The Numbers Game: The French Government, Its Fall, and Its Fallout

Let us start with a recap of the last couple of years in French domestic politics to understand where we stand today. Schematically since 2022, France has had a less stable domestic political scene than during President Emmanuel Macron’s first term (2017-22). Indeed, Renaissance (RE), the presidential party, failed to win an absolute majority in the June 2022 parliamentary elections and ended up with merely a relative majority instead. The dissolution of the parliament — decided by the president of the Republic on the evening of the European election results on 9 June 2024 — put an end to this relative majority and led to further fragmentation of the National Assembly.

When Two plus One does not Equal Three

Today, the Parliament is divided into three blocs equal in size and importance: the alliance of left-wing parties, the centre-right group, and the far-right. If the three blocs do not work together, two can block one. This is what happened on 4 December. Prime Minister Barnier’s government — appointed on 5 September 2024 and composed of members of the centre-right bloc — was toppled by a vote of no-confidence passed by MPs from the left-wing bloc and those from the far-right. It followed the discussions on the 2025 budget which the government had the power to pass without the parliament’s approval by using Article 49-3 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.

Pending the appointment of a new government by the President of the Republic, PM Barnier’s cabinet is now a ‘caretaker’ responsible for dealing with current affairs. In principle, the PM cannot take political measures unless they are of an urgent nature. It is important to mention that the Constitution and the associated laws concerning finances stipulate that until a new budget has been adopted, there is a possibility to enforce a special law so that the prior budget remains valid and applicable. There will be no US-style ‘shutdown’, where government activities come to a halt. The French president reiterated this in his statement on 5 December.

Up, Up, Up

The situation is neither optimal nor catastrophic. While the non-adoption of a 2025 Finance Bill will have some negative consequences for the defence apparatus, these are not radically damaging. Nor do they call into question the French deployments abroad, including those carried out within the framework of NATO on the Eastern Flank.

Defence spending is the second largest expenditure item for the French government after, surprisingly enough, education. In fact, of all expenditures, defence funding was set to see the biggest increase in 2025 had the budget been passed. As a reminder, the total budget for the Ministry of the Armed Forces was €49.1 billion (excluding pensions) in 2024, representing 2,06 % of GDP. This year, France, like 23 other Alliance members, will be above NATO’s 2% guideline. By comparison, Germany and the UK are at 2.12% and 2.33%, respectively, while Italy is at 1.49%.

Through two multi-annual Military Planning Acts (Loi de Programmation Militaire, LPM) since 2017, France has made a substantial effort to ensure the long-term credibility of its nuclear deterrence, modernise its defence apparatus, and increase its capabilities in a deteriorating geopolitical context, particularly as a result of the war in Ukraine. The funding earmarked in the 2019-25 LPM was €295 billion — i.e., a 23% increase compared to the 2014-18 period. The 2024-30 LPM provides designated €413 billion for the Armed Forces, bringing the annual budget to €68 billion — meaning an average increase of €3 billion per year.

What is (and is not) at Stake

It is this €3,3 billion increase for 2025 that has been called into question by the fall of the government and the failure to pass next year’s budget. The consequences will be felt mainly by the defence industry, affecting orders for new equipment such as the new-generation aircraft carrier and potentially causing delays in arms deliveries to Ukraine. Indeed, delays in the orders for new equipment are having a direct impact on the cessions of in-service equipment to Ukraine since the new has to be received in order to deliver the old. For example, it is necessary to have the Jaguar armoured reconnaissance and combat vehicles available to the French Armed Forces before the AMX-10 RC armoured fighting vehicles can be handed over to Ukraine.

However, French operations and missions abroad should not be affected. This is the case for activities on the Eastern flank, including the presence of troops in Estonia (as part of the Forward Land Forces Battlegroup, FLF BG) and in Romania (as the leading framework nation of the FLF BG Romania), as well as the deployment of Rafale in Lithuania (as part of enhanced Air Policing, eAP) or, more broadly, as part of the enhanced Vigilant Activities (eVA), meaning participation in air defence exercises and missions.

Time is Money

So, the changes in the French government may not have come at the best time. The political scene in Europe remains complicated: the widespread rise of populists and the far right in the last European and national elections and the break-up of the government coalition in Germany. Donald Trump’s second accession to the White House in January 2025 will likely further divide Europeans on many issues, starting with the resolution of the war in Ukraine.

The foreseeable future looks bleak since implications mainly run counter to the French Armed Forces’ swift transformation effort, but they are not dramatic. This effort will only be delayed, as the LPM provides a framework for the increase in funding until 2030, and there is, in any case, a cross-party consensus on defence spending. Furthermore, France will remain strongly committed to the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) posture in 2025.

What could be worrying is a possible delay in arms deliveries to Ukraine at a time when France’s political will to support the country is a priority on its agenda. The meeting organised by President Emmanuel Macron between his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky and US President-elect Donald Trump in Paris during the ceremony to re-open the Notre Dame Cathedral on 7 December is a good example of this commitment. France should also use the interest on Russian frozen assets to finance Ukraine’s acquisitions — in principle, up to €300 million worth of equipment for the first tranche.