Bridging the Oceans

The architecture of western-aligned security cooperation is undergoing its most consequential stress test since the end of the Cold War. The simultaneous erosion of traditional American strategic leadership, the sharpening of authoritarian revisionism by actors like Moscow and Beijing, and the emergence of new middle-power coalitions have created both a crisis and an opportunity.

The issue is no longer if there is a strategic link between the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, but rather how to create a permanent and institutionalised linkage between them and on what terms. Such linkages have historically been viewed almost exclusively through the lens of the US and its grand strategy. This has resulted in the linkage being primarily based on American perceptions of threats and the need for American political will to make it a reality, and is therefore largely dependent on American decision-making.

Such a perspective has always been somewhat limited; however, it is now dangerous. As the US currently assesses its alliances and its levels of multilateral involvement, the capitals of European states and Canada face a clear decision: either wait for the US to again provide the necessary leadership in creating a linkage between the two regions, or step into the intersection of the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

The Strategic Convergence Is Real

Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security challenges should be treated as a single integrated strategic environment. 

First, there is the indivisible nature of the rules-based international order. When principles of this nature are breached in one region, they are observed (and challenged) in other regions. Thus, when borders are being contested through force in Europe, the residents of Taipei, Seoul, Manila, and Tokyo are watching. When the same principle is defied in the South China Sea, the citizens of Tallinn, Warsaw, and Ottawa are also taking note. There is a global audience for the threats to the rules-based international order, and hence, the responses to such threats must be global.

Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security challenges should be treated as a single integrated strategic environment.

Second, the Covid-19 pandemic has illustrated the reality of reliance on authoritarian suppliers of critical components. The disruption was exacerbated by the sudden and dramatic loss of access to rare earths, semiconductors, and other critical technologies upon which our modern economies depend. No single alliance can tackle these issues alone. Therefore, it is essential to develop transatlantic relationships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that all critical choke points are addressed. Similarly, any attempt to build resilience in the Indo-Pacific must integrate the economic and financial weight of European industry.

Third, the growing strategic partnership between Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—including weapons transfers, diplomatic protection at the United Nations, and a shared desire to undermine unity among western democracies—represents a relationship, commonly referred to as an “Axis of Convenience.” To counter this emerging threat, cooperation must occur across theatres, something individual allies cannot do on their own.

NATO’s Indo-Pacific Dimension

NATO’s involvement with its four Indo-Pacific partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand), referred to as the IP4, is arguably the most developed institutional expression of cross-theatre alignment to date. All four nations have taken part in NATO summits since 2022, contributed to the war in Ukraine, and engaged in dialogue on issues such as the Chinese military modernisation programme, technology security, and information warfare.

While collaboration is significant, there are limitations. If we are to engage in an honest appraisal, then we need to identify what NATO-IP4 engagement is and is not. It will serve as a forum for political consultations, the coordination of intelligence sharing, and practical interoperability within specific capability domains.

However, NATO-IP4 engagement cannot—nor should it—be portrayed as a formal Article 5-type mutual defence commitment in the Indo-Pacific region. The IP4 nations also have their own regional fora (QUAD, AUKUS, and bilateral US alliance structures), which can offer varying levels of political and legal arrangements. The attempt to place these under a NATO umbrella would undoubtedly cause confusion and elicit fears from regional participants who are not parties to it, as well as an adverse response from Beijing that could exceed the strategic rationale behind the arrangement.

Therefore, a more productive way to view NATO-IP4 is as a complementary architecture. This will allow European and Indo-Pacific democracies to jointly assess threats, coordinate on technology and standards, reduce duplication in capability development, and present a united political front on the norms that define the international system. Therefore, there is considerable room to improve this relationship by conducting joint exercises, deepening cyber and space cooperation, and coordinating responses to economic coercion.

However, its effectiveness relies on the European allies’ ability to bring strategic weight, rather than simply endorsing US decisions. If they utilise the NATO-IP4 framework solely to align with the US, they will add minimal independent value. If Canada and Europe bring their own perspectives, regional partnerships, and willingness to incur costs—economic or otherwise—over their relationship with China, the architecture becomes much more robust.

The China Question

The single most consequential gap in transatlantic–Indo-Pacific cooperation is the absence of a shared threat assessment regarding China. This is not primarily a problem of information—western intelligence communities exchange data, but that of political will and economic interest.

The single most consequential gap in transatlantic-Indo-Pacific cooperation is the absence of a shared threat assessment regarding China.

Within Europe, attitudes toward China range from the relatively hawkish positions of the Baltic and central European states, who have experienced its economic pressure and diplomatic coercion firsthand, to the more cautious postures of larger economies with significant trade and investment exposure. Germany’s Zeitenwende has been impressive in the Russia context; a comparable strategic reorientation on China remains incomplete. France maintains its longstanding preference for strategic autonomy that sometimes reads in Indo-Pacific capitals as strategic ambiguity.

Among the IP4, Japan and Australia have moved to sharper positions on China—driven by direct experience of economic coercion, grey-zone maritime pressure, and cyber intrusions. South Korea navigates a more complex geometry, given its interdependence with China and security exposure to North Korea.

A genuine shared threat assessment need not flatten these differences. It should acknowledge them while establishing common baselines: that China’s military modernisation, pace of nuclear expansion, and grey-zone activities represent a structural challenge to regional stability; that Beijing’s economic coercion of partners who take positions it dislikes is a tool that requires collective response frameworks; and that the fusion of civil and military technology in China’s industrial base creates dependencies in western supply chains that are strategically unacceptable.

The goal should be to develop a shared strategic framework that connects economic resilience to security objectives.

The European Union’s 2023 “de-risking” formulation was a useful step—providing political cover for reducing dependency without triggering the full rhetorical freight of “decoupling.” But de-risking without a shared underlying threat assessment may become merely a trade and industrial policy, untethered from security strategy. The goal should be to develop, through the G7, NATO-IP4, and bilateral engagement, a shared strategic framework that connects economic resilience to security objectives.

Europe and Canada Must Lead

The most significant structural shift in the current environment is America’s partial withdrawal from its role as the primary architect of transatlantic-Indo-Pacific cooperation. This is not simply the product of one administration’s preferences—it reflects deeper trends in domestic politics, resource constraints, and a genuine, not entirely unreasonable, debate about burden-sharing. European and Canadian planners would be unwise to assume any future American administration will reverse this trajectory comprehensively.

This creates a leadership vacuum that is dangerous if unfilled, but potentially generative if the right actors step forward.

The European Union has the economic weight, regulatory capacity, partnership network across the Indo-Pacific, and institutional credibility to be a genuine strategic actor in this space—not merely an adjunct to American strategy. The EU’s partnerships with Japan, South Korea, India, and the ASEAN bloc, combined with its leadership on digital regulation, green technology, and trade architecture, give it tools complementary to military-security frameworks. The challenge has been political: translating economic weight into strategic coherence and overcoming the habit of framing EU external action primarily in terms of normative promotion rather than strategic competition.

Canada’s position deserves particular attention. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent “middle powers must cooperate” agenda represents a serious and timely contribution to this debate. Canada has a unique position: a formal NATO Ally, a Five Eyes partner, a G7 economy, a Pacific nation with diaspora ties and trade relationships across the Indo-Pacific, and—given current strains in the US-Canada relationship—a country with a particular interest in demonstrating that committed multilateralism is not simply a subsidiary of American foreign policy preferences.

Canada’s credibility in the region is real but underutilised. Its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy was an important signal of intent. The follow-through—in terms of defence spending, diplomatic presence, development finance, and engagement in regional security frameworks—has not yet matched the ambition. A Canada that leads in convening middle-power coalitions, that contributes seriously to shared threat assessment, and that presents itself as a predictable, rule-bound partner in an era of great-power unpredictability would be playing to a true comparative advantage.

The Nordic-Baltic states, individually small but collectively punching above their weight in strategic clarity and credibility, have a role here. Their understanding of grey-zone warfare, resilience-based defence, and the long-term nature of authoritarian pressure gives them perspectives directly applicable to Indo-Pacific security challenges. Tallinn’s expertise in cyber defence, Helsinki’s experience in civil resilience, Stockholm’s deepening Indo-Pacific engagement—these are not peripheral contributions. They are central ones.

Modalities for Deepening Cooperation

Translating this strategic vision into operational reality requires focus on a set of specific modalities.

• Shared Threat Assessment: The EU should develop, in formal partnership with the IP4 and through the NATO-IP4 framework, a regular, structured exchange on China’s military and coercive activities that feeds into both NATO’s strategic concept cycle and the EU’s own security assessments. This need not be a single document—it should build common baselines over time.

• Technology and Supply Chain Coordination: The EU Chips Act, the AUKUS Pillar II advanced capabilities, and US-Japan-Korea technology cooperation should be connected through dedicated coordination mechanisms to avoid duplication, identify gaps, and align export controls. Canada should be formally integrated into this framework.

• Economic Coercion Response: The EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, when deployed in coordination with Indo-Pacific partners, becomes significantly more powerful. A standing mechanism—perhaps within the G7—should be established to enable rapid collective response when any partner faces Chinese economic pressure.

• Defence Industrial Cooperation: European defence industries and their Indo-Pacific counterparts have growing complementarities. Interoperability on logistics, sustainment, and specific capability domains—particularly in maritime, cyber, and space—should be an explicit agenda item in EU-IP4 and NATO-IP4 forums.

• People-to-People and Institutional Networks: Think tanks, universities, and policy communities across the transatlantic–Indo-Pacific space are already doing the intellectual work. Sustained public investment in these networks—through research partnerships, fellowship programmes, and joint policy exercises—builds the human infrastructure that formal institutions depend on.

The Opportunity in the Crisis

The partial American retreat from its traditional role as the indispensable organiser of western-aligned security cooperation is a serious challenge. It is also, paradoxically, an opportunity—for Europe, for Canada, for the middle powers of the Indo-Pacific—to build a more genuinely multilateral architecture that is resilient to the domestic political cycles.

The democratic world does not lack the resources, the relationships, or the values to sustain and deepen the transatlantic–Indo-Pacific convergence. What it has sometimes lacked is the political will to lead without waiting for permission. The moment calls for precisely that kind of leadership: clear-eyed about the China challenge, honest about differences within the coalition, and committed to the institutional work of converting shared threat perception into shared strategic action.

The Lennart Meri Conference convenes in a city that understands, better than most, what is at stake when the rules-based order frays and what it takes to defend it. That understanding is not a Baltic speciality—it should be a transatlantic and Indo-Pacific one.

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This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).