Ukraine After Yermak: The End of Power Vertical Built by Zelensky’s Shadow Man?

Pushed out by the Mindich gate, potentially the biggest corruption scandal in Ukraine’s history, Andrii Yermak—Zelensky’s indispensable, all-mighty ally and one of the least trusted political figures in the country [1]—finally resigned as head of the Presidential Office in late November 2025.

Without an electoral mandate, yet in office since February 2020, Yermak effectively engineered a power vertical by staffing key offices across government and exerting informal influence over the legislative and judicial branches. What consequences might his departure have for Ukraine?

The Rise and Fall of Yermak

Andrii Yermak—a former lawyer and film producer, initially unknown to the public and even to much of Zelensky’s entourage—began his ascent to power as a peripheral adviser before becoming the chief negotiator on prisoner swaps and the Donbas conflict in summer 2019. From the outset, Yermak portrayed himself as ‘the president’s shadow,’ carefully avoiding any appearance of overt political ambitions.

Over time, he earned Zelensky’s full trust, displaying total loyalty reinforced by flattery while sidelining competitors such as his predecessor and once a lawyer to oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, Andrii Bohdan. Yermak accompanied Zelensky on nearly all foreign and domestic trips, but more importantly, he methodically expanded his influence over the president’s decision-making. Some even wondered who was truly calling the shots—Zelensky or Yermak.

In 2019, a landslide victory by Zelensky’s Servant of the People party secured an unprecedented, absolute majority, also known as “mono-majority,” in the Verkhovna Rada, upsetting the traditional balance in Ukraine’s semi-presidential system. It enabled Bankova—a colloquial name for the seat of the Presidential Office—to subordinate the parliament, thereby weakening the legislature’s oversight of the executive branch. During the full-scale war, the Rada’s dependence on the Presidential Office only deepened, and its agenda became meticulously controlled by Bankova. Bankova itself was run by Yermak.

Yermak’s resignation followed a search at his residence by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) in connection with Operation Midas. This major corruption scheme has implicated Zelensky’s close associate and co-owner of Kvartal 95 Studio, Timur Mindich, who fled to Israel, along with several high-ranking government officials.

The Buck Stopped at the President’s Office

Corruption in the energy sector has had particularly severe consequences: Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv, have suffered unprecedented electricity blackouts this winter. Investigations indicate that the organisers of the scheme demanded 10-15% kickbacks on contracts related to the procurement of materials for the protection of energy facilities. According to NABU, those involved exploited their connections in the Ministry of Energy and the state-owned nuclear energy company Energoatom to control personnel decisions, procurement processes, and financial flows. Audio recordings revealed discussions about halting construction of protective structures for transformers due to the “senseless loss of funds.”

Concerns about delays in protective measures at nuclear power plants were repeatedly raised with Energy Minister (then Justice Minister) Herman Haluschenko. In September 2024, the chairman of the board of Ukrenergo—the operator of the Ukrainian electricity transmission system—Volodymyr Kudrytskyi was dismissed, according to western board members, for politically motivated reasons, likely after criticising Halushchenko’s failure to safeguard energy infrastructure from Russian strikes. In October 2025, Kudrytskyi was arrested by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) on embezzlement charges—a move widely seen as orchestrated by the Presidential Office to make him a scapegoat for the energy crisis. In November, Zelensky publicly blamed Kudrytskyi, rather than Haluschenko, for the failure to ensure the security of the energy sector. Soon after, the Verkhovna Rada dismissed Haluschenko from his post as Justice Minister following NABU’s allegation that he was implicated in the corruption scheme at Energoatom.  

Bankova vs. Anti-corruption Bodies

In the heat of the summer, in July 2025, the Servant of the People and parts of the opposition overwhelmingly passed draft law No 12414, effectively ending the independence of anti-corruption institutions—the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and NABU—by subjugating them to the Prosecutor General. As the latter is appointed by the President with parliamentary consent, the amendments aimed at establishing the President’s de facto control over SAPO and NABU through the Prosecutor General.

Nationwide protests, combined with clear signals from the EU and G7 that undermining the reform violates EU membership conditionality and jeopardises financial assistance for Ukraine, prompted Zelensky to backtrack and restore the independence of the anti-corruption bodies.       

Meanwhile, other law enforcement agencies, including the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and SBI—whose heads are appointed by the President—were used to pressure the independent institutions. In particular, amid NABU and SAPO’s investigation of Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov—who later appeared in Mindich-gate recordings—the SBU, SBI, and Prosecutor General’s Office conducted 70 searches targeting NABU and SAPO staff, claiming to have uncovered “Russian agent networks.” Zelensky echoed the accusations, calling for cleansing anti-corruption agencies of “Russian influence.”  

The SBU arrested several NABU detectives, including the ones who were later confirmed to have been leading Operation Midas. A similar allegation of “Russian ties” was used to block the appointment of a former NABU detective and the independent selection committee’s nominee to head the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU), established in 2021 to tackle the country’s shadow economy. It was again the pressure from civil society and international partners, including the IMF, that compelled the government to proceed with the anti-corruption reform.

Not a One-off

The Presidential Office, especially through its head Andriy Yermak and his influential deputy Oleh Tatarov, used to exert undue influence over law enforcement and the judiciary for years. Tatarov, an Interior Ministry official under Viktor Yanukovych, notoriously tried to convince media and foreign diplomats that Euromaidan protesters were shooting themselves.

After a SAPO head resigned in 2020 in protest against interference by the Prosecutor General, the Presidential Office obstructed the appointment of the selection committee’s chosen candidate, Oleksandr Klymenko—who, as a NABU detective, had previously investigated Tatarov for bribery and document forgery. (The case was transferred from NABU to the SBU, which is more controllable by the Presidential Office, and closed in 2022.) Only after the European Commission explicitly tied the appointments to Ukraine’s EU accession process did Kyiv complete the process.

An End of an Era?

Yermak himself appears in NABU recordings, which suggest he used to give instructions to law enforcement agencies to target NABU and SAPO personnel. But despite mounting criticism, the president defended Yermak until the very last moment. The fact that a successor has not yet been selected underscores Yermak’s irreplaceability for Zelensky.  

His resignation could thus have immediate as well as far-reaching consequences. First, the Presidential Office’s tight control over law enforcement and judicial branches may loosen, halting politically motivated prosecutions. Notably, after Yermak’s ousting, one arrested NABU operative was released from custody.

However, Yermak’s ally Tatarov remains in office. His longstanding ties to Andriy Portnov—first deputy head of Yanukovych’s Presidential Administration—are well known. Portnov fled the country after the Euromaidan but returned after Zelensky’s victory in 2019 and restored influence over key courts, a phenomenon sometimes described as a “court mafia.” (For instance, the “coal case” against former President Petro Poroshenko was reportedly fabricated by Portnov through the SBI.) Days before his assassination in Madrid in May, Portnov reportedly met with Tatarov and the SBI director in Kyiv, though what was discussed remains unknown.

Whether the Presidential Office re-establishes manual control over law enforcement and the judiciary will ultimately depend on Zelensky’s political will.

Second, since Yermak’s departure, the concentration of power in Bankova and its informal external control of the parliament and the government appear to be weakening, while independent interactions between the two branches have intensified. During preparation of the 2026 budget, Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko—who rebelled along with the ruling party leaders against her ‘boss’ Yermak—held discussions with nearly all parliamentary factions.

Personnel decisions, previously coordinated informally by Yermak, have also shifted toward parliament. Candidates for energy and justice ministers, both vacated by the corruption scandal, will be shortlisted by the ruling party before being proposed to the government and the President. Further reshuffling may follow, affecting Yermak-aligned officials (as well as governors) suspected of corruption.  

Third, Zelensky may face a diplomatic vacuum. During wartime, Yermak led nearly all high-level engagements and maintained constant communication with western national security advisors, foreign and defence ministers, and special envoys. He could summon ambassadors to Bankova on short notice and message them on Signal at any hour. In the early months of the full-scale war, Yermak effectively sidelined the Foreign Ministry. However, his refusal to follow the advice of career diplomats and his tendency to act hastily and disregard established practice sometimes produced undesirable outcomes. Yermak coordinated international groups on Russia sanctions, western security guarantees, and Ukraine’s Peace Formula, and headed the Ukrainian delegation in negotiations with the United States.

Reforms Must Go On

Ukraine’s diplomatic challenge in November—the so-called 28-point peace plan—coincided with the corruption scandal. Russia, and potentially the US, may exploit moments when Ukraine’s domestic unity is shaken.

Since February 2022, Ukraine’s opposition and western partners have refrained from openly criticising President Zelensky to avoid feeding Russia’s anti-Ukraine propaganda or encouraging “Ukraine fatigue” among western publics. Yet, unjustified pressure on political opponents and civil society increased, culminating in the failed attempt to restrict the independence of anti-corruption institutions.

In peacetime, democratic elections would allow voters to renew ineffective governments in response to major scandals. Absent an election, Ukraine’s independent anti-corruption institutions were preserved thanks to the oversight by civil society and international partners. Turning a blind eye to high-profile corruption and abuses of power by the Presidential Office would further erode the morale of Ukrainians fighting against Russia’s full-scale war for the fourth year and undermine the allies’ trust at a critical moment. With Washington reducing support to Kyiv, Ukraine’s partners must intensify their engagement while closely monitoring governance issues within the Zelensky administration. EU institutions and G7 Ambassadors’ Ukraine Support Group should reinvigorate their efforts to help Ukraine continue reforms—particularly in the judiciary and law enforcement sectors—in close coordination with civil society.

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Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).