Tetiana Fedosiuk
Publication Manager / Editor of Diplomaatia
April 13, 2026
Ukraine Has the Cards Now
Dr Taras Kuzio talks about the parody of the ‘peace process’, hypocrisy and double standards in the world of international relations, and fighting a future war against a dictatorship.
Putin continuously talks about the need to eliminate the “root causes” of the war. You have written a book on that very subject, Russia’s War on Ukraine: The Four Roots of Putin’s Invasion. So, in a sense, there is an agreement: for the war to end, we must resolve its root causes. How do we achieve that?
Dr Taras Kuzio: Most western policymakers don’t understand what Putin means when he talks about the root causes of the war, so the Russians get angry because this is their real problem in Ukraine. It translates very simply into the only outcome the Kremlin will accept—a Belarus 2.0 scenario, i.e., Ukraine becoming another Russian puppet state resembling Lukashenko’s Belarus. The Russians are demanding a priority status for the Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church, adoption of Russian historical myths, and no European integration. Russia will not allow Ukraine to be a country with a Ukrainian and European identity—this is what they mean by eliminating the root causes of the war. But it is not Russia’s decision to make. It’s up to Ukrainians to decide what kind of country they want.
Reconciling these two visions is an unattainable goal for any negotiations. The war cannot be stopped because there is no real peace process. The Trump team are not really approaching it in a balanced way. They’re not trying to apply pressure on both Ukraine and Russia—the pressure is only on Ukraine. This is the first reason.
It’s up to Ukrainians to decide what kind of country they want
The second reason is that the Trump negotiating team is not staffed with professional diplomats who understand this war. They neither understand why Russia is waging war against Ukraine, nor do they understand why Ukraine is defending itself. So, this peace process is not a real process. The Ukrainians and the Europeans remain involved because they do not want to irritate President Donald Trump, who can be vindictive. And the Russians are also pretending, despite having no real intention of negotiating a ceasefire and insisting on their maximum demands from the spring of 2022. So, this so-called peace process goes around in circles.
For example, Russia continuously complained—in 2014 and 2022—that Ukraine was committing a “genocide against Russian speakers.” There has never been a single bit of evidence of this: no international organisation, such as the Council of Europe, no human rights watchdog, and no opinion poll in Ukraine has ever supported this allegation. It’s simply fake news and a myth. What the Russians really mean by this, though, is that Russian should become a second state language. They have demanded this for over three decades. They achieved this in Belarus where Soviet style russification continues, and the Belarusian language is marginalised, and in occupied Ukraine where the Ukrainian language is banned. However, when Russian is elevated to the status of a second state language, as in Belarus, this does not lead to language equality but to Russian again becoming dominant, like in the Soviet Union.
Russia is also applying double standards here, because the second largest minority in the Russian Federation are Ukrainians, but there are no Ukrainian schools and no Ukrainian-language media or Ukrainian national churches. All of these are also banned in Russian-occupied Ukraine. Russia is described as lying at the centre of Eurasian civilisation where the Russian language and the Russian people are dominant. They are trying to transform the multinational Russian Federation into a Russian nation-state. Therefore, I don’t see a way forward in dealing with the so-called roots of the war, because it would basically require Ukraine to capitulate and become a Russian puppet state.
- Dr Taras Kuzio is Professor in the Department of Political Science, National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. He previously held positions at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, NATO Information and Documentation Centre (Kyiv), George Washington University, German Marshall Fund of the US, Johns Hopkins University, University of Toronto, and Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. He has published, authored, and edited 25 books, including Russia’s War on Ukraine. The Four Roots of Russia’s Invasion (Cambridge University Press, 2026); Russia and Modern Fascism. New Perspectives on the Kremlin’s War Against Ukraine (Ibidem and Columbia University Press, 2025); Crimea: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win (Jamestown Foundation, 2024); and Russian Disinformation and Western Scholarship (Ibidem and Columbia University Press, 2023).
If I were to play the devil’s advocate, I would suggest that these root causes do not apply, or only partially apply to European states beyond Ukraine. Does it play into the Kremlin’s narrative that Russia will stop the war at Ukraine’s borders, in the ‘territory for peace’ settlement?
This Russian narrative is already being parroted by western journalists, who keep asking why Ukraine will not withdraw. The Trump administration is asking the same question. Why is nobody asking that of Russia, the invading country or of both Ukraine and Russia? At the very least, let’s take a balanced approach and ask: why don’t you both withdraw? The problem with the Trump approach is that it has adopted the Kremlin narrative on this war. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff has been to Moscow seven times, but never once to Ukraine. In one interview, Witkoff could not even name the four occupied Ukrainian oblasts in question. Trump and Witkoff repeatedly say they trust what (serial liar) Putin tells them.
If President Trump is so desperate for the Nobel Peace Prize, he should apply pressure on both sides to compromise and reach a ceasefire. But Trump has a vision of the world in which the great powers have a right to do what they want, as well as a right to their own spheres of influence, while little countries, like Ukraine or Estonia, should stay silent and accept their fate. There is no respect for Ukraine amongst the Trump team. Not to mention the personal conflict between Presidents Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whom he blames for one of his impeachments during his first term.
This peace process will never conclude with any results. The Russians inherited the Soviet approach to negotiations, which implies that they will continue to put forward maximalist demands and demand that Ukraine capitulate. No opinion poll and no piece of evidence suggests Ukrainians will agree to capitulate to Russia, as this would be the end of Ukrainians as a people distinct from Russians.
What goals is the Trump administration pursuing through this so-called peace process?
Trump’s personal emissaries, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, are pursuing his personal agenda. Trump claims he has solved eight wars, which, of course, is not true. He claims he wants the big peace prize by ending the war between Ukraine and Russia. That is his only goal.
The only pressure that Russia is now facing is from the Ukrainian military
One may counterargue that Trump has been more willing to apply pressure on Russia on the energy question than the Europeans, and there may be some truth to this. For example, last year, he sanctioned India, which then ended the purchase of Russian oil. Yet the biggest buyer of Russian energy and the largest supporter of Russia’s military machine is China. Without Chinese support, Russia would be unable to wage war against Ukraine. However, there is limited pressure on China either from the Europeans or the Americans. Therefore, there is no real concrete pressure on Russia to end this war. The only pressure that Russia is now facing is from the Ukrainian military, which has been targeting the shadow fleet and oil refineries, but this is being accomplished by Ukraine—not the west.
What are the Europeans aiming to achieve when they try to obtain a seat at the negotiation table?
They’re not doing a very good job, are they? They should have been demanding a seat from the very beginning. The Trump team, like Putin, are “Brexiteers” as they both hate the European Union for similar ideological reasons—i.e., a perceived threat to national sovereignty. Vladimir Putin, in particular, only respects NATO that has hard power—but not the EU.
This is, however, a very positive development for Ukraine for two reasons. First, the Europeans are supporting Ukraine and have the same position as Ukraine in negotiations. Ukrainians are in a much better position than, for example, Palestinians in Gaza, who were betrayed by Arab countries and left to themselves. In this case, Ukraine has the backing of the EU, Norway, and the UK.
Second, a more critical, eastern European view of Russia, which used to be looked down upon by the French and Germans until five years ago, is now dominant in Brussels. The mood has changed. In Germany, Chancellor Friedrich Merz is not Angela Merkel. France has changed, too. Britain has always been anti-Russian, more like eastern Europe. Estonians know that if you agree to Russian territorial demands, then you open a Pandora’s box: today the Donbas, tomorrow Narva. There is simply no difference in negotiating position between Europeans and Ukrainians anymore.
Ukrainians can help Europeans to transition their militaries from the 20th to the 21st century
In the last two years, there has been a tremendous growth in defence cooperation between European countries and Ukraine. The original 2022 approach—i.e., only supplying military assistance—has evolved to, first, providing financial support to Ukraine so that it could build up its domestic defence sector and, second, to establishing joint military production, which greatly benefits both sides. On the one hand, it bolsters the economy, employment, and domestic production in Ukraine, with about 60% of its military equipment now produced locally. On the other hand, Ukrainians can help Europeans to transition their militaries from the 20th to the 21st century.
Many US companies, particularly from Silicon Valley, are already involved in Ukraine, which is, after all, the world’s best testing ground for military equipment. On the battlefields, Ukrainian soldiers can test several prototypes against Russian forces before the weaponry is offered to the Pentagon. Now, it is the US and Middle Eastern countries who are asking Ukraine for drones and drone interceptors—one year after Trump said Ukraine had no cards.
If we assume that Ukraine, together with its partners, manages to put enough pressure on Russia to agree to a ceasefire, how do we design that agreement to prevent Russia from falling back on the same ‘provocation’ casus belli, both in rhetoric and in terms of security guarantees?
It is a million-dollar question because nobody has the answer. The only way forward is through security guarantees and a Reassurance Force, which, of course, opens another Pandora’s box: How do we make them powerful enough to deter Russia? I’m quite sceptical that a ceasefire can be negotiated for two reasons: Ukrainians don’t trust the Russians at all, nor do they trust weak western security guarantees because of what happened in 2014 when the US and UK ignored their commitments under the Budapest Memorandum. President Zelenskyy said that if the US offers security guarantees, their provision must be ratified into law by the US Congress. Meanwhile, the US is in a political crisis as the Republicans are likely to lose the mid-term elections in November.
Then, there are many questions about the Reassurance Force. Why are we waiting until after the ceasefire has been agreed instead of deploying them now? Russia is against a Reassurance Force regardless, so what difference does it make? Russia will always claim the Reassurance Force is a target, irrespective of whether they arrive in Ukraine before or after a ceasefire. Moreover, these will never be peacekeeping or peacemaking forces used against the Russians but rather western support to Ukraine who would be stationed in western Ukraine and the capital city of Kyiv (not on the frontline).
We are potentially entering a transition period that leads to an unknown destination
In the best-case scenario, Putin’s Russia has no choice but to negotiate and compromise because the situation on the ground becomes unfavourable to him. We began to see the first signs of this in January and February. The number of monthly Russian combat casualties is now higher than monthly recruitment figures. The Russian army lost Starlink communications, which allowed Ukraine to launch a counteroffensive that has removed Russian forces from all of Dnipropetrovsk and large areas of Zaporizhzhia regions. If this continues, the Russian army will be in a very weak position, which could then impact the Russian negotiating team as well. But this is a big ‘if’ because Russia is a fascist dictatorship and Putin lives in a vacuum bubble. No one brings bad news to the dictator, so no one knows whether he really understands what is happening on the ground. Zelenskyy often visits the front lines, but Putin never does, as he is too scared.
The situation will likely continue to deteriorate for Russia on the battlefield. Yet, when Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, Putin, and the Kremlin talk about the war, they do not seem to understand it. Nor do they care about Russian casualties and assume that Russians will continue to die in huge numbers, which might not be the case sometime in the near future. We are potentially entering a transition period that leads to an unknown destination. We all hope it will be like 1917, when the Russian army disintegrated and went home. Former Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi said, in 2022, that when Russian casualties reached 150 000, it would be the end for Russia; he now admits he was wrong. Russian casualties have reached 1.3 million—which is unsustainable and cannot last forever—yet we still do not know where the tipping point will be.
One might say that the negotiations will drag on for as long as Ukraine can stay in the fight. What has allowed Ukraine to succeed so far, and what are the internal threats that may jeopardise the war efforts? Are any of those existential?
These threats are not existential because pro-Russian-ism is now dead in Ukraine. It began to die in 2014 with the marginalisation of pro-Russian forces. In 2022, 5 pro-Russian TV channels and 12 pro-Russian parties were banned. The Russian Orthodox Church, a former soft power tool for the Kremlin, is no longer influential. Both Ukraine and Russia are using the Telegram messaging app and social media to hire students or young people to commit various terrorist attacks; Russia is doing this in Europe as well. Such attacks will continue, but they are not existential to the Ukrainian state.
President Zelenskyy claims he doesn’t want young people to die in this war because they are the future of Ukraine, and many are very critical of his approach to mobilisation. However, even if Ukrainians were to fully mobilise, they could never match the enemy’s potential because Russia is three times the size of Ukrainian population. Ukraine has to fight the war relying more on technology, which is good for Ukraine’s defence sector, and good for soldiers because there are fewer casualties.
It’s always going to be difficult for western democracies, including Ukraine, to fight a war with a dictatorship which does not care about human casualties and does not play by the rules of international law. How does a democracy that cares about casualties and plays according to international law win a war against a dictatorship? First, no western democracy, including the United States, could survive 1.3 million casualties. Second, western democracies will abide by international law; for example, Ukraine cannot bomb Russian civilians. Meanwhile, Russia is ignoring international law and committing war crimes, and China would not care about international law if it went to war with Taiwan. This leads to a whole new problem area of how democracies fight future wars against dictatorships.
Ukraine is now a strategic partner, teaching them how to fight a full-scale war
An emphasis on military technology means that Ukraine has an innovative defence sector with many new domestic products and western prototypes. The Ukrainian defence sector is also very different from the Russian military industrial complex that remains Soviet with large factories controlled by the state. Ukraine’s defence sector is comprised of private companies, which encourages competition and innovation. There are 500 small drone companies. Hence why the Europeans, and now the Trump administration, are asking Ukrainians to assist them in waging 21st century warfare.
The west, particularly Europeans, have not fought a full-scale war since 1945 or the Korean War. Afghanistan and Iraq were not full-scale wars but anti-terrorist operations. After 1991, the so-called peace dividend led to most western armies being reduced; for instance, the British army today is half the size it was in 1991. It is only now that they have realised that history did not end in 1991 and thus have begun to rebuild their militaries. Meanwhile, Ukraine is now a strategic partner, teaching them how to fight a full-scale war in the 21st century.
This article was written for ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).
