Estonia and the Donbas Scenario: A Misleading Analogy

After the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, speculations have periodically surfaced suggesting that Estonia could be the next target of Russian aggression.

The latest wave was sparked by the emergence of a provocative Telegram channel and amplified by alarmist media coverage. Ukrainian bloggers have even argued that Vladimir Putin might attempt to replicate a Donbas scenario in Estonia, seizing territory under false pretences.

In this narrative, events in Narva could unfold similarly to Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. In a recent Sunday interview, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also suggested that Russia’s restrictions on social media may be linked to preparations for a new mobilisation and a possible “limited offensive” against one of the Baltic states.

Parallels between Estonia and Ukraine are not particularly convincing.

However, such parallels between Estonia and Ukraine are not particularly convincing. Experts at the ICDS have already offered a comprehensive and persuasive response to the question “Is Narva Next?”, focusing on Estonia’s military and political readiness to withstand external threats. This text complements that analysis by examining the broader logic of Russia’s foreign policy.

A closer look at Russia’s actions in 2014 suggests that, before resorting to force, it seeks to achieve its objectives at the lowest possible cost by weakening the target state from within. Moscow’s strategy is not to prevail at any price, but to secure victories without becoming entangled in prolonged military campaigns and while minimising resource expenditure. In other words, Russia deploys its “little green men” only once the conditions for intervention have been thoroughly prepared.

To this end, the Kremlin typically focuses on four key areas.

1. A Resilient and Consolidated Population

On the eve of the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, Russian propaganda actively promoted narratives about “brotherly peoples,” a “shared history,” a “common cultural space,” etc. The aim was to lower public vigilance, undermine social cohesion, and reduce the willingness to resist invasion. At the time, public attitudes toward Russia in Ukraine were generally positive.

In Estonia, by contrast, there have long been far fewer illusions about Russia. Perceptions of threat from the east intensified after the 2007 Bronze Night events and the 2008 Georgia-Russia war. Moreover, surveys indicate that 70% of Estonians are now ready to take part in national defence in the event of an invasion—a notably high level of societal cohesion. It is precisely for this reason that Russian propaganda often labels Estonia and similar countries as “Russophobic.”

2. An Effective Decision-Making Process

In times of crisis, coordinated and timely action by the executive branch is critical. In 2014, the Kremlin had clearly prepared the ground by corrupting key Ukrainian officials and disrupting decision-making processes. Ukrainian military leadership later acknowledged that police and security services in several regions effectively defected, siding with Russia and its proxies.

In 2014, the Kremlin had clearly prepared the ground by corrupting key Ukrainian officials and disrupting decision-making processes.

Russian intelligence penetration appeared extensive, reaching the highest levels of government. Two defence ministers in Mykola Azarov’s government even held Russian citizenship and significantly weakened Ukraine’s defence capabilities. Many senior officials in government, the military, and law enforcement effectively acted in Russia’s interests and later fled there after the Revolution of Dignity alongside President Viktor Yanukovych, with several subsequently charged with treason.

Russia has nothing approaching this level of influence over political decision-making in Estonia. Moreover, there is broad consensus among both the Estonian political elite and the public on key strategic defence-related issues.

3. A Capable Military

On the eve of Crimea’s annexation, the Ukrainian armed forces were in a dire state. Their size had been steadily reduced: while an optimal force level was estimated at around 225 000 personnel, under Viktor Yanukovych it dropped to an unacceptable 166 000. The military was underfunded and poorly supplied, receiving only about 1% of GDP.

The poor situation in the Ukrainian army was well illustrated by the situation in March 2014, when out of 41 000 ground troops, only about 6 000 were combat-ready. According to then-Defence Minister Mykhailo Koval, the Ukrainian military was simply not operational.

In contrast, Estonia today allocates one of the highest shares of GDP to defence within NATO. Although relatively small, its armed forces are well-trained, equipped with modern weaponry, and supported by a substantial reserve. Estonia also actively incorporates innovations and closely studies Ukraine’s combat experience.

4. Strong Allies

In 2014, Ukraine was outside any collective defence framework and lacked robust security guarantees. Public opinion on NATO was divided, and under Viktor Yanukovych, the country’s movement toward Euro-Atlantic integration was effectively halted. For the Kremlin, NATO enlargement posed a major obstacle to bringing Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence by military force—hence its vehement opposition to NATO enlargement. Under sustained Russian pressure and the influence of domestic political dynamics, Kyiv’s defence and security policy remained notably inconsistent until the Revolution of Dignity, and Ukraine at times entered into highly risky strategic compromises with Moscow.

Estonia, unlike pre-2014 Ukraine, has a clear understanding of the principal external threats to its sovereignty and would not face Russian aggression alone. It is a member of NATO, the world’s most powerful defence alliance. The presence of Allied troops on its territory not only strengthens practical defence capabilities but also signals a clear commitment to collective defence under the Washington Treaty. In a crisis, Estonia would be backed first and foremost by its regional partners, for whom an assault on a neighbour would also represent a direct threat. For the same reason, Estonia would stand by its Allies if they were attacked.

A Donbas scenario is most likely when a disoriented society, a demoralised military, a compromised elite, and the absence of reliable allies converge.

In sum, a Donbas scenario is most likely when a disoriented society, a demoralised military, a compromised elite, and the absence of reliable allies converge. Together, these conditions amount to an invitation to intervene. By all four criteria, Ukraine in spring 2014 and Estonia today differ fundamentally.

This, however, does not mean that the Kremlin will scale back its subversive activities—quite the opposite. Russia will continue to wage a hybrid war against Europe. Amid shifts in US foreign policy following Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Moscow increasingly views a reduction in European support for Ukraine as its best chance to prevail. Through information provocations and other means, the Kremlin seeks to divert European attention away from Ukraine. In this context, alarmist speculations about Narva and forced analogies with a Donbas scenario are unlikely to benefit either Ukraine or the broader goal of strengthening European security.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).