Europe Must Hold Its Line: Talking to Putin Is Not a Peace Strategy

Media reports suggest that the governments of France and Italy are considering the possibility of resuming contacts with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and are lobbying for the appointment of a special envoy. They justify this with fears that Donald Trump could strike a deal with Putin over Ukraine behind Europe’s back.

In reality, these concerns have existed for a long time, and the emergence of a European special negotiator would hardly serve as a reliable safeguard against such a scenario. Moreover, the very public debate over who might take on this role is currently doing more harm than good to both Europe and Ukraine.

Macron’s Russia Moment

Emmanuel Macron publicly raised the idea of resuming EU diplomatic contacts with the Kremlin for the first time in a long while just a month ago, in December 2025. Notably, this came immediately after the French president withdrew his support at the last moment from an initiative by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to transfer frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. This reversal stood in stark contrast to his position only two months earlier. In October, he had endorsed the idea of using the full value of Russia’s immobilised sovereign assets for Ukraine’s benefit and raised no objections to it until the December summit in Brussels. In diplomatic circles, there was even talk that Paris’s move was perceived in Berlin as a betrayal.

Macron’s statements on Europe’s strategic autonomy are far less ambitious than they may appear

As a result, the EU opted for a so-called ‘Plan B’, under which the required €90 bn for two years will be raised through borrowing. Yet this option also appears to be problematic for the Élysée Palace. An increase in debt—already high in France—provides additional ammunition for opposition parties to attack Macron’s government, whose political position has remained extremely fragile in recent years.

Paradoxically, it is precisely now that favourable conditions have emerged for deepening the EU’s strategic autonomy—an idea Macron has advocated since at least 2017. Against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its hybrid war against Europe, and Donald Trump’s radical reordering of US foreign policy priorities, a sharp increase in defence spending is no longer seen as excessive but as long overdue. The idea of creating a European army has also returned to the agenda.

In reality, Macron’s statements on Europe’s strategic autonomy are far less ambitious than they may appear. They are not about a genuine strengthening of Europe’s military power or geopolitical weight, but rather about reducing dependence on the United States and redistributing that dependence toward other ‘centres of power’, including China and Russia. Even after the start of Russia’s full-scale war, he maintained contacts with Putin longer than most European leaders—until August 2022; he urged the west not to humiliate Russia in Ukraine and sought to involve China in mediation, despite Beijing effectively playing behind-the-scenes in Moscow’s favour. Taken together, this record makes Paris one of the weaker links in Europe’s ranks and is read in the Kremlin as an invitation to bargain over European security and Ukrainian sovereignty. This is precisely why Putin immediately declared his readiness to engage in dialogue with Emmanuel Macron specifically.

Risks of Reopening Dialogue

What is notably missing from the calls to renew contacts with the Kremlin is any clear sense of purpose. It would be easier to answer the question of why such engagement is needed if Russia had ceased hostilities and Putin were genuinely prepared to negotiate. Instead, developments are moving in exactly the opposite direction. Russia continues to launch massive strikes on Ukrainian cities and systematically commits war crimes against civilians. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, while not openly opposing Macron’s initiative, recently reiterated that Putin is interested not in peace but in the further destruction of Ukraine.

There is already ample experience of negotiating with Putin, and frankly, it cannot be described as successful. Over the past year of contacts, neither Donald Trump—who promised to end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours—nor his team have extracted a single concession from the Kremlin. Moscow refuses to compromise and continues to raise the stakes. The appointment of a European special envoy would not fundamentally alter this logic.

Drawing Europe into a debate over who should represent it in negotiations with Putin is premature and harmful

Resuming contacts between Europe and the Kremlin at this stage would inevitably invite comparisons with Donald Trump’s approach and could be perceived in Kyiv as a drift away from Ukraine. By initiating dialogue with Putin, Trump made it clear that a just and durable peace in Ukraine was no longer a US priority. He also demonstrated a willingness to bargain away Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and European security in pursuit of a ‘quick deal’ and a return to business as usual with Moscow. In essence, Macron’s initiative has been presented as an alternative to achieving a just peace settlement. Its underlying message appears to be this: if the war cannot be stopped in the coming weeks, Europe should seek an arrangement with Putin on his terms.

Pressure, Not Talks

Under current conditions, drawing Europe into a debate over who should represent it in negotiations with Putin is premature and harmful. Such a discussion would itself signal European weakness and encourage Moscow’s efforts to undermine European unity. If the Kremlin wishes to speak with the EU, there is already the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the Council of the European Union, António Costa, or even the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. Undermining the EU’s institutional framework or creating parallel structures simply because the Russian dictator dislikes the current EU leadership is unacceptable.

President Macron has previously stated that France would strive to place Ukraine in a position “that allows it to negotiate peace on the best possible terms,” while Giorgia Meloni has stressed that Italy will never be a weak link in the western alliance against Russian aggression. If these commitments remain relevant for Paris and Rome, then the priority must be to further tighten sanctions against Russia and significantly increase support for Ukraine.

In this regard, both France and Italy could contribute far more than they currently do. In terms of the share of GDP allocated to supporting Ukraine, they remain among Europe’s laggards, at just 0.291% and 0.145%, respectively. It is a multiple increase in these figures—not a hasty return to negotiations with Vladimir Putin—that would strengthen Europe’s security architecture and finally open a path toward a just peace in Ukraine.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).