President Trump’s second arrival in the White House has ushered in a new era of transatlantic relations that will fundamentally reshape ties between the US and its Allies. It is appropriate to mourn the trust and confidence that have been lost in a matter of weeks. Yet, with no time to spare, devoted transatlanticists should reimagine how this relationship could better serve American and European security interests. In this endeavour, Europe’s objective should be to achieve greater strategic agency—and work with Trump’s Washington to get there.
To achieve strategic agency, European nations must do three things: step up meaningful defence spending and production; press the United States to continue leading NATO and maintain a robust military footprint in Europe; and strengthen resilience against Chinese economic and military coercion. None of this will be easy; it will require Europe to do more with less and engage a White House that has proven to be at best disinterested and at worst hostile toward Europe’s security and economic interests.
Bolstering Defence Spending and Production
There is no alternative to greater defence spending among NATO Allies. As in the first Trump administration, the President has predicated US military assistance on whether an Ally meets NATO’s spending target of 2% GDP on defence. Building on this warning, President Trump has since called for every Ally to spend at least 5% of GDP on defence. Calls for increased Allied spending are not unique to the Trump administration (every President since Eisenhower has pushed Europeans to do so), and NATO Secretary General Rutte has also insisted on bigger budgets to effectively resource the Alliance’s defence plans and meet the threats posed by Russia. But what used to be a benchmark has quickly become a demand.
Allies are already stepping up. The EU Commission has provided member states with more flexibility to spend on defence, potentially unlocking €650 billion over four years if defence spending rises by 1.5% of GDP on average. Recent announcements from Germany, the UK, Estonia, Poland, Spain, and others are promising signs that a fundamental shift is underway in Europe. But this is only the first step. European politicians must consistently and persuasively communicate to their publics why greater defence spending may come at the expense of domestic and social priorities. European capitals must also ramp up industrial production in ways that do not increase fragmentation or prioritise national industries at the expense of NATO standards and interoperability.
Even as Europe boosts its own defences, member states must continue to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. British and French-led efforts to develop a post-ceasefire European reassurance force in Ukraine cannot lose momentum, not least because only a robust and credible military presence will be taken seriously by the Trump administration. The UK and Germany’s decision to take over leadership of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group is also a valiant effort to maintain a coalition of over 50 nations to coordinate military assistance for Ukraine. As the administration indicates it may walk away from ceasefire negotiations with Russia and Ukraine, European nations must show Ukraine (and Putin) that they stand with Kyiv even after the fighting ends—to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty and Europe’s future security.
Keeping America in NATO and in Europe
Keeping America in NATO has never been more important. Russia has proven willing and able to invade its neighbours and will likely rapidly reconstitute its military after the hot phase of its war in Ukraine ends. On a positive note, President Trump, Secretary of Defense Hegseth and Secretary of State Rubio have all publicly reaffirmed the US commitment to NATO and to the Alliance’s Article 5 collective defence guarantee.
But the administration is also giving every indication that it will reduce America’s military footprint in Europe and has even floated the idea of relinquishing NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) position. Reporting on the Department of Defense’s Interim National Defence Strategic Guidance notes that the Pentagon will prioritise China and homeland defence, emphasising border security and American interests in the western hemisphere at the expense of its European posture. As DoD’s global posture review gets underway, officials will likely draw down American capabilities and troops in Europe and look to shift more of the security burden to Europeans.
Throughout the pending US posture review, Allies must look for creative ways to buy time on America’s eventual drawdown in Europe. The United States currently maintains around 85 000 troops in Europe, having surged approximately 20 000 troops following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Over the course of the war, the total number of US troops has ranged from 75 000-105 000, depending on planned exercises and regular rotations.
While some reduction of US capabilities and troops could be managed, Europe has significant capability gaps and relies heavily on the United States for air defence, long-range strike, strategic airlift, battlefield command and control, and satellite-enabled intelligence and communications. Europe could close some of these gaps—namely, long-range strike and battlefield command and control—within five years, but other capabilities will take more time.
Allies should, therefore, work with counterparts across the US interagency to outline the capability gaps Europeans could fill in the near term, while proposing a longer timeline for withdrawing others that European Allies cannot ramp up as quickly. Host nations of US troops across Europe—from Poland to Italy—should also consistently message the administration and members of Congress on how US presence in their countries (that they help to fund) is supporting US readiness and global force projection.
The worst-case scenario would be an abrupt announcement of massive troop and capability reductions, followed by a hasty withdrawal that leaves Europeans underprepared and vulnerable to future Russian aggression. This outcome would also be detrimental to US interests. As America’s largest trading partner and source of foreign direct investment, Europe contributes significantly to American economic prosperity. The administration would be wise not to take European security or stability for granted.
De-risking from China
While the US administration’s foreign policy goals are not fully formed, it is likely that challenges from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific will animate US force posture decisions in Europe. So too should China factor into Europe’s thinking on how it wants to reshape the transatlantic relationship. Ensuring strategic agency will require Europe to avoid creating new dependencies on Beijing and, on certain issues, pursue a coordinated approach with Washington.
Two such issues include securing supply chains and safeguarding advanced technologies. This is a lesson the Trump administration should take from its predecessor. When the Biden administration moved to regulate US exports of advanced AI and semiconductor technology to China, it was clear that the medium- to long-term strategy would backfire if other chip-producing countries did not follow suit. That is why administration officials worked to secure collaboration with Japan and the Netherlands (major semiconductor producers) to join in the export controls. The agreement not only served as a diplomatic victory but also made the restrictions on China’s access to this technology even more effective.
If the Trump administration does form a more comprehensive security strategy toward the PRC, European counterparts should be ready to discuss concrete ways in which the US and Europe can jointly work to secure advanced technologies and supply chains. The European Union and member states have made important progress in recent years in strengthening economic and security resilience against PRC influence. These trends must continue, and in doing so, Europe will likely find a willing partner in Washington.
For the US, China experts rightly point out that Washington should look to build shared tariffs and regulations against the PRC’s unfair trade practices, construct joint approaches to industrial policy, investment rules, export controls and research protections, and deepen coordination and provision of advanced US military technologies to Allies. Developing a shared approach to counter China’s influence and technological advance has long been in America and Europe’s shared interest; both sides of the Atlantic should ensure that political differences do not get in the way of this broader alignment.
Looking Ahead
Today’s deep transatlantic rift does not leave much reason for optimism. But if Europe is to enhance its own strategic agency within the transatlantic relationship, European Allies should pursue a series of policies aimed at boosting their own defences, engaging the Trump administration to keep the US in NATO and in Europe, and deepening transatlantic cooperation on China policy. An approach aimed at strategic autonomy or holistically separating from Washington while embracing warmer ties with Beijing would only weaken Europe and everything the United States and Europe have worked to build in recent decades. Now is the time for Europe to lean in and lead the way.
This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).