The transnational repression toolkit that the Kremlin employs to target its citizens abroad is wide, and the international connections exploited are many. The latent threat of repression even while abroad means that distance is no barrier against the Kremlin. While cases of assassination remain controversial, cases of Russian transnational coercion, delegitimisation, blacklisting, coerced returns, and surveillance are routinely documented by human rights organisations and the press.
We can expect that the Kremlin will continue to pursue critics abroad, regardless of distance. Therefore, those governments offering asylum or protection to Russian activists, journalists, or CSOs must consider the following recommendations.
Transnational repression is a persistent reality.
- Raise awareness in government and among the relevant non-governmental sectors. Focus on building capacities to identify repression and on avoiding the unintentional securitisation of the targeted communities and individuals.
- Establish an official definition of transnational repression that encompasses its multifaceted nature and its threat to both the human rights of the targets and the national security of the hosting society.
Protecting vulnerable individuals upholds national security.
- Disinformation campaigns targeting vulnerable individuals affect the broader society and peddle Russian strategic narratives. A proactive stance to disinformation is necessary in general, including the protection of potential Kremlin targets.
- Several of the transnational repression tools used by the Kremlin can be used to target foreigners abroad, too. This includes surveillance tools; any vulnerabilities enabling Russia’s transnational repression must be addressed proactively.
Cooperate with the new Russian diaspora for increased resilience.
- Focus on building trust. Treat the victims of transnational repression as such and not as latent security threats. Discretion and the involvement of non-law enforcement government bodies can help.
- Engage in triangular cooperation with the relevant international organisations.
- Provide funding for the CSOs and human rights organisations that monitor transnational repression incidents.
Download and read: Distance is Not a Shield. Russia’s Transnational Repression in Wartime (PDF)