Shielding the Skies: European Ballistic Missile Defence

The conflicts in Ukraine and Israel have showcased the centrality of ballistic missiles in contemporary warfare and the importance of ballistic missile defence (BMD) in enhancing the survivability of armed forces, building resilience, and avoiding decapitation strikes by an enemy.

The US has been the main provider of BMD in Europe, especially against high-end, longer-range threats. Today, however, the US is seeking to reduce its role as a security guarantor on the continent at a time when the risk of armed conflict with Russia is greater than it has been in decades. Russia, meanwhile, once again possesses a considerable arsenal of ballistic missiles of varying range and capability, all of which can deliver both conventional and nuclear payloads.

Europe has acknowledged a need to ramp up its own BMD capacity, but the task is a formidable undertaking. This policy paper examines the ballistic threats Europe faces from Russia, the shortcomings of its current missile defences, and how these might be addressed in the years to come.

Europeans should accept the need to devote significant resources to quickly scale up a strengthened missile defence architecture compatible with NATO’s integrated air and missile defence and BMD frameworks. They should:

• Collaboratively acquire air and missile defence systems to reduce procurement and operational costs.
• Focus on interoperability to rapidly build a multi-layered defence.
• Jointly design and build a comprehensive network of ground-based and space-based sensors to improve Europe’s situational awareness and early warning abilities.
• Augment the European Phased Adaptive Approach with European sea-based effectors and sensors to reinforce European defence and demonstrate a stronger commitment to transatlantic security.
• Strengthen cooperation with Ukraine on BMD by establishing a Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre, potentially drawing on the Polish-Ukrainian drone-defence partnership.
• Enhance passive defences of potential ballistic missile targets.
• Continue to deploy missile defences to the eastern flank under NATO’s Rotational Air Defence Model.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that ballistic missile defence is not a silver bullet. BMD is costly and can be saturated. European Allies must strike a balance between deterrence by denial—delivered through air and missile defence—and deterrence by punishment through strike capabilities. BMD’s core function is to preserve the forces that can eventually neutralise the threat. The shield enables the sword and prevents decapitation. In a prolonged conflict, targeting the archer—i.e., missile launchers—is more effective than trying to intercept every arrow. If Russia cannot rely on disabling its opponent and must expect a coordinated response, it is less likely to initiate further aggression.