting missiles and drones to Russia in 2022. Moscow has long sought to increase multilateral cooperation with the Gulf states—one key point of division with Iran regarding influence in Syria. Moreover, in a joint declaration in Morocco in December 2023, Russia stated that the three Gulf islands (the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa) legally belong to the UAE. Those three islands are a significant point of conflict between Iran and the Gulf states, making Russia’s statement a direct blow to bilateral relations with Tehran.
Over the past year, high-ranking Iranian officials have become increasingly insecure about Tehran’s relationship with Moscow. In January, a senior IRGC commander, Behrouz Esbati, voiced his discontent with Russia. He claimed that the Russians had essentially betrayed Iran in Syria by not appropriately supporting the Assad regime before its collapse. Esbati also claimed that the Russians had virtually allowed Israel to strike high-level IRGC commanders.
A Stab in the Back?
Another aspect that worries Tehran is increased cooperation between Moscow and Washington. The Trump administration has completely changed Washington’s relationship with Russia in the span of a few months. President Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, met with Putin four times in the past few months and mentioned possible Russian-US economic partnerships and sanctions relief. Washington’s move closer to Moscow could be detrimental for Tehran, a topic of discussion among high-ranking Iranian officials.
Although Washington is in talks with Tehran to create a new nuclear deal, Republicans still recognise the Islamic Republic as an adversarial state. On 4 February 2025, President Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” sanctions on the regime. In April 2025, congressional Republicans reaffirmed their support for the “maximum pressure” campaign and proposed new sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.
Additionally, Iran’s historic adversaries in the Middle East appear to be strengthening their relationship with Russia. In the past few months alone, the first Russian-Ukrainian-American peace talks took place in Riyadh, Israel voted against a resolution calling to reaffirm Ukraine’s territorial integrity and denounce Russia’s illegal invasion, and the UAE hosted a “Strategic Financial Dialogue” with Russia.
As Moscow tries to woo the United States into closer relations, it could use Tehran as a bargaining chip. Essentially, Moscow could sacrifice its relationship with Tehran in exchange for American economic rapprochement or concessions to Ukrainian territories. Multiple Iranian government officials have publicly voiced their concerns over the possibility of a Russian strategic realignment. An Iranian official even reported to Reuters their concern over Russia’s commitment to Iran in April.
Moscow’s Way Out
One way that Moscow could sever its relationship with Tehran is by activating the snapback resolution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although the US officially left the JCPOA under the first Trump presidency, the deal is still legally active. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, while negotiating the JCPOA in 2015, implemented a “snapback resolution” to the agreement. In short, any member of the JCPOA (France, UK, Germany, China, Russia, and formerly the US) could claim Iran broke their nuclear obligations and reimpose full UN sanctions. The deadline to activate the snapback resolution is October 2025, meaning it would have to be triggered as soon as possible.
If Russia were to do so, then all UN member states would be legally mandated to reimpose a vast number of UN resolutions tasked with preventing Iran’s nuclearisation, specifically 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929. One of the most damning of these, 1929, would ban any UN member state from exporting heavy weaponry to Iran. Essentially, the Russians could reimpose UN sanctions, then use them as an excuse to stop all weapons exports and nullify any previous arms-transfer agreements, hence deepening the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy.
The Trump administration’s desire for rapprochement with Russia opens the door for Moscow to restructure its relationship with Tehran. The past few months have presented Russia with the opportunity to capitalise on a bilateral estrangement it has been looking for. As long as Moscow seeks further cooperation with Washington and the Gulf, its relationship with Iran will deteriorate.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).