The EU’s ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
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The EU-China Relationship
The current EU approach is structured according to the 2019 “Strategic Outlook on China,” a document providing a framework for EU-China relations.[1] It marked a shift in the EU’s approach to China, going beyond economic considerations and defining China in three dimensions: as a cooperation partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival.
While the other two dimensions of the EU’s approach to China receive some explanation in the document, little detail is given for the third—“systemic rival”—beyond China being a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” As the only “negative” category, “systemic rivalry” has since become a flexible label used to describe various challenges in EU-China relations that do not fit under the other two pillars.
However, despite persistent China-related security issues, security concerns are largely absent from the Strategic Outlook, the key document shaping EU-China relations. Since it was adopted, Europe’s security landscape has changed dramatically, particularly due to Russia’s illegal military aggression against Ukraine. China’s backing of Moscow’s war efforts directly undermines European security. However, it is important to recognise that the security challenges China poses to the EU extend beyond its support for Russia, encompassing a range of well-documented hybrid activities.
China-Russia Alignment
Despite repeated claims of neutrality, China has become a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s illegal military aggression against Ukraine.[2] It provides dual-use goods, helps to circumvent sanctions, and facilitates Russia’s hybrid operations. EU and Ukrainian officials have pointed to China’s role as a “circumvention hub” for EU’s sanctions against Russia, acting as both a supplier to Russia and a transit route for western products.[3] Chinese entities have been sanctioned by the EU for supplying drone and microelectronic components to Russia. Chinese officials and state-controlled media have provided a platform for Russia’s talking points and disinformation narratives. China has criticised sanctions against Russia and regularly accused the west of starting and fuelling the war. Perhaps the sole positive role China has played is in deterring Russia from making excessive nuclear threats.
The security challenges China poses to the EU extend beyond its support for Russia
In diplomatic engagements with China, the EU and individual member states have consistently emphasised China’s support to Russia as a key irritant in EU-China relations. Beijing has also been asked to use its influence on Moscow to help end its war of aggression against Ukraine.[4] However, repeated calls by EU leaders and diplomats do not seem to have had any real effect, as China continues to sustain Russia’s war machine to this day, directly undermining European security.
A Threat to Security and Values
Beyond its support for Russia, China poses a challenge to European security in and of itself. This includes potential conflicts over Taiwan and the South China Sea, hybrid activities targeting EU member states, and weaponising economic and trade links for political purposes.
A conflict in the Indo-Pacific would have global ramifications. The report by Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission Sauli Niinistö calls the potential economic and security impact of Chinese aggression against Taiwan or in the South China Sea “staggering” for Europe, likely triggering opportunistic behaviour from Russia against an EU member state.[5]
The EU’s most immediate vulnerabilities arise from espionage, cyber intrusions, and technology infiltration
While China’s military threat in the Indo-Pacific is a pressing concern, the EU’s most immediate vulnerabilities arise from China’s hybrid tactics—espionage, cyber intrusions, and technology infiltration—the evidence of which is clear and growing. Individuals suspected of spying for China have been sentenced in Estonia and indicted in Germany.[6] Chinese ships have recently been involved in cable-cutting incidents in the Baltic Sea.[7] In Belgium, a politician was recruited by China’s intelligence services to manipulate political discussion and discredit a researcher critical of Beijing.[8] The EU has called the use of hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors a threat to its security and values and has pointed at China which pursues its policies by using cyber tools and displaying hybrid tactics.[9]
National threat assessments confirm China’s targeting of the EU. The Swedish Security Service considers China, alongside Russia and Iran, as the greatest threat to Sweden’s security, stating that Beijing attempts to influence Stockholm’s decision-making.[10] The Danish Defence Intelligence Service notes that China is trying to sow discord between European countries to weaken the EU’s unity, for example, when mitigating risks of cooperation with China.[11] The Belgian security service similarly claims China is trying to damage intra-European relations.[12] Germany’s domestic intelligence services state that China seeks to create a favourable environment outside its borders for the Communist Party’s objectives and looks for influential political figures to speak in favour of Chinese interests.[13]
Multiple Chinese cyber groups have targeted the EU, with several of them linked to the Chinese state.[14] Western cyber security agencies have attributed cyber activities targeting European governments and lawmakers critical of Beijing as well as naval research activities and technology development to China’s state-sponsored threat actors.[15] The EU has sanctioned individuals and organisations associated with APT10, a group linked to China’s Ministry of State Security.[16]
China is a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) actor with a broad arsenal of tactics, which in turn can be connected to other forms of hybrid threats like economic coercion or cyber operations.[17] In addition to the promotion of disinformation narratives, intimidation and suppression of individuals and organisations by Chinese actors have also been reported in Europe.[18]
The EU should acknowledge this reality and explicitly label China a security challenge, adding a fourth pillar to the existing three
Security concerns extend to Chinese technologies. Measures like the EU’s 5G Toolbox were introduced largely due to national security risks associated with Chinese suppliers. Recently, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service has highlighted security risks related to Chinese electric vehicles and electricity network equipment.[19] Advanced technologies like these can become vectors for data collection, espionage, or strategic dependency. In extreme scenarios, China could exert substantial control over parts of Europe’s critical infrastructure.
China’s use of economic dependences to pressure and punish countries that defy its policies is a source of concern with potential impact on European prosperity and security.[20] EU member states have already experienced China’s economic coercion. In the case of Lithuania, this policy affected not only the country’s direct economic links with China but, more disturbingly, saw China pressuring multinational western companies to sever links with Lithuania.[21] This risk of weaponisation of economic links and dependencies would only increase in the case of a potential conflict over Taiwan.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Calls to also categorise China as a security threat have so far primarily stemmed from its support for Russia.[22] However, even before the full-scale war in Ukraine, when EU-China ties seemed positive, covert espionage, cyber threats, FIMI, and coercion persisted, showing that the EU cannot rely on goodwill or diplomacy alone to mitigate security threats from China. China’s hybrid activities against the EU make it increasingly difficult to engage with Beijing without also considering the security risks it poses on its own.
The EU should acknowledge this reality and explicitly label China a security challenge, adding a fourth pillar to the existing three. This would not be merely a rhetorical shift but a necessary alignment of the EU’s policy with actual circumstances. It would also provide member states with a more comprehensive basis for managing relations with China across multiple dimensions.
Enhancing policy coherence: China should be viewed not merely as a country but as a systemic-level actor that must be factored in nearly every aspect of EU policymaking. Formally labelling China as a security challenge would enhance consistency across policy areas and across the EU. Although the EU implicitly recognises China’s security risk through various initiatives—often actor-agnostic in name but effectively tailored to counter Chinese influence—these measures can be reactive and piecemeal. A clearly defined “security dimension” in the EU’s China policy would help coordinate member states’ efforts and limit ad hoc responses.
Assessing risks systematically: It would also further promote the idea that member states should treat China-related security risks more broadly and comprehensively, beyond the specific areas covered by existing EU initiatives. This should enable the EU to make more informed decisions when engaging with China and be prepared for long-term trade-offs, rather than addressing threats only after they arise.
Reflecting national concerns: Several member states’ security services already list China among the primary security threats, especially given Beijing’s close alignment with Moscow. Officially recognising these concerns at the EU level would help forge consensus on China policy. It also shields member states from the ramifications of acting alone and facing potential Chinese retaliation in isolation, allowing them to rely on a unified stance when calling out Chinese activities that endanger European security.
Raising awareness among the public and stakeholders: Explicitly labelling China as a security challenge would extend awareness well beyond government institutions, helping to combat the EU-wide lack of understanding of China-related risks, a weakness continually exploited by China’s foreign interference activities. A clear designation, consistently articulated by the EU and its member states, would reinforce vigilance among local authorities, SMEs, and subnational entities that might unwittingly expose themselves to Chinese influence. This, in turn, would bolster societal resilience against Chinese hybrid threats.
Signalling to Beijing: Labelling China as a security challenge would underscore the EU’s fundamental concerns also to China. It would signal that undermining European security comes with a cost for China. While China may push back diplomatically or resort to coercive measures such as economic retaliation, these actions would only reinforce the EU’s rationale for treating China as a security challenge.
Ultimately, security risks for the EU don’t stem solely from the specific activities of Chinese actors but also from the fundamental nature of the Chinese system: the Communist Party has placed itself above the law; the state and party are intertwined by design; the party aims to control all aspects of society in the country and is ready to leverage every sector for achieving its political aims. China’s private sector is no exception.
Taking proven security risks into account should be an integral part of a clearer-eyed and multifaceted relationship with China under any conditions—one that safeguards the EU’s long-term interests. This does not imply disengaging from China but rather ensures that Europe’s engagement is grounded in a risk-aware strategy that protects the EU’s values and security. The current upheaval in transatlantic relations should not make the EU less attentive to these risks.
Endnotes
[1] European Commission, EU-China – A strategic outlook (European Commission, 2019).
[2] NATO Heads of State and Government, Washington Summit Declaration (the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. 10 July 2024) https://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm
[3] Koen Verhelst, “The never-ending job of depriving Putin of the means to kill Ukrainians,” Politico, 12 July 2024; Julia Payne, “Ukraine says China is key route for foreign tech in Russian weapons,” Reuters, 24 September 2024.
[4] President von der Leyen, “Press statement by President von der Leyen following the trilateral meeting with French President Macron and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping,” European Commission, 6 May 2024; Ken Moritsugu, “The German chancellor presses China on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” Associated Press, 16 April 2024; Sylvie Corbet, “Macron puts trade and Ukraine as top priorities as China’s Xi opens European visit in France,” Associated Press, 7 May 2024.
[5] Sauli Niinistö, Report: Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness (European Commission, 2024).
[6] “Court jails Estonian woman found guilty of spying for China,” ERR, 4 July 2022; Richard Connor, “Germany arrests 3 suspected China spies,” DW, 22 April 2024.
[7] “Sweden says China blocked prosecutors’ probe of ship linked to cut cables,” France 24, 23 December 2024.
[8] Demetri Sevastopulo, Henry Foy in Brussels, John Paul Rathbone, and Joe Leahy, “Chinese spies recruited European politician in operation to divide west,” Financial Time, 15 December 2023.
[9] Strategic Communications, “Factsheet on Countering hybrid threats,” European External Action Service, 18 March 2024; General Secretariat of the Council, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security (Council of the European Union, 21 March 2022).
[10] Säkerhetspolisen, The Swedish Security Service 2023-24 (Säkerhetspolisen, 2024).
[11] Danish Defence Intelligence Service, Intelligence Outlook 2024 (Danish Defence Intelligence Service, 2024).
[12] Veiligheid van de Staat [Belgian State Security], Intelligence Report 2024 (VSSE, 2024).
[13] Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [German domestic intelligence services ], Brief summary 2023 Report on the Protection of the Constitution (BfV, 2024).
[14] “CISA and Partners join ASD’S ACSC to Release Advisory on PRC State-Sponsored Group, APT 40,” America’s Cyber Defense Agency, 8 July 2024.
[15] Stuart Lau and Paul de Villepin, “China targeted European lawmakers with cyberattacks, Washington says,” Politico, 27 March 2024.
[16] Office of Public Affairs, “Two Chinese Hackers Associated With the Ministry of State Security Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaigns Targeting Intellectual Property and Confidential Business Information,” US Department of Justice, 20 December 2018.
[17] Strategic Communications, Task Forces and Information Analysis (STRAT.2) Data Team, 1st EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats (European External Action Service, February 2023).
[18] Marje Vlaskamp, “How a Volkskrant-reporter became the target of Chinese intimidation,” Volkskrant, 8 April 2023.
[19] Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, “The advance of Chinese technology” in International Security and Estonia (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, 2024).
[20] Niinistö, Report: Safer Together; Danish Defence Intelligence Service, Intelligence Outlook 2024.
[21] Richard Milne and Kathrin Hille, “Lithuania tests the EU’s resolve on Chinese economic coercion,” Financial Times, 13 February 2022.
[22] Natalie Sabanadze, Abigaël Vasselier, Gunnar Wiegand, China-Russia Alignment: A Threat To Europe’s Security (MERICS, 2024).
Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.