In December 2021, Russia passed a point of no return when it publicly revealed its intention to redraw the world into geopolitical zones of influence. It lodged its claims to control almost all countries where the Soviet Union had once ruled. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine marked the beginning of Russia’s conquest to return the ‘post-Soviet republics’ to Russia’s orbit. Today, the Russian leadership is interested in ending neither the war with Ukraine nor the confrontation with the west.
Over the past three years, the political system in Russia has made a transition from authoritarianism to totalitarianism, the military-industrial complex has become one of the pillars of its economy, and the Russian state has been officially declared a “besieged fortress.” Ultimately, domestic propaganda has become all-encompassing and so intense that it has caused hysteria in Russian society, leading it to think of its own future exclusively in terms of a grand victory for the Russian state. In this context, the regime, led by the special services with Putin on top, simply cannot afford to lose — otherwise, it will face the threat of being immediately toppled by a disappointed and angry population and competing elite groups.
In the meantime, as a result of three years of full-scale war, a political nation has emerged in Ukraine, despite consisting of many ethnic groups, adhering to different religions and confessions, and living in regions with strikingly different cultural and historical experiences. These people resolutely repelled Russian aggression in the winter and spring of 2022 and have since been fighting to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their state.
An Either-Or Dichotomy?
The Constitution of Ukraine allows territorial changes only by a nationwide referendum, as President Zelensky has repeatedly stated. The fact that Ukraine today lacks the resources to liberate the territories lost to Russia does not equal recognition of their loss.
When Putin proclaimed the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts of Ukraine as subjects of the Russian Federation in 2022, he effectively set a time bomb for any future negotiators. Russia did not fully control those regions in 2022; nor does it fully control them in 2025. To follow Putin’s lead and agree to his interpretation of international law means not only to lose this war but also to lay the foundation for the next war in Europe. For Ukraine, ceding its territories is unacceptable — it would disregard the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people against Russian aggression that began in 2014.
The best security guarantee for Ukraine would have been NATO membership. But due to the unwillingness of some of the Allies to endorse it, this option has been put aside, while Ukraine has been working to arrange security guarantees that would deter Russia, chiefly in the form of a credible military force. Security guarantees should include continued support for the domestic defence industry as well as foreign military assistance and the deployment of a European contingent backed by the US to Ukraine. Its format, contributing nations, and the number of troops are already being actively discussed, although no agreement has been reached.
In addition, Ukraine should join global economic, infrastructure, and political projects. For example, the agreement on a century-long partnership between Ukraine and the United Kingdom seems promising. The document covers strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities, economic and trade cooperation, and joint efforts in maritime security. It remains to be seen whether the economic partnership with the US centred on the exploration of rare-earth minerals — and misrepresented as paying back for the military and financial assistance — will rest on mutually beneficial terms, which for Ukraine, implies security guarantees.
If the war continues, Ukraine will face an acute shortage of human resources, both on the front lines and in the economy, necessitating new waves of mobilisation, a highly sensitive subject for society. Ukraine is interested in peace negotiations to reach an agreement that promotes economic development and neighbourly relations in the region. However, concessions — a de facto capitulation to Russia — will fail to bring sustainable peace to Ukraine or Europe.
Ukraine’s people have remained united in their resistance to Russian aggression. Ukraine’s Armed Forces have adopted the most advanced foreign weapons and equipment, such as F-16s, at an astonishingly rapid pace, as well as mastered asymmetric methods of warfare. Ukraine retains a realistic opportunity to prevail on the battlefield and defeat Russia, but only if it has timely and comprehensive military support from its allies.
Do It. Do It Now.
Unless and until Russia has achieved its initial goals in Ukraine, including through the negotiation process, the war will continue. Putin is prepared to destroy Ukraine, to turn the country into a scorched earth, to make it unliveable. Even if Russia agrees to a peace settlement freezing the status quo, it will treat this ‘peace’ solely as a respite in order to better prepare for a renewed large-scale offensive. And once it is done with Ukraine, Russia will move on to other European nations.
Today, in the Russia-occupied territories of Ukraine, as well as Moldova and Georgia, there are approximately 1 million people with military training and combat experience constituting a pool for forced mobilisation. This is a fact that Europe cannot afford to ignore. Meanwhile, Russia can afford to wage more wars on the continent unless and until it is defeated in the current one. Building a welfare state should not come at the cost of funding defence and security. US President Trump’s demand to NATO member states to increase their defence budgets to 5% of GDP might be an unrealistic prospect for some, but such an approach to security is necessary to guarantee peace and prosperity on the European continent. Nations that share the border with Russia, such as Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland, have already been investing significantly more in defence, whereas other Allies in western and southern Europe are in less hurry to do so. It risks exposing Europe to further aggression as well as damaging the transatlantic relations.
Although the Kremlin may publicly signal its readiness to negotiate, it will undoubtedly continue trying to undermine the transatlantic unity and prevent the consolidation of common foreign, security, and defence policies in the EU. European leaders must not forget that Moscow’s strategic goal has been the collapse of the EU — in fact or in essence — and that of NATO so that Russia could instead shape bilateral relations with European states from a more favourable position as a dominant and coercive power.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).