Ahead of the State Duma Elections: The Results Will Be Decided in the Kremlin

In 2026, the effects of the war against Ukraine have reached most Russians for the first time.

Those have taken various forms: fuel shortages caused by Ukrainian drone strikes, which have cost the Russian state budget dearly; damage from Ukrainian drone strikes to warehouses operated by Wildberries, a company dubbed Russia’s Amazon, where goods worth hundreds of millions of dollars have been destroyed; and rumours of an imminent mobilisation, despite repeated denials by the authorities. At the same time, the country’s economic difficulties are deepening. They have already lowered Russians’ living standards and, in a recent shift, unemployment has begun to rise, replacing the labour shortage that previously characterised the economy.

Against this backdrop, Russia will have its annual so-called single voting day on 18–20 September, when elections at various municipal and regional levels are held across the country. This year, the three-day voting period will also include elections to the State Duma — for the first time since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022.

Back to the Future

What initially promised to be a dull and uneventful election has been enlivened somewhat by growing social tensions and the Kremlin’s management of the electoral process. At least as far as the State Duma is concerned, however, this will make little difference. The new Duma will remain compliant and consist solely of parties that have publicly pledged, to varying degrees, their loyalty to Vladimir Putin and his political course. The official election results are essentially communicative messages from the ruling regime, directed at both Russian citizens and the wider world. In this respect, the Kremlin is hardly unique: this is a common feature of authoritarian regimes.

What still distinguishes present-day Russia from Stalin’s Soviet Union is the absence of mass repression.

Indeed, it is difficult to call this process an election at all, since everything — from who is allowed to run to the final count — is under the Kremlin’s strict control. Before February 2022, a few remnants of civil liberties survived in Russia, although elections were already stage-managed by the Kremlin. In the years since, the country has moved at an accelerating pace towards conditions last seen during the Soviet era. Moreover, today’s Russia increasingly resembles not the late Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev but the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin. What still distinguishes present-day Russia from Stalin’s Soviet Union is the absence of mass repression.

Much has been written in both the international and Russian-language media about electoral fraud. Adjusting the results at the margins is one thing, but manipulating them on a large scale without making the fraud conspicuous is considerably more difficult. To make this easier for the presidential administration, which oversees elections, voting has been spread over three days rather than a single election day since the 2021 State Duma election. This makes election monitoring considerably more labour-intensive and gives the authorities more room to conceal manipulation.

In addition to the result itself, turnout is also important. From the Kremlin’s perspective, it should not be significantly lower than at the previous election, when it stood at 51.72%, and should ideally exceed 50%. The actual turnout in 2021 is very difficult to estimate. The official figure this time will likewise depend on what figure the Kremlin chooses to report. Vladimir Putin’s overriding concern is to ensure that the regime appears legitimate, at least on the surface. The final numbers for both turnout and party support will therefore be set at whatever levels the Kremlin considers best suited to achieving that objective.

Vladimir Putin’s overriding concern is to ensure that the regime appears legitimate, at least on the surface.

The Central Election Commission initially allowed 11 parties to stand in the election, including all the Kremlin-loyal parties already represented in the parliament: United Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), the Communist Party (CPRF), A Just Russia, and New People. Somewhat surprisingly, Yabloko was also initially allowed to stand, and was even given No 2 on the ballot. Within a couple of weeks, however, it became clear that the Kremlin had made a serious mistake, and on 10 August, the Supreme Court removed the party from the ballot. Yabloko appealed the decision, but, as expected, the appeal was dismissed. After that exclusion, the central question is whether United Russia will retain its constitutional majority in the new State Duma.

United Russia

In July, leaked reports suggested that the presidential administration had initially planned for United Russia to receive 55% of the vote, but had since reportedly lowered the target to 45% to avoid too stark a discrepancy with the actual mood in Russian society. A cautious estimate would put United Russia’s real support at no more than 35%, while some even place it below 30%. As recently as late June, media were speculating that United Russia would retain its constitutional majority. Since half of the 450 seats in the State Duma are allocated through party lists and the other half as individual mandates, the Kremlin’s reported decision to lower the target share of the vote does not automatically abandon the goal of a constitutional majority, as the necessary additional seats can be secured through individual mandates.

The central question is whether United Russia will retain its constitutional majority in the new State Duma.

Even if United Russia fails to do so, that outcome would not, in itself, be disastrous for Putin or his government. The Kremlin-controlled electoral process ensures that only manageable representatives of the so-called systemic opposition enter the State Duma, and their ‘yes’ votes are not difficult to secure.

Given the broader political and economic outlook, the Kremlin is likely to prefer a strong result for United Russia so as not to appear weakened — something Putin has feared above all else throughout his years in power. Such a result would also allow the regime to demonstrate to both the Russian public and the wider world that its chosen course is correct and unwavering. This interpretation is borne out by Putin’s speech at the United Russia party congress. On 22 August, he argued, among other things, that the State Duma election would demonstrate the determination of millions of Russians to safeguard Russia’s sovereignty and security. Putin went on to claim that the whole of Russian society supports the war against Ukraine and stressed the need to unite in pursuit of victory.

Yabloko

With social discontent on the rise, 57% of respondents described the situation in Russia as ‘tense’ and 13% as ‘critical’ or ‘potentially explosive’. A Levada Center opinion poll found that 62% favour opening peace talks with Ukraine. Hence, allowing Yabloko to stand in the election was a risky decision from the outset — so much for Putin’s claim that the whole of Russian society supports the war against Ukraine. Yabloko would have been the only party on the ballot to position itself as anti-war and even dare to campaign against the climate of fear. All the alternative candidates currently represented in the State Duma, by contrast, have endorsed Putin and the war against Ukraine. Against this backdrop, media reports that Yabloko grew its support to 9.3% within a couple of weeks seem entirely plausible. There is reason to believe that this was far from the limit and that its popularity would have continued to grow.

The Kremlin could not, of course, allow a party whose positions clearly diverged from Putin’s official course to enter parliament. An even more immediate danger — and one that suggests the Kremlin had not fully thought the decision through — was that openly expressing anti-war views would once again have become legal in Russia for the duration of the election campaign.

Yabloko is one of Russia’s oldest active parties, alongside the CPRF and LDPR, and has existed for 33 years. Over that period, it has damaged its reputation among liberal voters, leaving it with little more than a small core electorate that has aged with the party. Unexpectedly for the Kremlin, however, this has changed. The party rapidly began gaining popularity among young people with very little campaigning. Yabloko’s opposition to the war and the climate of fear it created in society were enough for young people from the middle and upper-middle classes to start promoting Yabloko on on social media.

The Undertide

Yabloko’s appeal likely extended beyond the younger generations directly threatened by the prospect of another mobilisation and unwilling to fight for Putin’s obsessions.

This case has highlighted a trend that has become visible in 2026. Whenever even a moderately well-known figure voices any criticism of current conditions or the Putin regime itself, it attracts enormous attention, suggesting considerable latent demand for a political alternative. It is difficult to assess what proportion of society would like to see the regime replaced, but the deadlock over the war in Ukraine and the resulting deterioration in living standards can only reinforce that sentiment.

The Kremlin created controversy in what would otherwise have been an extremely dull election.

It can, of course, be argued that Yabloko is primarily popular among liberal young people in the major cities and lacks comparable support across Russia, so its rise in popularity should not be overstated. There is undoubtedly some truth to this. At the same time, Russian history shows that at moments of profound political change, struggles for power have invariably been decided in the country’s major cities, sometimes directly on the streets, which only increases the potential threat Yabloko poses to the regime. Given the growing control exercised over society by the security authorities, including the FSB, whether anyone would dare to challenge the Putin regime in the near future is a separate matter. And the answer is probably ‘no’.

However, authoritarian regimes often collapse unexpectedly, and their downfall can begin with an individual or organisation whose initial ambitions are relatively modest and do not extend to overthrowing the government.

Yabloko’s exclusion is unlikely to significantly affect other parties contesting the election, but it will reduce turnout, particularly among young and urban voters.

It is also worth stressing that removing Yabloko as a party from the ballot does not automatically prevent individual candidates associated with the party from running. Under the law, courts must remove these candidates individually. Russian authorities may do this as well, although some may still be allowed to campaign. More importantly, by first allowing Yabloko to stand and then excluding it, the Kremlin created controversy in what would otherwise have been an extremely dull election and made the choice between ending the war and continuing it indefinitely a central issue. Removing Yabloko cannot make it disappear.

Yabloko’s exclusion is unlikely to significantly affect other parties contesting the election, but it will reduce turnout, particularly among young and urban voters.

The Bigger Problem

More broadly, the election will not, of course, alter the overall trajectory of Russian domestic politics, as the state propaganda narratives increasingly diverge from reality. Although the Kremlin will probably produce the election results it wants, this will not resolve growing domestic political tensions as the consequences of the war become increasingly tangible.

In the longer term, these tensions pose a bigger problem for Putin’s regime, while the Russian authorities clearly have no quick way to ease them. On the one hand, the regime does not want to end the war without an outcome it can present as a success at home and abroad. On the other hand, Russia lacks the capabilities either to achieve the desired level of success or to shield regions far from the front from the effects of the war. The domestic consequences of the war have therefore become increasingly difficult for the Kremlin to manage. A new wave of mobilisation would be unpopular with most of the population and therefore represents a risky option for the Kremlin. Moreover, there is no guarantee that this would enable Russia to escape the military and political deadlock looming ever more clearly. These considerations may nevertheless fail to prevent another wave of mobilisation if Putin sees no alternative. In any eventuality, a new mobilisation would significantly raise the stakes for the Kremlin, above all domestically but also internationally.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).