Sailing Through Uncertainty: Nordic-Baltic Military Integration as Plan B

Despite notable progress on military integration since 2022, the Nordic-Baltic Sea region must now plan for a worst-case scenario. This means joint defence planning, conventional and hybrid capabilities, and negotiating with Allies on a European supplement to the US nuclear umbrella.

In his contribution to last year’s Diplomaatia, Professor Karsten Friis from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs argued that the Nordic and Baltic states needed to build the capacity to deter Russia without the United States. In his view, the greatest obstacle to timely action in this regard was the unwillingness of the relevant decision-makers to accept the need to do so. Nordic and Baltic decision-makers still did not really believe that the United States would abandon them in the event of a Russian attack.

What a difference a year makes. In January 2026, Danish military deployed in Greenland with explosives and blood bags, ordered to blow up the runways in Nuuk and Kangerlussuaq if US troops attempted to take control of Greenland by force. Since there was no indication that an attack was imminent, the operation was intended to signal to Washington that a hostile takeover of Greenland would be “the end of NATO,” as Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen put it. This message was reinforced by symbolic deployments from France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, and the United Kingdom. When Trump reacted with threats to impose sanctions on the troop-deploying countries, the EU threatened to respond in kind. Trump then declared victory, even though he had not been offered anything concrete from Greenland and Denmark.

The risk of US abandonment forces the NATO members to create the capacity to deter and, if need be, fight Russia with little or no US support.

The Greenland crisis corroborated the conclusion drawn by Professor Friis in his 2025 article: Support from the Trump Administration cannot be taken for granted in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO member in the Nordic-Baltic Sea region. The risk of US abandonment forces the NATO members to create the capacity to deter and, if need be, fight Russia with little or no US support.

The only way to do this is to increase Nordic-Baltic Sea military integration within the NATO framework. There is no alternative to NATO’s military infrastructure, and not enough time to build one—especially in view of Nordic and Baltic intelligence estimates assessing that Russia can build an offensive capacity in the Baltic Sea region in just two to five years, once the fighting in Ukraine comes to an end.

Plan A: With the US

Military integration is a way to enable military forces from different nations to fight as one. It hinges on a shared threat perception and sense of purpose, creating a willingness to establish the unified command and control (C2) structures and a high degree of interoperability and interchangeability among the national forces involved. While interoperable forces are capable of communicating and share common doctrine and procedures, infrastructure and bases, interchangeable forces share identical equipment, training, doctrines, and logistics.

NATO has been the principal driver of Nordic-Baltic Sea military integration since the start of the Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014. Since then, NATO has adopted higher defence spending and capability targets, deployed multinational land forces in the Baltic countries and Poland (2018) and Finland (2026), increased the number of NATO rapid reaction forces from 40 000 to 300 000, and reintroduced regional defence plans. These regional plans are now being implemented with the establishment of new NATO commands in the Nordic-Baltic Sea region, while the new command structures and the defence plans are tested regularly in larger and more frequent NATO exercises across the region.

NATO facilitated a burst of military integration among the four Nordic NATO members.

When Finland and Sweden joined NATO in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO facilitated a burst of military integration among the four Nordic NATO members by placing the lion’s share of their forces under the same Joint Force Command (JFC Norfolk) and regional defence plan (Northwest). The establishment of new NATO commands in all four Nordic countries has increased their military cooperation significantly, and it is underpinned by a shared Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) Vision 2030 aimed at establishing an ability to fight as one, and by joint procurement and development aimed at enhancing security of supply, interoperability, and interchangeability of the Nordic armed forces.

The picture is the same in the southern Baltic Sea region, where JFC Brunssum, the regional defence planning Centre, and the associated regional commands act as an engine of integration for the Baltic countries, Germany, Poland, Denmark, and Sweden in the land and sea domains. The integration at sea is spearheaded by the new Multinational Maritime Command/Tactical Operational Headquarters, Commander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic), established in October 2024. It is headed by Germany, Poland, and Sweden on a rotational basis. Staff from all Baltic Sea NATO members man the HQ, which also has contributions from France and the UK. In the land domain, Multinational Division Northeast (Elblag, Poland), established in 2018, and Multinational Division North (Ādaži, Latvia/Karup, Denmark), declared fully operational in 2023, perform the same function, integrating the land forces of the Baltic countries, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and Poland, as well as the other NATO contributing nations to the multinational Forward Land Forces in the Baltic countries and Poland. The 2026 decision to give command of JFC Brunssum to Germany and Poland on a rotational basis will further promote integration. The assignment of Danish and Swedish land forces to JFC Brunssum helps mitigate the fear of a Baltic-Nordic split that was voiced by the Baltic countries when the Nordics were assigned to JFC Norfolk.

In addition to integrating the local NATO Allies, the two defence plans and their adjusted command structures serve ‘to keep the US in’ by assigning US forces to them. By spending more on defence, meeting their capability goals, standing up the new commands, and testing the new defence plans in larger and more frequent exercises, all NATO members in the Nordic-Baltic Sea region contribute to deterring Russia and to increasing the likelihood that the United States will honour its obligations in the event of a Russian attack.

Plan B: Without the US

To address the increased risk of US abandonment underlined by the Greenland crisis and Trump’s repeated threats to withdraw from NATO, the Nordic-Baltic Sea nations need to build the capability to deter and defend their region without US support. To do this, they need to create the ability to execute NATO’s defence plans with in-place forces. They should also establish closer relations with other Allies they hope to get assistance from, notably Canada, the UK, and France, but support from these countries should be nice rather than necessary for the defence of the region.

Support from Allied countries should be nice rather than necessary for the defence of the region.

The multinational NATO commands, set up in the region to execute NATO’s defence plans, should be headed by double-hatted national commanders and given the necessary Nordic-Baltic Sea staff to execute their missions without US support. This is already happening to some extent. For instance, the Combined Air Operations Centre Northwest (CAOC-NW) in Bodø is commanded by the chief of the Norwegian Air Force and co-located with the Norwegian Joint Air Operations Centre, whose Nordic division strives to be able to operate the four Nordic air forces as one by 2030. All other NATO HQs in the Nordic-Baltic Sea region should do the same.

In addition, the Nordic-Baltic Sea NATO member states need to strengthen their military industrial base, security of supply, interoperability, and interchangeability by increasing joint procurement and development. Significant progress has already been made among the Nordic countries, which are buying weapons from each other to an unprecedented extent. Cooperation among the Nordics, Germany, and Poland is also increasing. Poland and Sweden have entered cooperation agreements, which have led to Warsaw’s purchasing of Carl Gustaf grenade launchers, two Saab 340 AEW early warning surveillance planes, two signal intelligence ships, and 3 A26 submarines, significantly enhancing interoperability between the two nations. Norway and Germany are jointly procuring 12 submarines, while Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Norway, and Sweden have all procured the German-produced surface-launched medium range (IRIS-T SLM) air defence system.

From Plan to Posture

While progress on military integration in the Nordic-Baltic Sea region since 2022 is a cause for optimism, much remains to be done if the Nordic-Baltic Sea NATO members are to be able to deter and defend against Russia without the United States. Given the uncertainty of the future US commitment to NATO, Nordic-Baltic Sea defence integration must be based on this worst-case assumption from now on.

Nordic-Baltic Sea defence integration must be based on the worst-case assumption from now on.

In moving forward, the Nordic-Baltic Sea member states should conduct a joint analysis of what they need to execute NATO’s defence plans, covering their region without the United States, and then prioritise their force development and procurement accordingly. Priority should be given to conventional and hybrid deterrence and defence to convince Russia that limited conventional land grabs or faits accomplis can be denied by in-place forces in the region with no or limited support from the United States or other NATO members. With respect to nuclear deterrence, the Nordic-Baltic Sea countries should develop a joint position and negotiate with France and the UK on how to establish a European supplement/alternative to the US nuclear umbrella.

This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).