Austria’s Neutrality At 70 —Is It Still Fit for Purpose?

In 2025, Austria marked 70 years of neutrality and three decades in the European Union. With war on the EU’s doorstep and global alliances shifting, some are asking if neutrality still protects Austria in an increasingly polarised world.

After the second world war, Germany was divided and became a member of NATO (West Germany) and the Warsaw Pact (East Germany), but the Allies agreed that Austria should become a united, independent country with permanent neutrality. The State Treaty, signed on 15 May 1955, enshrined this condition and Austria’s parliament, the Nationalrat, passed the Federal Constitutional Law on Neutrality on 26 October 1955. Allied soldiers had already left the country the day before.

Austrian neutrality

Austrian neutrality requires the policy of neutrality itself to be maintained and defended, and disallows membership of military organisations and the hosting of foreign soldiers and military bases in Austria. It also entails a focus on comprehensive national defence. Martin Senn, Professor at the University of Innsbruck, describes four periods of Austria’s neutrality: a consolidation phase after the adoption of the Neutrality Act in 1955 until 1970; an expansion period until 1990 in which Austria became more involved on the international level; a period of integration after the end of the Cold War which included Austria’s accession to the EU and membership of the NATO Partnership for Peace programme; and the current period focused mostly on military neutrality.

Joining the EU

Austria’s 1995 accession to the EU was undoubtedly the biggest challenge to its neutrality. In the end, Austria concluded (along with Finland and Sweden) that membership was compatible with neutrality, but the Neutrality Act had to be amended to reconcile it with Austria’s participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This expanded Austria’s freedom to act within the EU but raised questions about the character of its neutrality.

Austria is required to support sanctions within the framework of the CSDP and has to participate in peacekeeping missions. It currently participates in 10 PESCO projects (coordinating one of them) as well as in 11 military and civilian missions within the EU, NATO or UN framework. Its largest contribution is to the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it has more than 200 soldiers. However, to protect its neutrality regarding the mutual assistance clause, Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty, which specifies the Member States’ duty to provide assistance to each other, including in armed conflicts, Austria can refer to text included at Ireland’s request stating, “this shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”. In practice, Austria may contribute as much assistance as it wants within the framework of its neutrality.

And today?

Austria’s defence spending stood at 1.3 to 1.7% of GDP until 1990, but by 2024 had decreased to just 1.0%, putting it far behind most NATO Allies (although Austria is, of course, not required to meet NATO targets). It currently plans to reach 2.0% of GDP by 2032 which will also fall far behind NATO’s hard defence spending target of 3.5% by 2035.

Austria’s new security strategy, published in autumn 2024, addresses the internal and external stability of the EU as well as the stability of the EU’s neighbourhood in the context of the new geopolitical situation. The strategy points out that even as a neutral country, Austria may send financial or humanitarian aid in case of a breach of international law or if the independence of a state is threatened. Since 2022, Austria has supported Ukraine with €822 million, mostly in humanitarian allocations. According to the strategy, Austria also intends to continue supporting EU sanctions in the future and to help ensure that they are not evaded.

However, public opinion polling in February and March 2024 found that a slight majority of Austrians (51%) believe that Austria’s neutrality is increasingly being circumvented but also that while 75% of Austrians believe their country is insufficiently protected against an armed attack, only 32% are willing to defend it. In another poll from the same year related to Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty, 90% said that EU Member States should provide military support to Austria in the case of an attack, while only 13% agree that Austria should do so in the reverse case. Meanwhile, a poll in summer 2025 found that a majority (78%) is still in favour of neutrality, while only 22% would like to see it abandoned. Joining NATO (13% in favour) seems out of the question.

What next?

Given the rather poor state of the Austrian military, an increase in defence spending to at least 2.0% of GDP is absolutely necessary to meet the goal of comprehensive national defence. In addition, an increase in defence spending is needed in order not to jeopardize Austria’s engagement in the EU (through PESCO and EU missions).

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden abandoned decades of neutrality to join NATO. But in Austria, former Chancellor Nehammer’s statement on 7 March 2022 that the political debate about Austria’s status was “over” ended any discussion before it could even start. Nonetheless, the defence spokespersons of all parliamentary parties agreed in September 2025 that there should be an “honest discussion” about the future of neutrality.

Austria needs a comprehensive debate on this question. Its geographical and geopolitical situation has shifted enormously since 1955 and 1995, including new military and hybrid threats and its own EU accession and CSDP participation. According to security expert Franz Stefan Gady, neutrality no longer guarantees Austria’s security as, in the case of a war, it could be faced with the decision to either close its borders to EU and NATO troops (which would be almost out of question) or to serve as an (air) hub for them. In addition, the legal framework of neutrality is outdated, and, over the years, Austria has tended to focus on how compatible new measures are with neutrality, rather than clarifying the nature of the policy itself. Without political underpinning, ongoing discussions on the subject in academia will merely continue to go round in circles. The agreement of the spokespersons is, at least, a first step.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).