, October 28, 2024

The More Chaos, the Better: Russia’s Gamble in the US Presidential Election

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Republican presidential nominee, former President Donald Trump, takes the stage at the campaign rally at Madison Square Garden on October 27, 2024 in New York City.
Republican presidential nominee, former President Donald Trump, takes the stage at the campaign rally at Madison Square Garden on October 27, 2024 in New York City.

Whom does the Kremlin expect to see in the White House? And what does it expect from them?

Beyond the phenomenal consolidation of Ukrainian society and the bravery of Ukrainian soldiers, one of the key elements of Ukraine’s ability to resist the Russian full-scale invasion has been the support from its partners within the US-led Ramstein group. After the failure of its blitzkrieg and the transition of the war into a phase of attrition, Moscow has been persistently seeking to weaken these pillars of Ukraine’s resilience, particularly international support. To this end, the Russian government has employed a wide array of tools—from nuclear blackmail rhetoric to acts of sabotage on the territory of EU countries.

All of this, in the Kremlin’s design, is meant to aggravate domestic economic problems and societal divisions in major western countries, which, in turn, increases the chances of isolationist-leaning populists coming to power. That is, those ones who would eventually turn away their countries from Kyiv and strike a bargain with Vladimir Putin at the expense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this context, the Kremlin’s hopes are currently tied to the return of Donald Trump to the White House.

The Promise of Donald Trump

From the very start of the 2024 election campaign, Trump spoke about the need to get along with leaders of nuclear powers and the possibility that Ukraine might have to give up some of its territories for peace. Whether such an agreement would be fair or lasting, and what its long-term consequences for the west might be, didn’t seem to concern Trump. In the Kremlin’s view, he is a dealer unconstrained by moral or ideological principles, more concerned with short-term advantages than strategic gains—the perfect candidate for a “pragmatic dialogue” with Moscow.

Thus, it’s no surprise that throughout the US presidential race, the sympathies of Russia’s political establishment were fully on Trump’s side. They were very encouraged by public opinion polls, which throughout the first half of the year consistently showed a significant lead for the Republican candidate. Moscow’s confidence in a favourable outcome was also based on the belief that Trump had fully taken control of the Republican Party and that the Senate opposition had been significantly weakened. Trump appeared to be the clear favourite, who—barring any unexpected events—would easily defeat the “increasingly unconvincing” Joe Biden. Against this backdrop, Putin’s remark that Joe Biden would be a preferable US president for Russia was pure deception. Knowing the deeply negative public opinion of him in America, the Russian dictator likely made this statement to play ball with Biden’s opponent.

As the election campaign developed, Donald Trump increasingly signalled his determination to quickly implement his plan to end the Russia-Ukraine war. After a meeting with him in March 2024, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that Trump planned to stop the war by refusing to give a penny to Ukraine. In Russia, it was believed that, while Trump was prone to grandstanding and épatage, his position on Ukraine was consistent, and that he would certainly reduce, if not cut off, support for Kyiv.

As the elections approached, the conviction in the Kremlin grew that power in the US was about to change. This assurance strengthened even more after Biden failed in the first round of televised debates. The assassination attempt on Trump that followed in mid-July convinced the Kremlin beyond doubt that the “barely functioning” US president would not stay in office. Both Russian decision-makers and their advisors unanimously declared that Donald Trump, now seen by many Americans as almost a martyr in his battle against the “deep state,” was already the victor, and nothing could stop his sweeping triumph.

After Biden dropped out of the race, Moscow was practically ready to pop the champagne. Many Russian politicians believed that anyone replacing Biden would inevitably lose and that the Democrats’ best-case scenario was simply to avoid a catastrophic defeat. Anticipating this, many began speculating on what US foreign policy would look like under the “postmodern president.” In the meantime, Kamala Harris, who replaced Biden, was regarded as “a pig in a poke,” and Kremlin-linked experts largely ignored her in their analyses. Her rise in popularity in the polls during August and September did little to change the Kremlin’s calculations.

Expectation or reality?

With Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office, Russia expects the following changes. First, a sharp reduction, if not cessation, of US financial aid and arms supplies to Ukraine. This would essentially disarm the Ukrainian army and severely undermine its morale. Second, a worsening of relations between Washington and its NATO Allies in Europe, as Trump would again, in his usual insolent style, raise the issue of redistributing the burden of security expenses among member countries. The Kremlin harbours no illusions about NATO disappearing, but they firmly believe that any unity can be undermined by exacerbating internal conflicts and divisions. They see Trump as the battering ram capable of inflicting serious damage to the cohesion of the Alliance. Third, Moscow expects that Trump’s unpredictability will manifest not only in the American foreign but also in domestic politics. They anticipate that his sharp statements after the election—regardless of who ultimately wins—could easily lead to a prolonged internal civil conflict.

All three of these scenarios stem from one overarching goal pursued by Russia: to divert the west’s attention from Ukraine, so that Moscow could eventually stay one-on-one with Ukraine to completely destroy it. And a Trump victory would undoubtedly bring Russia closer to this goal. If Americans elect Kamala Harris as their president, it will hardly alter the Kremlin’s strategic intentions; however, it will leave a good chance that the US will finally find a way to shed its reflexive fear of victory over Russia and shift from a reactive to a more proactive approach in providing military aid to Ukraine.

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