Russia and the Red Sea since 2022: The Wartime Engagements of an Aspiring Major Power

The Red Sea has become more important to Russia since 2022, as several Russian trade and sanctions evasion routes run through it.

The Kremlin has taken a proactive approach to the Red Sea region to further its aggressive foreign policy, undermine what it perceives are western interests, and facilitate its energy trade through the Suez Canal.

Russia pursues some of its core naval policy goals in the Red Sea region, namely territorial protection and claims to major power status. This is also part of broader naval diplomacy efforts, which include training and anti-piracy exercises.

Russian economic statecraft in the area focuses on arms, energy, fertilisers and grains, essential inputs for societal security. This creates dependencies and compensates for other weaknesses in the Russian economy.

Good Moscow-Tehran relations and Iran’s relative weakness push the Houthis to cooperate with the Kremlin. In turn, by empowering the group, the Kremlin asserts its role as a capable major power, gaining recruits and a regional advocate.

The Red Sea region can become a source of strategic depth for Moscow, the way it was during the Cold War. A proactive response must include monitoring, pressure, cooperation with local partners and competition.

Drawing from this analysis, the recommendations for US, NATO, and other policymakers concerned with Russia’s role in Red Sea security are as follows:

• A proactive approach is needed.
• Monitor Russian basing claims closely.
• Increase pressure on the supply logistics to the Houthis.
• Tackle the gold trade.
• Promote alternatives to Russian grains and fertilisers.

This publication was funded in 2024 by the Russia Strategic Initiative, US European Command. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.